Holloday v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 12 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 03-PT-1323-M.,CV 03-PT-1323-M. |
| Citation | 463 F.Supp.2d 1324 |
| Parties | Glenn William HOLLADAY, Petitioner, v. Donal CAMPBELL, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
James D Sears, Sears Law Firm, Daphne, M Bradley Almond, Almond & Cheshire LLC, Tuscaloosa, for Glenn William Holladay, Petitioner.
Troy R King, Office of the Attorney General, Henry M Johnson, Office of the Attorney General, William A Lisenby, Office of the Attorney General, William H Pryor, Jr, Office of the Attorney General, Beth Jackson Hughes, Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, for Donal Campbell Commissioner Alabama Department Corrections, Respondent.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This cause comes on to be heard on Petitioner's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation filed on May 13, 2006 and a further evidentiary hearing conducted on August 17, 2006.
On August 17, 2006, the court received further amplifications, explanations and evidence from the two expert witnesses who had previously testified before the magistrate judge. The parties agreed that there are no substantial disputes as to the underlying facts and that the substantial disputes relate to the inferences drawn and conclusions reached by the two experts and the magistrate judge. Except to the extent that this court either expressly or impliedly disagrees herein with the report of the magistrate judge his report is hereby adopted. To the extent that there is any conflict between these findings of fact and conclusions of law and the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge these findings of fact and conclusions of law will prevail and apply.
On June 26, 1987, the Petitioner, Glenn Holladay ("Holladay"), was convicted'. in Etowah County, Alabama of the murders of Larry Thomas, Jr., Rebecca Ledbetter Holladay and David Robinson, and the jury recommended a sentence of death. On July 27, 1987, Holladay was sentenced to death by Judge Donald W. Stewart. On September 20, 1988, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed those convictions and the sentence. Holladay v. State, 549 So.2d 122 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). His convictions and sentence were affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court on May 5, 1989. Ex parte Holladay, 549 So.2d 135 (Ala.1989). The United States Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari, Holladay v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 1012, 110 S.Ct. 575, 107 L.Ed.2d 569 (1989), and rehearing was denied shortly thereafter. Holladay v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 1095, 110 S.Ct. 1173, 107 L.Ed.2d 1075 (1990).
Holladay filed a motion for relief from conviction pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 (then Temporary Rule 20) on September 10, 1990. On December 5, 1991, after a hearing by the trial court, this petition was denied. The denial of this Rule 32 petition was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on December 30, 1992. Holladay v. State, 629 So.2d 673 (Ala.Crim.App.1992). The Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the denial of that petition. On February 28, 1994 the U.S. Supreme Court denied Holladay's petition for a writ of certiorari. Holladay v. Alabama, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S.Ct. 1208, 127 L.Ed.2d 555 (1994).
Holladay then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with his primary claim being ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 29, 1998, a magistrate judge of this court filed a Report and Recommendation stating that the petition should be denied. On July 22, 1998, this court adopted that Report and Recommendation and denied Holladay's petition. This denial was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on April 19, 2000. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir.2000). The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, Holladay v. Haley, 232 F.3d 217 (11th Cir.2000), and the United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Holladay v. Haley, 531 U.S. 1017, 121 S.Ct. 578, 148 L.Ed.2d 495 (2000). Holladay was scheduled to be executed at 6:01 p.m. on May 29, 2003.
Holladay moved the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for leave to file a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Holladay, who claims to suffer from mental retardation, filed this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which held that it was a violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause to execute mentally retarded prisoners.1 On May 26, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit granted both his motion for leave to file for a second writ of habeas corpus and his motion for a stay of execution. In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir.2003).2
On June 4, 2003, Holladay filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Atkins grounds. On July 18, 2003, a magistrate judge of this court filed an order that the Respondent's answer to the petition would be treated as a motion for summary judgment. On January 9, 2004, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation suggesting that the motion for summary judgment be denied. On February 12, 2004, this court filed a Memorandum Opinion adopting in part and rejecting in part the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. The accompanying Order denied both the Respondent's motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, and referred the matter to the magistrate judge for further proceedings on the merits.
On April 14, 2006, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation suggesting that Holladay's present petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied on the merits, asserting that Holladay had failed to establish his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.3 On May 13, 2006, Holladay objected to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that the magistrate judge had made inappropriate findings of fact and had applied incorrect legal standards. On June 16, 2006, Donal Campbell, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, filed a response to Holladay's objections.4
The history of mental retardation has been an evolving one, as to stereotyping, definition, treatment, etc. As has been the case with mental illness, there has been improvement in the understanding of mental retardation.5 The diagnosis of mental retardation remains, however, encumbered by amorphousness comparable to clutching mercury, as illustrated by the contradictory opinions of the experts in this case. The ultimate decision may equate to the game of "Button, button, who's got the button?"6
Both experts testified that "one size fits all" with regard to mental retardation determinations. The following language in American Association on Mental Retardation (hereinafter AAMR), Mental Retardation (10th ed.2002) suggests to the contrary:
The functions or reasons for applying a definition of mental retardation to a person are multiple and may include diagnosis, classification, and/or planning supports. Each function may have multiple purposes. For example, the diagnostic function may be applied to determine eligibility for services, benefits, or legal protections. Likewise, there are different grouping purposes for classification, including service reimbursement or funding, research, services, communication, and so forth. Supports planning for a given person should relate to that individual's strengths and needs in all five dimensions of individual functioning: Intellectual Abilities; Adaptive Behavior; Participation, Interactions, and Social Roles; Health; and Context.
Id. at 37. Some determinations may be for the purpose of inclusion of mentally retarded persons; some for exclusion.7
Indicative of the evolution is the fact that one of the most subjective essential elements of mental retardation, the adaptive behavior or adaptive functioning factor, was not added to the American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)8 definition until 1959. AAMR, supra, at 24. Not only was its inclusion late, "consensus on its construct is still lacking."... Id. at 24.9
From 1959 to 1973 the AAMR definition of mental retardation included persons with IQ scores of 70-85 as "borderline retarded." "This group is no longer labeled retarded by professionals in the field." Ellis and Luckasson, supra n. 9, at 422, n. 44.10 "Mildly retarded people have IQ scores in the range between 50 to 55 and approximately 70 and thus have substantial disability." Id. at 423
Id. at 424 (footnote omitted).11 The authors further state, however, 12 There is no evidence that the Petitioner has ever had such education or habilitation.
The Petitioner's objections can be summarized as follows:
1. "The magistrate judge incorrectly found that the IQ scoring cutoff for a fording of mental retardation is 70...
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