Holloway v. Pigman

• Decision Date: 31 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-1685,88-1685
• Parties: Winston HOLLOWAY; Jeff Arbaugh; Larry Jones; and Terry Proctor, Appellants, v. Dennis PIGMAN, Chaplain; Dewie W. Williams, Chaplain; Arthur Lockhart, Director, A.D.C.; Randy Morgan, Asst. Director; Larry Norris, Warden; Marvin Evans, Asst. Warden; Robert Perry, Major, Tucker Unit; Board of Correction, All in Their Individual and Official Capacities, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 365

884 F.2d 365

Winston HOLLOWAY; Jeff Arbaugh; Larry Jones; and Terry Proctor, Appellants, v. Dennis PIGMAN, Chaplain; Dewie W. Williams, Chaplain Arthur Lockhart, Director, A.D.C.; Randy Morgan, Asst. Director; Larry Norris, Warden; Marvin Evans, Asst. Warden; Robert Perry, Major, Tucker Unit; Board of Correction, All in Their Individual and Official Capacities Appellees.

No. 88-1685.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 10, 1989.

Decided Aug. 31, 1989.

Marcia Barnes, Little Rock, Ark., for appellants.

David B. Eberhard, for appellees.

Before FAGG, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

MAGILL, Circuit Judge.

Winston Holloway, Jeff Arbaugh, Larry Jones and Terry Proctor (collectively, plaintiffs) are inmates housed in the Maximum Security Unit (MSU) of the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC). Plaintiffs filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that prison chaplains, various prison officials, and the Board of Corrections (collectively, defendants) violated plaintiffs' rights to freedom of religion, speech and association, and to due process and equal protection. The district court ¹ granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issues of plaintiff Holloway's access to religious items and the claims of mail interference, and dismissed the claim involving misuse of inmate welfare funds for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.

On appeal, plaintiffs allege that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants because (1) plaintiff Holloway raised genuine issues of material fact concerning defendants' denial of his access to Native American religious items, and (2) plaintiffs raised genuine issues of material fact that procedural safeguards were lacking in the prison mail system, causing a violation of plaintiffs' due process rights to their mail. Plaintiffs further allege that the district court erred in dismissing their claim that defendants misused the inmate welfare fund, arguing that the complaint and amended complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action. We shall address briefly each of plaintiffs' arguments.

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we must determine whether the record as it stands reveals any disputed issues of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To be material, the disputed facts must be facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The presence of a genuine issue of fact is predicated on the existence of a legal theory which can be considered viable under the nonmoving party's version of the facts. Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987). The mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient alone to bar summary judgment; rather, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law. Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642 (7th Cir.1987).

In his complaint, plaintiff Holloway asserted that defendants denied him the opportunity to practice his Native American religion in any meaningful way; that defendants sought to frustrate such practice; and that defendant Norris, Warden of MSU, denied Holloway the use of certain nonhazardous religious items which were stored in Norris' office. In response, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits. In his affidavit, Warden Norris stated that he had done nothing to prevent or frustrate Holloway from practicing his religion as long as Holloway's practice did not create a security risk or breach prison policy. Norris also stated that he did not have any of Holloway's property in his office and was not aware of the nonhazardous items referred to in Holloway's complaint. In an attempt to rebut Norris' affidavit, Holloway submitted copies of grievances he had filed with the ADC while attempting to obtain sage and sweet grass to use in worship. Holloway also submitted an ADC Inmate Personal Property Record stating that sage and sacred tobacco were stored in the warden's office.

In determining whether Holloway's right to freedom of religion was violated, we apply a reasonableness standard. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). A prison regulation that infringes on a prisoner's constitutional rights is valid if it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. In O'Lone, the Supreme Court considered the degree of infringement in determining whether a prisoner's rights were violated. Here, Holloway does not detail what the practice of his Native American religion requires, nor does he assert any facts showing that he is deprived of all opportunity to practice his religion because Norris possesses his sage and sweet grass. Any disputes...