Holloway v. State

• Decision Date: 19 January 2017
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 59A01-1604-CR-745
• Citation: 69 N.E.3d 924
• Parties: Daniel Ray HOLLOWAY, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

69 N.E.3d 924

Daniel Ray HOLLOWAY, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 59A01-1604-CR-745

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed January 19, 2017

Attorney for Appellant David A. Smith, McIntyre & Smith, Bedford, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Daniel Ray Holloway ("Holloway") appeals his convictions, received following a jury trial, for Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine,¹ Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance,² and Class D felony possession of chemical reagents or precursors.³ At trial, the trial court admitted, over Holloway's objection, evidence of items used in methamphetamine manufacturing that investigators had discovered during a warrantless search of Holloway's car. On appeal, Holloway argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence because the search that produced it violated his right to privacy under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the exigent circumstances exception to the prohibition against warrantless searches under the United States Constitution applied, and the search was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of Holloway's vehicle.

Facts

[3] In the early morning hours of February 10, 2014, Harrison County Sheriff's Department Deputy, Michael Andry ("Deputy Andry"), was on duty in Palmyra, Indiana. He was patrolling a gas station when he saw a black Honda vehicle parked in front of the gas station door. He found the parking of the vehicle "odd" because it was "blocking the door completely," in spite of the fact that the parking lot was empty and there were actual parking spots available. (Tr. 122). As a result, he called dispatch and requested that the dispatcher check the BMV records for the Honda's license plate. The dispatcher ran the license plate and reported to him that the plate's registration was inactive and was associated with a different car, a Mitshubishi.

[4] Deputy Andry followed the Honda, which had departed the gas station while he was checking its records, and activated his lights and siren. The Honda did not stop or pull over. Instead, it led Deputy Andry on a chase that lasted for fifty minutes and reached speeds of over 100 miles per hour. Eventually, Deputy Andry followed the Honda onto a street that he knew was a dead end. He exited his vehicle, believing that the occupants of the Honda were going to attempt to escape on foot. However, the Honda made a u-turn and drove back in his direction. As it attempted to get around his police car, Deputy Andry slid on some ice on the road, and the Honda ran into him. Deputy Andry fell onto the car's hood and, as a result of the impact, accidentally discharged his firearm. The driver of the Honda, who was later identified as Holloway, "revv[ed] the motor up," and Deputy Andry then intentionally discharged his firearm three more times in Holloway's direction to make him stop the vehicle. (Tr. 132). Holloway suffered injuries to both of his hands as a result of the gunshots but finally stopped the vehicle.

[5] Conservation Officer Neal Bouwington ("Officer Bouwington"), who had followed Deputy Andry for part of the pursuit, arrived on the scene after the shooting. He and Deputy Andry determined that there were three people inside of the Honda and arrested all three of them. Officer Bouwington also looked into the vehicle and observed that it was a "mess," although he did not identify any specific items or conduct a search. (Tr. 223).

[6] Subsequently, other officers arrived as backup. Those officers learned the identities of the three people who had been in the Honda and became concerned, based on their prior knowledge of those individuals, that there might be a mobile methamphetamine laboratory in the vehicle. Rachel Kirkham ("Kirkham"), one of the passengers, also admitted that "there may be something methamphetamine related in the vehicle." (Tr. 243-44). As a result, the officers contacted State Police Detective Paul Andry ("Detective Andry"), who was trained to investigate methamphetamine labs.⁴

[7] When Detective Andry responded to the scene, he saw a glass methamphetamine pipe lying in the snow outside of the Honda, which "led [him] to believe that methamphetamine might be involved." (Tr. 238). He performed a preliminary search of the vehicle and removed a zipped bag from the back of the vehicle. He opened the bag and discovered chemicals commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine, but he did not discover an active methamphetamine lab. Because the chemicals were not interacting, he determined that the Honda was safe to move, and the officers transported it to the Sheriff's Department. At that point, the officers obtained a search warrant and inventoried the remaining items in the car. During the inventory, they discovered several additional items commonly used in manufacturing methamphetamine, including, among other items, pseudophedrine

, lithium batteries, muriatic acid, Coleman fuel, sulfuric acid, lye, instant cold packs, baggies, and a scale. They also found methamphetamine residue on a coffee filter, four baggies of methamphetamine, and a baggie containing a substance that appeared to be marijuana.

[8] That same day, February 10, 2014, the State charged Holloway with Class A felony attempted murder; Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine; Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance; Class D felony possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance; Class D felony resisting law enforcement; and Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness. The State also alleged that Holloway was an habitual substance offender because he had two or more prior unrelated substance abuse convictions.

[9] A jury trial was held on February 9, 10, and 11, 2016. At trial, Holloway objected to the admission of the evidence found in the bag that Detective Andry had searched without a warrant. He argued that the search had violated his constitutional right to privacy and that the evidence seized as a result of the search should be excluded. In response to Holloway's objection, the trial court heard testimony from Detective Andry outside of the presence of the jury. Detective Andry testified that he had known the three individuals in the Honda from prior investigations. He also testified that he had been working on an active investigation that included them when he responded to the instant case. As a result, Detective Andrey knew that they had been involved in procuring precursors for methamphetamine manufacturing "as recent[ly] as the week before" the car chase. (Tr. 242). He testified that this knowledge made him afraid that there might be a mobile methamphetamine lab in the car. He explained, "When [an officer] told [him] that there had been a pursuit that had gone on for a lengthy period of time[,] [he] was concerned that these chemicals could be [ ] potentially explosive."

(Tr. 243). Because there was a danger that one of the officers could be injured moving the car if there were an explosion, he believed that the car should not be moved until he could inspect its interior to make sure none of the chemicals was "in reaction." (Tr. 243). He also noted that there was a risk that evidence would be destroyed if there were an explosion.

[10] After hearing Detective Andry's testimony, the trial court overruled Holloway's objection to the admission of the evidence discovered during the search of the bag. As a basis for its conclusion, the trial court reasoned that public safety concerns justified the search. Then, at the beginning of the next day of the jury trial, the trial court again addressed its reasoning for overruling Holloway's motion. It clarified that it thought the search was permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the prohibition on warrantless searches—due to the need for officer safety and the potential for destruction of evidence—and under the custodial arrest exception.

[11] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Holloway of attempted murder, but it found him guilty of the remaining charges. Holloway then pled guilty to the habitual substance offender allegation. The trial court sentenced him to fourteen (14) years for dealing methamphetamine; one (1) year for maintaining a common nuisance; one (1) year for possession of chemical reagents; one (1) year for resisting law enforcement; and one (1) year for criminal recklessness, with all of the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court also enhanced Holloway's sentence for dealing methamphetamine by four (4) years for his habitual substance offender adjudication, resulting in an eighteen (18)-year aggregate sentence. Holloway now appeals his convictions for dealing in methamphetamine, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of chemical reagents.

Decision

[12] On appeal, Holloway argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals and supplies that Detective Andry discovered during his warrantless search of the bag in Holloway's Honda. He argues that the search violated his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and, accordingly, the evidence discovered in the search should have been excluded. Although the Federal and State constitutional provisions have similar structures, their interpretations and applications vary. Accordingly, we will address Holloway's argument under each provision separately.

[13] Preliminarily, though, we note that the trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility...