Holloway v. Holloway (Ex parte Holloway)
Decision Date | 26 August 2016 |
Docket Number | 2150821. |
Citation | 218 So.3d 853 |
Parties | Ex parte Jennifer Ann HOLLOWAY (In re Michael Gordon Holloway v. Jennifer Ann Holloway). |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
G. John Durward, Jr., of Durward & Durward, Birmingham, for petitioner.
William E. Swatek, Pelham, for respondent.
On October 23, 2015, Michael Gordon Holloway ("the father") filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") a complaint seeking a divorce from Jennifer Ann Holloway ("the mother"). In that complaint, the father also sought, among other things, an award of custody of the parties' minor son, who was born on September 20, 2015. In his complaint, the father alleged that the parties married on October 18, 2014, and that they separated on June 29, 2015.
In a separate motion for pendente lite relief, also filed on October 23, 2015, the father alleged that the mother had abandoned the marriage and had moved to Mississippi to live with her mother. Neither the father's complaint for a divorce nor his motion for pendente lite relief set forth the date on which the mother left Alabama to live in Mississippi or in which state the child was born.
On November 19, 2015, the mother filed in the trial court an "answer, counterclaim, and motion to dismiss." In that pleading, the mother alleged that the child had been born in Mississippi and had lived in Mississippi since his birth. Therefore, the mother argued, Alabama was not the child's home state and the trial court could not exercise jurisdiction over issues pertaining to child custody; the mother cited provisions of Alabama's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), § 30–3B–101 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. Accordingly, the mother moved to dismiss that part of the father's complaint that sought to litigate the issue of child custody in the trial court. The mother did not dispute the trial court's jurisdiction to divorce the parties and to divide their marital property.
In response to the mother's answer, counterclaim, and motion to dismiss, the father filed a "verified response," in which he stated that he and the mother had been residents of Alabama when he filed the divorce complaint, that he had believed the mother's move to Mississippi was temporary, and that the mother was not a resident of Mississippi. The father also submitted a copy of a Mississippi statute governing Mississippi's jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
The mother then, on January 15, 2016, filed in the trial court a verified motion to dismiss the father's child-custody claims. In that verified motion to dismiss, the mother stated, in short, that the child had been born in Mississippi and that the child had resided with her in Mississippi since his birth. In addition, the mother stated that a custody and child-support action was pending in the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi ("the Mississippi court"); the mother argued that the Mississippi court had jurisdiction over the issues of custody and child support because, she said, Mississippi was the child's home state under the UCCJEA. The mother amended the verified motion to dismiss on February 12, 2016, to submit to the trial court a copy of a pendente lite order of the Mississippi court in which that court determined, among other things, that it had jurisdiction over the issue of the custody of the child.
The father responded to the amended verified motion to dismiss by submitting a copy of a verified motion to dismiss that he had filed in the Mississippi court. In that motion filed in the Mississippi court, the father had argued that the mother had not been a resident of Mississippi for six months before she filed the custody action in the Mississippi court; the father did not address the issue of the Mississippi court's jurisdiction over the child. However, in his response to the mother's amended verified motion to dismiss filed in the trial court, the father argued that, by failing to communicate with the trial court, the Mississippi court had not complied with the requirements of the UCCJEA and that, therefore, the Mississippi pendente lite order was void for that reason.
The trial court set the jurisdictional dispute for a March 8, 2016, hearing at which it considered the arguments of the parties' attorneys. Thereafter, each party filed a brief in support of his or her position on the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the child-custody issue.
On June 8, 2016, the trial court entered two orders. In the first order, the trial court found that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the child-custody issue. In its second June 8, 2016, order, the trial court denied the mother's motion to dismiss that part of the father's divorce complaint pertaining to the issue of child custody. The mother timely filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's June 8, 2016, orders.
Ex parte Siderius, 144 So.3d 319, 323 (Ala.2013).
A circuit court or juvenile court in Alabama may not address an issue of child custody unless the court has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial custody determination. B.N. v. Madison Cty. Dep't of Human Res., 151 So.3d 1115, 1119 (Ala.Civ.App.2014). Section 30–3B–201, Ala.Code 1975, provides:
Under the UCCJEA, the term "home state" is defined as follows:
§ 30–3B–102(7), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added).1
With regard to the home state of a child who is less than six months old at the time a child-custody claim is asserted, this court has stated:
"
Gray v. Gray, 139 So.3d 802, 806 (Ala.Civ.App.2013).
In Gray v. Gray, supra, the father in that case had commenced a child-custody action in Alabama before the child was born. This court held that, under the UCCJEA, an unborn child does not have a home state and that the determination of the child's home state is necessarily deferred until his or her birth. 139 So.3d at 808. The child in that case was born in Michigan and lived in Michigan with the mother following his birth. This court concluded that Alabama was not the child's home state such that an Alabama court could exercise jurisdiction over the custody dispute; this court explained:
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