Holloway v. Lockhart
| Decision Date | 03 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-605-WHA-CWB [WO] |
| Parties | MICHAEL JEROME HOLLOWAY, AIS 129313, Petitioner, v. SID LOCKHART, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Michael Jerome Holloway (“Holloway”), an Alabama inmate has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 wherein he challenges his 1986 conviction for manslaughter. (Doc. 1).[1] For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Holloway's petition be dismissed as time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
On April 17, 1986, a Coffee County jury found Holloway guilty of manslaughter in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-6-3. (Doc. 9-1 at pp. 37, 75). On the same date, the trial court sentenced Holloway as a habitual felony offender to life in prison. (Id.). Holloway thereafter filed a timely motion for new trial, which was denied on June 20, 1986. (Doc. 9-1 at p. 37). Holloway did not file a direct appeal.
On August 13, 1999, over thirteen years after conclusion of the underlying proceedings, Holloway filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.[2] (Doc. 9-1 at pp. 8-23). The trial court dismissed the petition on February 4, 2000-finding it both meritless and time-barred by Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c). (Id. at pp. 75-76). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a memorandum opinion on August 18, 2000 affirming the dismissal. (Doc. 9-4). Holloway did not apply for rehearing and did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court.
Holloway filed the instant § 2254 petition on September 1, 2021[3] to assert: (1) that the State violated his right to equal protection under the law by systematically excluding African-Americans from his jury; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1). On December 6, 2021, Holloway amended the petition to add various other claims, including a claim that he is actually innocent of the underlying offense. (Doc. 14).
Respondents in turn contend that Holloway's § 2254 petition is time-barred. (Doc. 9). The undersigned agrees and recommends that the petition be denied without an evidentiary hearing and dismissed with prejudice.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) contains the following time limitations for federal habeas petitions:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
In most cases, a petition brought under § 2254 must be filed within one year of the date on which the underlying judgment becomes final, either by the conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of time for seeking direct review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Pugh v. Smith, 465 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). Here, the final day upon which Holloway could have filed a notice of appeal on direct review was August 1, 1986, i.e., 42 days after the trial court's June 20, 1986 denial of his motion for new trial.[4] Because Holloway took no direct appeal, his judgment of conviction became final on that date. See Bridges v. Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002) ( that defendant's conviction became final on the date his right to appeal expired where he did not seek a direct appeal from the conviction).
Notwithstanding the general limitations period of one year for seeking federal habeas relief, the Eleventh Circuit has held that Wilcox v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit thus adopted a “grace period” of “one year from the AEDPA's effective date” of April 24, 1996 for earlier-convicted prisoners to file federal habeas petitions. Id. at 1210-11. Even with that “grace period,” however, Holloway would have been required to file his § 2254 petition by April 24, 1997-a deadline that expired well before his September 1, 2021 filing.
A properly filed state court petition for post-conviction relief serves to toll the one-year limitations period under the AEDPA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, however, the one-year limitations period ran unabated for the full “grace period” and expired on April 24, 1997. Holloway's Rule 32 Petition as eventually filed on August 13, 1999 therefore had no tolling effect. Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[O]nce a deadline has expired, there is nothing left to toll.”); see also Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001). Nor has Holloway set forth any facts or arguments to establish tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), or (D), i.e., he has not shown that an unlawful state action impeded him from filing a timely § 2254 petition, or that his claims are based on a right newly recognized by the United States Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, or that the facts supporting his claims could not have been discovered earlier by exercising due diligence. Accordingly, statutory tolling cannot be applied to render Holloway's petition timely.
The AEDPA limitations period also can be tolled on an equitable basis when a petitioner submits an untimely filing “because of extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, it has been explained that “equitable tolling is an ‘extraordinary remedy,' ... ‘limited to rare and exceptional circumstances' and ‘typically applied sparingly.'” Hunter v. Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling “only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (citation omitted). Holloway has made no argument for equitable tolling in this case, and the court otherwise knows of no basis that would support equitable tolling under the circumstances presented.
Even when a § 2254 petition is untimely, the door to review occasionally may be opened through a credible showing of actual innocence. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 393-94 (2013). Actual innocence in that context, however, means factual innocence and not mere legal insufficiency. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623-24 (1998); Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 162 (2d Cir. 2004) (“As Schlup makes clear, the issue before court is not legal innocence but factual innocence.”) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)). The United States Supreme Court has described the narrow application of an actual innocence claim as follows:
[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. ... Tobe credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.
513 U.S. at 324. Ultimately, a petitioner asserting actual innocence must establish that, in light of new reliable evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
According to Holloway, an eyewitness named Jessie Satterwhite is willing to provide an affidavit affirming that he acted in self-defense when killing the victim. (Doc. 14 at pp. 3-4). Holloway states that Satterwhite would specifically testify that Holloway was in his own jail cell, minding his own business, when the victim attacked him-leaving Holloway no means of escape or retreat and necessitating that Holloway stab the victim in self-defense. (Id. at p. 4). Holloway further maintains that he previously asked his attorney to call Satterwhite to testify at trial (Id...
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