Holman v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Docket NumberCivil 21-112-BAH
Decision Date27 May 2022
PartiesLAURA HOLMAN, Plaintiff, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRENDAN A. HURSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the Court are five matters related to a motor vehicle tort action involving Plaintiff Laura Holman (hereinafter Plaintiff) and Co-Defendants Greyhound Lines Inc. (hereinafter Greyhound) and Just on Time Freight Systems, Inc. (hereinafter “JOT”). Three motions specifically relate to a pro rata settlement reached between Plaintiff and Greyhound: JOT's motion to preclude or in the alternative set aside settlement, ECF 49 (hereinafter “JOT's Motion to Preclude Settlement), Greyhound's opposition to JOT's Motion to Preclude Settlement and motion to dismiss JOT's crossclaims, ECF 54 (hereinafter “Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss), and Greyhound's motion for sanctions, ECF 55 (hereinafter “Greyhound's Motion for Sanctions) (collectively “Settlement-Related Motions”). The remaining two motions relate to discovery: Greyhound's motion for leave to file expert witness disclosure, ECF 42 (hereinafter “Greyhound's Motion for Leave), and JOT's motion to strike Plaintiff's untimely expert report, ECF 45 (hereinafter “JOT's Motion to Strike Expert Notice) (collectively, “Discovery-Related Motions”). All filings included memoranda of law, some of which included exhibits.[1] I have reviewed the pending motions and all related papers and find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021).

For the reasons set forth below, JOT's Motion to Preclude Settlement, ECF 49, is DENIED; Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss, ECF 54, is GRANTED IN PART and JOT's crossclaim for indemnification, ECF 24, is DISMISSED; and Greyhound's Motion for Sanctions, ECF 55, is DENIED. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 12, the Court converts the portion of Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss, ECF 54, relating to JOT's crossclaim for contribution, to a motion for summary judgment based on a settlement agreement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). JOT's crossclaim for contribution, ECF 24, remains pending for ten (10) days after the entry of this Memorandum Opinion to give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard and, absent a showing that JOT should prevail, the Court intends to grant Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss and dismiss JOT's crossclaim for contribution. Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 56, the Court intends to enter summary judgment as to Greyhound's crossclaims, ECF 20, against JOT. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Finally, given the Court's rulings on the Settlement-Related Motions, the Court invites all parties to show cause within ten (10) days of the entry of this Memorandum Opinion as to why the Discovery-Related Motions are not MOOT.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a May 23, 2019, vehicle collision on southbound I-95 in Cecil County, Maryland. Compl. 2, ECF 3. Plaintiff was a passenger on a Greyhound bus that was allegedly travelling above the posted speed limit. Id. An eighteen-wheel tractor trailer owned and operated by JOT “attempted, without proper warning, to make an unsafe and illegal lane change” into the path of the bus. Id. at 3. The bus swerved to avoid a collision with the JOT tractor trailer and left the roadway. Id. Plaintiff was “forcefully thrown or propelled” from her seat and suffered injuries to “her [h]ead, knee[, ] and shoulder.” Id. Plaintiff sued Greyhound and JOT in state court alleging negligence. Id. at 3-7.

On January 31, 2021, Greyhound removed this action to federal court alleging diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal 1, ECF 1. On March 8, 2021, Greyhound filed a crossclaim against JOT seeking contribution and indemnity. Greyhound's Crosscl., ECF 20. On March 19, 2021, JOT responded with crossclaims of its own against Greyhound based on the same theories. JOT Crosscls., ECF 24. All parties timely responded and discovery began.

After the parties were granted three extensions of time to complete discovery, Greyhound filed a motion on March 17, 2022, seeking permission to file an expert disclosure after the Court's deadline to do so had passed. See Greyhound's Mot. Leave, ECF 42. JOT opposes this request. See JOT's Opp'n to Greyhound's Mot. Leave, ECF 46. JOT, in turn, filed a motion to strike Greyhound's expert disclosure. See JOT's Mot. Strike Expert Notice, ECF 45. Plaintiff filed an opposition to that motion, Pl.'s Opp'n to JOT's Mot. Strike, ECF 50, to which JOT replied, JOT's Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF 56.

While discovery was still pending, the parties engaged in an unsuccessful settlement conference in late December 2021. Greyhound's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF 54-1. With litigation costs mounting, see id., and the relationship between the parties growing more acrimonious, see JOT's Mot. Strike Expert Notice 1, ECF 45, Greyhound and Plaintiff began to pursue settlement more aggressively. Greyhound's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2-3, ECF 54-1. On March 29, 2022, Plaintiff and Greyhound “entered into a pro rata settlement agreement whereby Greyhound stipulated it was one, active joint tortfeasor and Plaintiff stipulated that any remaining claim against JOT would be reduced to the extent of the pro rata share of Greyhound pursuant to Maryland Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §3-1401 et seq. Greyhound's Mot. Dismiss ¶ 3, ECF 54; see also Greyhound's Mot. Dismiss, Ex. C, ECF 54-4 (“Confidential Joint Tortfeasor Release and Settlement of All Claims”) (hereinafter the “Settlement”).

On April 11, 2022, JOT moved for this Court to “preclude or in the alternative set aside” the Settlement. Mot. Preclude Settlement 1, ECF 49. JOT objects to the Settlement on the ground that it represents “plain legal prejudice” to JOT. Id. at 4. More specifically, JOT alleges that the Settlement “will interfere with [JOT]'s ability to seek contribution or indemnification at trial” and will “potentially render [two Greyhound-affiliated] witnesses” - the bus's driver and a corporate representative - “unavailable to testify at trial, ” presumably because Greyhound will no longer call the witnesses at trial and both witness “are out of state and are unlikely to appear for trial.” Id. at 8.

Plaintiff filed an opposition to JOT's Motion to Preclude the Settlement, Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. Preclude Settlement, ECF 52, to which JOT filed a reply, JOT's Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF 57. Greyhound also opposes JOT's Motion to Preclude Settlement and moves to dismiss JOT's crossclaims against Greyhound, ECF 24, because the Settlement “extinguish[es] JOT's claim for contribution and because JOT's “claim for implied indemnity against Greyhound fails as a matter of law.” Greyhound's Mot. Dismiss 2, ECF 54.

Furthermore, Plaintiff and Greyhound counter that JOT lacks standing to challenge the Settlement because [m]ere allegations of injury in fact or tactical disadvantage as a result of a settlement simply do not rise to the level of plain legal prejudice.” Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. Preclude Settlement 3, ECF 52-1; Greyhound's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 13, ECF 54-1 (citing Agretti v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 982 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1992)). Regardless, Greyhound and Plaintiff aver that the Settlement comports with the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial Proceedings, § 3-1401 et seq. (hereinafter “UCAJT”), and therefore, JOT's contribution claim against Greyhound must be dismissed. Greyhound's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6, ECF 54-1. Greyhound notes that JOT suffers no harm or prejudice because “in the event any judgment is entered against JOT, JOT will receive the benefits of reduction as provided in the [Settlement] negotiated by Greyhound.” Id. at 9; see also Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Opp'n to JOT's Mot. Preclude Settlement 3-4, ECF 52-1 (“JOT is not prejudiced by this settlement, as it is receiving an automatic reduction for 50% of any judgment, regardless of its size, entered against it at trial.”).

JOT filed a response to Greyhound's Motion to Dismiss. JOT's Reply & Opp'n to Greyhound's Mot. Dismiss, ECF 58. JOT argues that Greyhound's motion is untimely. Id. at 9. JOT also appears to allege that dismissal is not warranted because the Settlement is not signed and because Plaintiff has not formally dismissed Greyhound from the case. Id. at 12-13.

Finally, Greyhound seeks sanctions against JOT for all costs “related to responding to [JOT's Motion].” Mot. Sanctions 2, ECF 55. Greyhound avers that JOT has filed challenges to the Settlement that are “not warranted by existing law, ” “lack[] merit[, ] and are being maintained in bad faith.” Greyhound's Mem. Supp. Mot. Sanctions 8, ECF 55-1. Greyhound asks this Court “to deter [JOT] from maintaining and filing meritless and harassing litigation by ordering it to pay all of Greyhound's attorney's fees and other expenses” incurred responding to JOT's motions. Id. JOT did not respond to Greyhound's request for sanctions.

II. ANALYSIS

This matter was removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1441(b) after JOT invoked diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Notice of Removal 1, ECF 1. “When choosing the applicable state substantive law while exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, a federal district court applies the choice of law rules of the forum state.” Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F.Supp.2d 678, 696 (D. Md. 2011)). Here, Maryland is the forum state and thus the parties agree that Maryland law governs the instant dispute. See Greyhound's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6, ECF 54-1 (citing LaChance v Service Trucking, Co., 215 F.Supp. 162, 164 (D. Md. 1963)); Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Opp'n to JOT's Mot. Preclude Settlement 3, ECF 52-1 (citing Maryland law); JOT's Mem. Supp. Mot. Preclude...

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