Holloway v. Chi. Heart & Vascular Consultants, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-16-0315,1-16-0315 |
| Citation | 2017 IL App (1st) 160315,81 N.E.3d 1048 |
| Parties | Agnes HOLLOWAY, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Byron Byars, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO HEART & VASCULAR CONSULTANTS, LTD., Dr. Anil Ranginani, and Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Edward G. Proctor, Jr., of Munday & Nathan, of Chicago, for appellant.
Catherine Basque Weiler, of Swanson Martin & Bell, LLP, of Chicago, for appellees Chicago Heart & Vascular Consultants, Ltd., and Anil Ranginani.
Richard H. Donohue, Karen Kies DeGrand, and Meagan P. VanderWeele, of Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC, of Chicago, for other appellee.
¶ 1 This appeal involves a wrongful death action based on alleged medical negligence. The action was brought by plaintiff Agnes Holloway as special administrator of the estate of her deceased husband Byron Byars. Plaintiff appeals a circuit court order dismissing the pro se complaint she brought against defendants Chicago Heart & Vascular Consultants, Ltd., Dr. Anil Ranginani, and Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (collectively "defendants").
¶ 3 Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012) ). Defendants argued that the plaintiff, as a pro se litigant, could not bring a wrongful death action on behalf of her husband's estate because such an action is properly brought in a representative capacity, and although a lay person may file a complaint on his or her own behalf, a lay person may not initiate legal proceedings on behalf of someone else. Defendants maintained that because the wrongful death action was filed by plaintiff pro se , in her capacity as special administrator of her husband's estate, the pleading was a nullity and void ab initio . Defendants added that since the complaint was a nullity, and it was the only complaint that was filed within the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence actions ( 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 2012)), subsequent actions brought by plaintiff after the statute of limitations had expired were time-barred.
¶ 4 Defendants further argued that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice because the plaintiff failed to comply with section 2-622(a)(1) of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 2014)), which requires that a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice file an affidavit stating that she has obtained a statement from a health professional opining that there is a "reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of such action."
¶ 5 The circuit court ultimately granted the motions to dismiss and entered judgment for the defendants. The court determined that the plaintiff's complaint was a nullity and that she did not establish good cause for failing to comply with section 2-622(a)(1) of the Code. The circuit court upheld its ruling upon reconsideration. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 7 On November 21, 2012, plaintiff's decedent, Mr. Byars, was under the care and treatment of the defendants when he died from cardiac tamponade. Plaintiff believed her husband died as a result of negligent medical care and subsequently obtained his medical records to determine whether she could proceed with legal action. Approximately a year after the decedent's death, plaintiff began searching for legal counsel to represent the decedent's estate in a medical negligence action. Plaintiff first consulted with Attorney Michael Bucchi, who referred her to Attorney David Heyer.
¶ 8 Plaintiff met with Heyer in January 2014, and provided him with the medical records in her possession. She also signed authorization permitting Heyer and his law firm to obtain additional material and documents necessary to evaluate the case.
¶ 9 Nine months later, in October 2014, plaintiff was informed that neither Heyer nor Bucchi would be proceeding with the case. Plaintiff was further advised that the applicable statute of limitations would expire on November 21, 2014, and that if she wished to pursue legal action against any of the potential defendants, suit would have to be filed no later than this date.
¶ 10 After failing to secure legal counsel, plaintiff decided to proceed pro se in an effort to meet the applicable statute of limitations. On November 21, 2014, plaintiff successfully petitioned a circuit court to appoint her special administrator of the decedent's estate. That same day, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendants seeking damages for the decedent's alleged wrongful death. Plaintiff did not attach an affidavit stating that she was attempting to consult with a healthcare professional and did not attach a report from a healthcare professional as required by section 2-622 of the Code. Plaintiff issued summons to the defendants, who were served with process by December 17, 2014.
¶ 11 During that December, plaintiff consulted with attorney Antone D. Smith, who declined the request for representation, but recommended plaintiff to the law firm of Power, Rogers & Smith. Attorney Smith forwarded the complaint and medical records to Power, Rogers & Smith, which subsequently declined representation.
¶ 12 In January 2015, plaintiff met with counsel from the law firm of Kralovec, Jambois & Schwartz. During this period, defendants filed their respective appearances, and the matter was scheduled to be heard before the circuit court for initial case management conference on January 27, 2015. Plaintiff appeared at the case management conference, where the circuit court continued the matter to March 17, for status on plaintiff's appearance through counsel. The circuit court also stayed the defendants' responsive pleading deadline.
¶ 13 At the case management conference held on March 17, 2015, plaintiff again appeared without counsel. The circuit court ordered defendants to file responsive pleadings within 28 days. In mid-March, plaintiff was informed that the Kralovec law firm was declining her request for representation and reminded her of an upcoming court date.
¶ 14 On April 7, 2015, defendant Mercy Hospital & Medical Center filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, based on plaintiff's failure to comply with section 2-622 of the Code. On April 13, 2015, defendants Chicago Heart & Vascular Consultants, Ltd., and Dr. Anil Ranginani, filed their motion to dismiss, also based on plaintiff's failure to comply with section 2-622 of the Code. In addition, the defendants argued that the complaint was a nullity and should be dismissed with prejudice because plaintiff had filed the complaint pro se , despite the fact that it set forth causes of action required to be presented in a representative capacity.
¶ 15 The defendants presented their respective motions to the circuit court on April 21, 2015. In deference to the plaintiff's pro se status, the circuit court gave plaintiff six weeks to file a response to the motions to dismiss, with the briefing schedule to close on June 16, 2015.
¶ 16 On July 13, 2015, after briefing closed, but before the circuit court ruled on the motions to dismiss, plaintiff's current counsel sought leave to file an appearance on her behalf. The circuit court granted leave, extended the briefing schedule, and continued the hearing date to permit plaintiff's counsel to respond to the pending motions to dismiss.
¶ 17 On July 30, 2015, plaintiff filed her response to the dismissal motions. She appended an affidavit detailing the nature and extent of her efforts to obtain legal representation prior to filing the pro se complaint. Plaintiff acknowledged that she filed her complaint pro se in order to avoid the statutory time-bar. She maintained that the nullity rule should not be applied in her case because she "diligently and persistently sought legal representation since 2013." Plaintiff stated that she "continually recognized the limitations of her authority as a non-attorney, and limited her actions to those that were necessary to avoid the statute of limitations."
¶ 18 Plaintiff added that her case should not be dismissed for failing to comply with section 2-622 of the Code because she "presented a record of diligent and persistent effort to secure legal counsel and fulfill all pleading requirements necessary to proceed with a medical negligence lawsuit." Plaintiff requested the circuit court to allow her a reasonable period of additional time within which to file the section 2-622 health professional report.
¶ 19 Defendants filed their respective reply memoranda on August 12, 2015. On August 27, after hearing oral argument from all of the parties, the circuit court issued a written ruling, granting the motions to dismiss with prejudice. The court determined that plaintiff's pro se complaint was a nullity and was time-barred. The court also determined there was no good cause shown to grant plaintiff additional time to comply with section 2-622 of the Code. The court subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and this appeal followed.
¶ 21 The first issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, based on its finding that the nullity rule applied to render the complaint a nullity. This is a question of law we review de novo . Pratt-Holdampf v. Trinity Medical Center , 338 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1083, 273 Ill.Dec. 708, 789...
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...based on the failure to comply with section 2-622 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Holloway v. Chicago Heart & Vascular Consultants, Ltd. , 2017 IL App (1st) 160315, ¶ 29, 415 Ill.Dec. 124, 81 N.E.3d 1048. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, o......
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