Holloway v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1978
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Citation: 403 Mich. 614,271 N.W.2d 777
• Parties: Brenda HOLLOWAY, by her next friend Sharon H. Holloway; and Sharon H. Holloway, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ernest T. Holloway, Deceased, Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION, a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Eaton County and Eaton County Road Commission, Defendant. 403 Mich. 614, 271 N.W.2d 777
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 777

271 N.W.2d 777

Brenda HOLLOWAY, by her next friend Sharon H. Holloway; and Sharon H. Holloway, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ernest T. Holloway, DeceasedPlaintiffs- Appellants, v.GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION, a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellee and Eaton County and Eaton County Road Commission, Defendant.

No. 1.

403 Mich. 614, 271 N.W.2d 777

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 4, 1978.

Richard J. Abood, William E. Rheaume, Abood, Abood & Abood, P. C., Lansing, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan by Grant J. Gruel and Kenneth L. Block, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee; Otis M. Smith, Detroit, of counsel.

LEVIN, Justice.

Rehearing was granted to resolve the equal division of this Court following a prior submission of this cause.Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 399 Mich. 617, 250 N.W.2d 736(1977).The trial court directed a verdict of no cause of action in favor of General Motors on the ground that the Holloways had failed to establish a defect in the ball joint assembly of the automobile.The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Both opinions on the prior submission are in agreement that a plaintiff may establish by circumstantial as well as direct evidence that there was a defect in the product when it left the manufacturer.The disagreement is whether it would be reasonable to infer such a defect from the circumstantial evidence in the instant case.

We conclude that it would be reasonable to draw such an inference.

We have also considered General Motors' further contention, on rehearing, that a failure attributable to the manufacturer is not proven unless the specific cause of the defect is identified.We conclude that, although the specific cause was not so isolated, the Holloways satisfied their burden when they presented evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that some defect in manufacture caused the accident.

We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I

On May 28, 1971, Ernest Holloway was driving at a speed of approximately 50 to 55 miles per hour along a gravel road in Eaton County when his automobile left the road.The vehicle struck a utility pole.Holloway was killed and his daughter, Brenda, seriously injured.The automobile was four years old, had been driven over 47,000 miles, and there were two previous owners.The Holloways alleged that the accident was caused by a defective ball joint assembly in the right front suspension which broke while the automobile was traveling over chuckholes in the road.

Sharon Holloway, as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and as next friend of her daughter, commenced this action against General Motors and other defendants.The trial judge granted General Motors' motion for a directed verdict; ¹ on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision on the ground that a manufacturing defect had not been proven.This Court affirmed by a 3-3 division.The Holloways' application for rehearing was granted.

II

On the prior submission, one of the issues was whether the ball joint assembly of the Holloway automobile failed while it was on the roadway, as contended by the Holloways, or after it hit a ditch and then a utility pole, ² as contended by General Motors.If the assembly did not break until after the automobile left the roadway that would indicate the cause of the failure was not a defect in the manufacture but, rather, the driver's loss of control of the automobile and its impact against the ditch or pole.

The opinion for affirmance did not find it necessary to consider that issue because it concluded that, in all events, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support an inference of a manufacturing defect.The opinion for reversal concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the break in the assembly occurred on the roadway and, thus, that the break was not a result of the driver's loss of control of the automobile.

Although General Motors continues to argue that it would be more reasonable to infer from certain circumstantial evidence that the break occurred after the automobile left the roadway, it has conceded, for the purposes of this rehearing, that the break occurred on the roadway.³

III

We therefore proceed on the premise that it would be reasonable to infer that the ball joint assembly failed on the roadway before the driver lost control of the automobile and, thus, that the assembly was defective.Proceeding on that premise, it is also reasonable to infer that the defect in and failure of the assembly caused the accident.⁴

The still-disputed issue is whether that defect was shown to have been attributable to the manufacturer.⁵

A plaintiff has the burden of establishing that when the product left the manufacturer it was defective.He is not, however, obliged to eliminate all possible causes of the accident consistent with the view that there was no manufacturing defect.⁶He sustains his burden when he establishes with direct or circumstantial evidence a reasonable probability that the defect is attributable to the manufacturer.⁷

On a motion for directed verdict, the question is whether it is reasonable to infer from the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the accident was probably caused by a defect attributable to the manufacturer.Questions of comparative probability are to be resolved by the trier of fact.⁸As stated in Schoepper v. Hancock Chemical Co., 113 Mich. 582, 586, 589, 71 N.W. 1081, 1083(1897), and since reaffirmed in Schedlbauer v. Chris-Craft Corp., 381 Mich. 217, 230-231, 160 N.W.2d 889(1968):

"It is true that where an injury occurs that cannot be accounted for, and where the occasion of it rests wholly in conjecture, the case may fail for want of proof.* * * But such cases are rare, and that rule should never be so extended as to result in a failure of justice, or in denying an injured party a right of action, where there is room for balancing the probabilities, and for drawing reasonable inferences better supported upon one side than the other.* * * (T)he question of whether the inference suggested by the plaintiff's theory is the correct one, or whether it was sufficiently rebutted, was a question for the jury."(Emphasis supplied.)⁹

The opinion for reversal on the prior submission of this cause similarly declared:

"Although the strength of an inference that the accident was caused by a manufacturing defect depends on the plausibility of competing explanations for the accident, plaintiffs did not have the burden of proving that the accident could only be attributable to a manufacturing defect or 'of effectively eliminating any other factors or circumstances which could have been responsible for the failure.'It was enough that they indicated 'a logical sequence of cause and effect * * * notwithstanding the existence of other plausible theories with or without support in the evidence.'Schedlbauer v. Chris-Craft Corp., 381 Mich. 217, 220, fn. 1, 160 N.W.2d 889(1968).They were 'not required to offer evidence which positively exclude(s) every other possible cause of the accident.'Swensson v. New York, Albany Despatch Co., 309 N.Y. 497, 502, 131 N.E.2d 902, 904(1956)."¹⁰

IV

The opinion for reversal on the prior submission contrasted a defect in a wheel assembly with a failure in a part of the automobile subject to periodic maintenance, E. g., the braking system:¹¹

"Wheel assemblies are not expected to wear out and be replaced.There was no suggestion that this assembly had been tampered with or that it is a part of the car that is expected to be or reasonably should be inspected on a periodic basis.

"While it may be necessary in some cases for a plaintiff to introduce evidence of proper maintenance to support an inference that the defect occurred before the product left the factory, where the defect alleged is latent in the very structure of the vehicle and may not in ordinary circumstances be discovered during routine maintenance, evidence of proper maintenance is not required.

"While prior malfunction of a brake system may indicate a manufacturing defect, the absence of prior malfunction does not negative the existence of a latent structural defect.A defective brake system may function intermittently; it is the nature of a wheel assembly failure that there are no 'prior incidents.' "¹²

Where a failure is caused by a defect in a relatively inaccessible part integral to the structure of the automobile not generally required to be repaired, replaced or maintained, it may be reasonable, absent misuse, to infer that the defect is attributable to the manufacturer.¹³

The circumstantial evidence in the instant case adequately supports a reasonable inference that the accident was probably caused by a defect attributable to the manufacturer.Both the Holloways and General Motors agree that the break in the ball joint assembly was fresh, metallurgically clean, and due to an impact failure.This suggests that the failure was not a result of fatigue or wear, ¹⁴ and, indeed, General Motors' experts testified that there were no signs of fatigue or wear.The fresh, metallurgically clean break, indicative of impact failure not attributable to fatigue or wear, tended also to negative lack of requisite maintenance, improper repair and even prior misuse as alternative causes.We are left with a reasonable probability that something was inherently wrong with the ball joint assembly such that it was unable to withstand an impact it should have withstood.¹⁵

"This is not to say that all parts of an automobile can be expected to function indefinitely and flawlessly without maintenance for the life of the vehicle.It is to say that the manufacturer who alone is in a position to guard against the risk is subject to liability for a life-threatening latent structural defect which ticks away like a time bomb with every mile driven."Holloway v. General Motors Corp., ...