Holloway v. Madison-Grant United School Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1983
• Docket Number: MADISON-GRANT,No. 2-183A4,2-183A4
• Citation: 448 N.E.2d 27
• Parties: 10 Ed. Law Rep. 770 Imogene C. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.UNITED SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 27

448 N.E.2d 27

10 Ed. Law Rep. 770

Imogene C. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MADISON-GRANT UNITED SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-183A4.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

April 25, 1983.

Daniel J. Harrigan, Bayliff, Harrigan, Cord, Maugans & Russell, P.C., Kokomo, for plaintiff-appellant.

Edward N. Kalamaros, Michael J. Anderson, Edward N. Kalamaros & Associates, P.C., South Bend, for defendant-appellee.

RATLIFF, Judge.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Imogene Holloway, widow of Merrill Holloway, appeals from the Industrial Board's denial of her claim for workmen's compensation benefits as a result of Merrill's death from heart failure. We affirm.

FACTS

Merrill was Assistant Superintendent of the Fairmount Middle School, and on April 28, 1980, he was engaged in performing the regular duties of his position. He handled a visit from the state fire marshal, a rather infrequent but not wholly unexpected occurrence, at which time the fire marshal noted thirty-eight specific violations of the fire code needing correction before the school could reopen in the fall. At approximately 3:00 p.m. on that day Merrill investigated a minor school bus accident which turned out to be a "fender bender" with no injuries. Merrill also had the responsibility of making a presentation to the school board that evening concerning the consolidation and construction of a new middle school. Contrary to his usual practice of resting between dinner and the school board meeting, Merrill worked on his presentation in favor of the controversial project and in anticipation of a certain amount of opposition to it.

Merrill was fifty-six years old with an enlarged heart showing progressive arteriosclerotic heart disease. He had suffered an acute inferior wall myocardial infarction on February 3, 1979, and was treated for an impending myocardial infarction on November 26, 1979. He was also a cigarette smoker who had gained twelve pounds between December 1979 and April 1980, weighing 277.5 pounds on April 21, 1980. His father had died at age 47 of a myocardial infarction, and doctors considered Merrill a very high risk for an acute cardial event.

Merrill began his presentation before the school board, and in the middle of it he suffered a fatal heart attack. Imogene filed a Form 10 Application with the Industrial Board of Indiana. The hearing officer denied her claim, making the following findings:

"5. That the proximate cause of Merrill E. Holloway's death was the natural 6. That plaintiff has not carried her burden of proof on proximate cause, in that medical conclusions offered by plaintiff were too speculative to provide the specific link between employment and heart attack required by Dykes ....

progression of his advanced coronary heart disease and the gradual lessening of his heart's ability to combat the disease.

7. That the position of Assistant Superintendent required decedent to react to various contingencies as may arise in the administration of a school district and as such was a highly stressful position. Because of the nature of the administrative position Mr. Holloway occupied, he was expected to deal with a variety of stressful school related problems on a recurring basis and was expected to put in long hours by attending evening school board meetings.

8. That said heart failure was not proximately caused by unusual mental, emotional or psychological stimulus because there was no identifiably significant increase in stress above and beyond the mental, emotional and psychological stimulus Mr. Holloway had been exposed to in the ordinary, usual and routine carrying out of his duties as assistant superintendent.

9. That the showing by plaintiff of proximate cause is legally insufficient to meet the Dykes test of 'unusual exertion' as that test was applied to the mental exertion situation in Harris v. Rainsoft, because the facts have not disclosed any sudden mental, emotional or psychological stimulus but rather show the inability of a deteriorating heart to meet the routine demands of the assistant superintendent's position."

Record at 71. The hearing officer's findings, conclusions, and negative award were affirmed by the full Board.

ISSUE

Did the Board err in finding that the events during April 28, 1980, did not constitute unusual stress above and beyond that normally associated with the duties of the assistant superintendent's office and therefore were not the cause of Merrill's death?

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Imogene challenges the Board's findings that the stress to which Merrill was subjected on April 28, 1980, viz., the visit of the fire marshal, the investigation of the school bus accident, and the presentation of a controversial project at the evening school board meeting, was not above the usual, ordinary, and routine stress of his position and therefore that this stress, rather than Merrill's physical condition, was not the cause of his fatal heart attack. She argues that the recent case of Harris v. Rainsoft of Allen County, Inc., (1981) Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1320, relaxed the rule of U.S. Steel Corporation v. Dykes, (1958) 238 Ind. 599, 154 N.E.2d 111, which requires some sudden or unusual exertion beyond the normal exertions and stress of the employee's position in order to be compensable. We disagree. Contrary to Imogene's contentions, we do not read Harris as dispensing with the requirement of some unusual exertion or sudden shock as laid down in Dykes.

In Dykes our supreme court reversed an award of benefits where the claimant's decedent had an arteriosclerotic heart condition and the fatal heart attack was not preceded by some type of untoward or unexpected incident or there was no evidence of the aggravation of a previously deteriorated heart or blood vessel. The decedent had been a grinder in a steel mill in Gary, Indiana, for more than eight years. He was approximately fifty-five years of age, well developed physically, and weighed 160 pounds at the time of his death. His job duties involved heavy physical labor requiring lifting, standing, and walking during the regular work period, but on the day in issue his work had slowed and was less than usual. The court stated,

"The mere showing that he was performing his usual routine everyday task when he suffered a heart attack does not establish a right to workmen's compensation because there was no event or happening beyond the mere employment itself."

238 Ind. at 613, 154 N.E.2d at 119.

In Harris this court reversed a denial of benefits by the Board, holding that a fatal heart attack suffered by an employee with a preexisting heart disease is compensable even though it results from a non-physical...