Holman v. Foster, Case No. 17 C 5765
| Decision Date | 13 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17 C 5765 |
| Parties | EXULAM HOLMAN, (#K52133), Petitioner, v. CRAIG FOSTER, Warden, Graham Correctional Center, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Exulam Holman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For these reasons, the Court denies Petitioner's habeas petition and declines to certify any issues for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). [R. 1, 16.]
When considering § 2254 habeas petitions, federal courts must presume as correct the factual findings made by the last state court to decide the case on the merits unless the habeas petitioner rebuts those findings by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 525 (7th Cir. 2017). Where Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption, the following factual background is based on the Illinois Appellate Court's findings in People v. Holman, 20 N.E.3d 450, 454 (3d Dist. 2014).
On December 31, 2011, Will County Sheriff's Deputies arrested Petitioner after being dispatched to his residence while a New Year's Eve party was in progress. During a fight with his uncle, Petitioner pressed his thumbs into his uncle's eye sockets resulting in severe injury, including that one of his uncle's eyes had to be removed and his uncle lost vision in the other eye. Petitioner was charged and tried on one count of aggravated domestic battery and one count of aggravated battery. After an August 2012 trial in the Circuit Court of Will County, the jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts and concluded that the offenses involved "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" making Petitioner eligible for an extended term sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2). The Circuit Court then sentenced Petitioner to the maximum sentence of fourteen years.
In his direct appeal to the Illinois Appellate Court, Petitioner, by counsel, argued that the evidence presented a trial was insufficient to support his conviction because he acted in self-defense and that his sentence violated Illinois law. On October 8, 2014, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Will County Circuit Court's judgment and sentence. In his petition for leave to appeal ("PLA") to the Supreme Court of Illinois, Petitioner, by counsel, argued that the Supreme Court should clarify the way the Illinois Appellate Court analyzes double enhancement claims on appeal. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's PLA on September 30, 2015.
Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition pursuant to the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective based on a conflict of interest and counsel's failure to file a motion concerning the prosecutor's use of perjured testimony. Petitioner also argued that his trial counsel should have impeached the responding officer's trial testimony. Moreover, Petitioner argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective. Last, Petitioner asserted that the trial judge had a conflict of interest andwas biased. The Will County Circuit Court summarily dismissed his pro se post-conviction petition as "frivolous and without merit." See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(2).
After Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, on November 22, 2016, his appellate counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). In addressing the potential judicial bias argument, counsel's Finley motion noted that Petitioner's post-conviction petition had alleged that the trial judge was biased against him because (1) her husband had represented him in a 1999 civil lawsuit against the Joliet Police Department resulting in Petitioner receiving a $100,000 settlement; and (2) the judge imposed the maximum sentence. In his Finley motion, appellate counsel argued that these facts did not demonstrate bias, especially because the Illinois Appellate Court had held on direct appeal that Petitioner's sentence was justified by his extensive criminal record, his history of "escalating violence," and the "gruesome facts" of the case. In response to counsel's Finley motion to withdraw, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to bring the 1999 civil lawsuit to the trial judge's attention and counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach his uncle with his prior testimony.
On January 12, 2017, the Illinois Appellate Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and affirmed the judgment holding that the judicial bias and ineffective assistance of counsel claims were forfeited because they could have been raised on direct appeal. The Illinois Appellate Court also concluded that these claims lacked merit. After Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition PLA, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied his PLA on May 24, 2017.
On August 7, 2017, Petitioner filed the present pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Construing Petitioner's pro se allegations liberally, see Echols v. Craig, 855 F.3d 807, 812 (7thCir. 2017), he asserts that: (1) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective and had a conflict of interest for failing to bring the 1999 civil lawsuit to the trial court's attention; (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to impeach his uncle's testimony; (3) the trial judge was biased; (4) the evidence underlying his conviction was insufficient, especially because he had acted in self-defense; and (5) his sentence is excessive because the trial court did not consider mitigating evidence.1
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the Court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Pinno v. Wachtendorf, 845 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has explained that a state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. Under the "unreasonable application" prong, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that although the state court identified the correct legal rule, it unreasonably applied the controlling law to the facts of the case. Id. at 407.
"A federal habeas corpus petitioner is required to exhaust his available state remedies before seeking federal relief." Lisle v. Pierce, 832 F.3d 778, 785 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 28U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)). "Inherent in the habeas petitioner's obligation to exhaust his state court remedies before seeking relief in habeas corpus, is the duty to fairly present his federal claims to the state courts." King v. Pfister, 834 F.3d 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). More specifically, a habeas petitioner must fully and fairly present his federal claims through one full round of state court review before he files his federal habeas petition. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 848, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); Tabb v. Christianson, 855 F.3d 757, 765 (7th Cir. 2017). If a habeas petitioner fails to fully and fairly present his federal claims through one full round of state court review, he has procedurally defaulted his claims. Tabb, 855 F.3d at 765. Also, "a federal court may not review federal claims that were procedurally defaulted in state court - that is, claims that the state court denied based on an adequate and independent state procedural rule." Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017). Procedural default precludes federal courts from reviewing the merits of a petitioner's habeas claims. Thomas v. Williams, 822 F.3d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 2016).
A habeas petitioner may overcome procedural default by demonstrating cause for the default and actual prejudice or by showing that the federal court's failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The Supreme Court defines cause sufficient to excuse procedural default as "some objective factor external to the defense" which prevents a petitioner from pursuing his constitutional claim in state court. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); Johnson v. Foster, 786 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 2015). Prejudice means actual prejudice infecting the "entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Murray, 477 U.S. at 494 (citation omitted). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs when ahabeas petitioner establishes that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." Id. at 496; see also Jones v. Calloway, 842 F.3d 454, 461 (7th Cir. 2016).
In response to the present habeas petition, Respondent asserts that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his judicial bias and ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the Illinois Appellate Court's determination that Petitioner had "forfeited" these claims because he could have raised them on direct appeal. More...
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