Holloman v. Kiser
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:20cv00115 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | SHAVIS HOLLOMAN, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY KISER, et al., Defendants |
Shavis Holloman ("Plaintiff"), a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendants Red Onion State Prison ("Red Onion") Warden Jeffrey Kiser, Assistant Warden Fuller, Major Delma Tate, Officer Lovell, Officer Walker, Officer Vitatoe, Officer Whitt, Officer Mullins, Officer Dutton, Officer Farmer, Officer Hill, and Officer Holloway (collectively "Defendants") violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA"), 34 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq. On July 27, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Holloman responded. After reviewing the pleadings, the court finds that the Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it will grant Defendants' motion.
On September 12, 2019, officials at the Red Onion placed Plaintiff in full-body restraints to transport him to the hospital for treatment of a Staph infection.1 The restraintsincluded handcuffs, a black box, leg shackles, a chain around his waist, and an electric shock belt. Plaintiff alleges he was left in these restraints for three days, but later alleges he was in the restraints for "over 50 plus hours."
Over the course of his hospital stay, Plaintiff complained about the pain and discomfort caused by the restraints to numerous prison officials; he reiterated his discomfort whenever Defendants changed shifts and new officers came in to monitor him. Holloman alleges that, in response to these requests, Defendants all responded that they could not remove the restraints because the prison's policy required the officials to leave Holloman in metal restraints unless he was undergoing active treatment or surgery, in which case plastic restraints would be used instead.
Holloman alleges that on September 13, he was unable to eat his breakfast because of the full-body restraints and states that he was "dropping food from [his] mouth." At around 10:00 a.m., the prison officials removed some of the Plaintiff's restraints in order for Holloman to use the bathroom, but the officials placed him back in the full-body restraints for the rest of the day. Holloman also alleges he was unable to sleep because the restraints were too uncomfortable. On September 14, Defendants took Holloman back to Red Onion around 6:30 p.m. and removed the full-body restraints.
Because prison officials left him in the full-body restraints for an extended period of time, Plaintiff alleges Defendants deprived him "of his basic necessities," including the ability to "sleep, shower, and . . . eat." Holloman also claims that being left in the full-body restraints for so long caused "nerve damage" and, afterwards, he was "unable to move [his] wrist and ankles properly." He also had "pain in [his] kidneys[, a] headache[,] and sever[e] stiffness." Byleaving him in the restraints for so long, Holloman claims that the various prison officials who observed him—and Red Onion's Warden, Assistant Warden, and Major—violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the PREA. He demands $60,500 from each of the 12 named defendants.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 27, 2020 (ECF No. 12), and Holloman responded (ECF No. 20). On February 19, 2021, before the court ruled on Defendant's motion to dismiss, Holloman filed a motion for summary judgment.2 (ECF No. 23.) The court has reviewed the pleadings and applicable law, making this matter ripe for decision.3
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, which, if true, "'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Under this plausibility standard, a complaint must contain "more than label[s] and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint mustinclude 'more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'" Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693, 709 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court "'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint' and 'draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Montgomery Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). This is only true for factual allegations; a district court does not afford legal conclusions any deference. Moreover, a court does not have to accept as true "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement, . . . 'unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.'" Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th Cir. 2009)).
Holloman brings his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that he has been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that this deprivation resulted from conduct committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
In his complaint, Holloman lists four § 1983 claims against Defendants. First, he claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, he claims Defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, he claims Defendants violated the PREA. Finally, he claims Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The gravamen of Holloman's complaint, however, is his Eighth Amendment claim.
"[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision . . . the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997). Holloman alleges he was kept in restraints for over 50 hours and deprived of his basic necessities. This allegation, although serious, does not implicate the Due Process Clause. Instead, Holloman's allegations should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the court will dismiss Holloman's due process claim.
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To successfully plead a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, Holloman "must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination." Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654(4th Cir. 2001). Holloman has not alleged any facts in his complaint that he was treated differently from others who were similarly situated. To the contrary, Holloman alleges he was subjected to treatment under a policy that is applied to all prisoners who are transported to the hospital. Since Holloman has not alleged facts to show he was treated differently, he cannot sustain a claim that Defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The PREA does not create an individual right of action. De'lonta v. Clarke, No. 7:11-cv-483, 2013 WL 209489, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2013). Chinnici v. Edwards, No. 1:07-cv-229, 2008 WL 3851294, at *3 (D. Vt. Aug. 13, 2008). It is well settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "creates no rights; rather it provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)). Because Holloman does not have a federal right under the PREA, Holloman cannot sustain a § 1983 claim under the PREA.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII." [P]unishments which are incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society'" are "repugnant to the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). While the Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons," Rhodes v.Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), the Eighth Amendment provides protections for "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993).
Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether conditions of confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1994). First, the court asks "whether the conditions of...
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