Hollman v. County of Suffolk
| Decision Date | 15 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-CV-3589 (JFB) (ARL),06-CV-3589 (JFB) (ARL) |
| Parties | Mary HOLLMAN, Individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of SAMUEL A. COX, and the Estate of SAMUEL A. COX, on behalf of decedent JOHN COX, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF Suffolk, Suffolk County Police Department, Suffolk Homicide Commander Det. Lieutenant Jack FITZPATRICK, in his individual and official capacity, POLICE Officers "John DOE" 1 through 10, whose names are known by the Defendants but as of yet are not known by Plaintiffs, OFFICE OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY MEDICAL EXAMINER, Charles WETLI, M.D., Medical Examiner, in his individual and official capacity, JAMES C. WILSON, M.D., Deputy Medical Examiner, in his individual and official capacity, BROOKHAVEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, SOUTH COUNTRY Ambulance, EMT L. Smith, in his individual and official Capacity, EMT D. TOTONG, in his individual and official capacity, EMT S. Al QADRI, in his individual and official capacity, and AMBULANCE DRIVER M. SNEED, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
June 15, 2011
Plaintiff Mary Hollman (hereinafter, "plaintiff") brought the instant action on behalf of decedent John Cox (hereinafter, "Cox" or "decedent") regarding the incidents surrounding Cox's death on April 22, 2005. Plaintiff seeks damages against a number of defendants, including the County of Suffolk, certain Suffolk County Police Officers, the Office of the Suffolk County Medical Examiner and several of its employees, Brookhaven Hospital Memorial Medical Center, and South Country Ambulance and certain emergency medical technicians ("EMTs") who are members of the South Country Ambulance company,under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, and various New York state law causes of action, including negligence and wrongful death. Defendants South Country Ambulance, EMTs Smith, Totong, Al Qadri and Ambulance Driver Sneed (collectively, "Ambulance Defendants") now move for summary judgment on all claims, pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in its entirety, and the Ambulance Defendants are terminated from the above-captioned case.1
The facts described below are taken from the parties' depositions, affidavits, and exhibits, and the parties' respective Rule 56.1 statement of facts ("Defs.' 56.1" and "Pl.'s 56.1"). Unless otherwise noted, the facts are undisputed. Upon consideration of the motions for summary judgment, the Court shall construe the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. See Capobianco v. New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2001).
On April 22, 2005, Cox, a thirty-nine year old African American male, was visiting his girlfriend at a residence in Bellport, New York. (Am. Comp. ¶ 43; Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 1.) At some point prior to 8 p.m., individuals present at the residence called the Suffolk County Police Department, requesting assistance because Cox was agitated. (Am. Compl. ¶ 44; Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 2; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) The police arrived at the residence around 8:00 p.m., and arrested Cox. (Am. Compl. ¶ 45; Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 3.)
The parties dispute the extent to which Cox struggled with the police officers when they attempted to arrest him. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the officers ordered the other residents outside the house, closed the blinds, and assaulted Cox. (Am. Compl. 47-48.) Specifically, plaintiff claims that the officers stomped on Cox's head and body, kicked him in the groin, and shocked him with a Taser gun multiple times, which caused third-degree burns. (Am. Compl. 49-50.)
Sergeant Kevin Lixfield of the Suffolk County Policy Department was the senior officer at the scene during the incident and made a radio call for an ambulance.2 (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 5-6.) The Ambulance Defendants arrived on the scene at approximately 8:27 p.m. (Pl.'s Counter-Statement of Material Facts In Dispute (hereinafter, "Pl.'s Counter 56.1") ¶ 42.) Sergeant Lixfield was standing outside the residence when the Ambulance Defendants arrived, and reported to EMT Smith that Cox was an emotionally disturbed¶person, and violent.3 (Pl.'s Counter 56.1 ¶ 43.) EMT Smith entered the bedroom of the residence, where he witnessed four to five police officers restraining Cox on the bed, while placing him in handcuffs. (Pl.'s Counter 56.1 46-47.) While EMT Smith was in the residence, he did not witness Cox striking the police officers, but did observe the officers using a Taser on Cox. (Id. ¶¶ 50, 76, 148, 16061.) Upon request, EMTs Smith and Totong brought a stretcher to the main area of the house, and the police placed Cox face down on the stretcher, with his hands and legs cuffed. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49, 51.) EMTs Smith and Totong applied straps to secure Cox to the stretcher. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 61.) During the time that the EMTs were in the residence, EMT Smith prepared a rebreather mask to supply oxygen to Cox, but the officers ordered him not to apply the mask. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 60.)
EMTs Smith and Totong assisted the police in carrying Cox, on the stretcher, to the ambulance. (Id. ¶ 61.) Cox was positioned incorrectly in the ambulance, face down on the stretcher, with his head facing the rear doors of the ambulance. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 62.) EMT Smith advised the police officers at the scene that Cox should be repositioned so that he was face up, with his head at other end of the stretcher, but he was rebuffed by the police officers, who reported that repositioning Cox would be unsafe. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 63.)
Cox remained in police custody during the ambulance ride to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical Center. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 10; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 10.) Smith and Totong rode in the back of the ambulance with three police officers who were restraining Cox. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 12.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that one police officer was sitting on Cox's lower back, another was sitting on his legs, and another was restraining his neck by applying pressure on the back of his neck for the entire journey to the hospital. (Pl.'s Counter 56.1 ¶ 20.) During the ambulance ride, the police officers directed Smith to not provide Cox with medical treatment. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 11, 14; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 11, 14.) Smith attempted to apply the rebreather mask a second time, but was again ordered not to by the police officers, because they advised him that Cox was still combative. (Pl.'s Counter 56.1 ¶ 64; Pl.'s Ex. G at 93.)
The ambulance arrived at the hospital at approximately 8:42 p.m. (Id. ¶ 67.) After Cox was removed from the ambulance, he was no longer combative. (Id. ¶ 72.) Cox was brought into the trauma room at the hospital, but the police would not allow a registered nurse to transfer Cox to a hospital stretcher without hospital restraints because they claimed Cox to be combative. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 146.) While the hospital staff retrieved restraints, Smith observed that Cox was not moving or speaking, and that the police officer was still holding the back of Cox's neck. (Id. ¶ 71.) After the hospital staff returned with restraints, Cox was uncuffed, turned over, and it was discovered that he was in cardiac arrest. (Id. ¶ 73.) The EMTs were then instructed to leave the room. (Id. ¶ 73.) At approximately 8:50 p.m., Cox had no recordable blood pressure, no pulse and a respiratory rate of zero. (Id. ¶ 74.) Cox was officially pronounced dead at 9:37 p.m. (Id. ¶ 97.)
EMT Smith did not leave a Prehospital Care Report at the hospital when Cox was admitted. (Id. ¶ 79.) While at the hospital, EMT Smith contacted the chief of his company, who instructed him not to submit any statements until the ambulance company's attorney was notified. (Id. 66, 79.) That report was submitted at a later date, and included as the chief complaint a description that "[a]s per PD, emotionally disturbed person, violent." (Id. ¶ 43.) The report only indicated injuries to Cox's hands and arms. (Id. ¶ 162.) EMT Smith also completed an Incident Report Form which indicated that "the police department was advising me that it was, in my opinion, in my best interest that I didn't interact with the patient." (Id. ¶ 65.)
Plaintiff filed the complaint in the instant action on July 21, 2006. An amended complaint was filed on November 10, 2006. On April 29, 2009, the Ambulance Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed opposition papers to the motion for summary judgment on July 1, 2009, and the Ambulance Defendants filed their reply papers on July 28, 2009. The Court held oral argument on the instant motion, and other related motions on August 24, 2009. On November 24, 2009, plaintiff filed a supplemental declaration in support of plaintiff's memorandum of law in opposition and, on January 15, 2010, the Ambulance Defendants filed a sur-reply. This matter is fully submitted.4
The standards for summary judgment are well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may only grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the...
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