Holmes Cnty. Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Miss. Dep't of Educ.

• Decision Date: 19 January 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:21-CV-508-DPJ-FKB
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
• Parties: HOLMES COUNTY PETITIONERS CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. RESPONDENTS

HOLMES COUNTY PETITIONERS CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ET AL. RESPONDENTS

Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-508-DPJ-FKB

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Northern Division

January 19, 2022

ORDER

DANIEL P. JORDAN III, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Petitioners allege that Respondents violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when closing the Holmes Consolidated School District (the “District”). The case is before the Court on (1) its own motion regarding subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) Petitioners' two motions seeking mandamus [6, 16]; and (3) Petitioners' motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) [2]. As explained below, the Court concludes that (1) it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the procedural-due-process claim but not the remaining claims (2) Petitioners' first motion for mandamus relief is moot, and their second is denied; and (3) Petitioners' motion for TRO is denied without prejudice to refiling.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In April 2021, the Mississippi Department of Education (MDE) began an on-site investigative audit of the District. That audit concluded on July 23, 2021, and on July 26, 2021, MDE sent a letter to the District's superintendent and the president of its school board: Attached was an audit report indicating that the District “is in violation of 26 out of 32” accreditation standards. Letter [1-2] at 1. The letter further informed the District that

[t]he MDE Office of Accreditation will present evidence to the Commission on School Accreditation (Commission), which will determine whether an extreme emergency exists in the [District] that jeopardizes the safety, security, or educational interests of the children enrolled in the schools in the District.... The Commission meeting will begin at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, August 2, 2021, in the Senator Gray Ferris Board Room on the Fourth Floor of the Central High School Building in Jackson, Mississippi.

Pursuant to Accreditation Policy 2.9.2.2, District representatives, which shall include[] the Superintendent and the [District] Board Chair, will be allowed to address the Commission prior to the Commission's determination....

If the Commission makes a recommendation(s) at this meeting, the recommendation(s) will be presented to the [State Board of Education (SBE)] at a special-called meeting on August 3, 2021, at 10:00 a.m. in the Senator Gray Ferris Board Room on the Fourth Floor of the Central High School Building in Jackson, Mississippi. The SBE will follow the same format as the Commission in allowing the District and the MDE to address the SBE prior to the SBE's determination.

Id. at 2.

Those meetings took place, and the Commission and the SBE found, on August 3, 2021, sufficient cause to believe that an extreme emergency situation exists in the . . .

District brought on by serious violations of state and federal law and accreditation standards, serious concerns regarding financial resources and lack of internal controls, inappropriate standards of governance, inappropriate oversight by the local board, a continued pattern of poor academic performance, and the failure to sustain a safe school climate, which jeopardizes the safety, security, and educational interests of the children enrolled in the schools of this district, and which, without intervention by the Commission . . . and the [SBE], could result in the continuation of an inadequate and unstable educational environment thereby denying the students of this district the opportunity to learn, to excel, and to obtain a free and appropriate public education.

SBE Resolution [18-3] at 1; accord Commission Resolution [18-2] at 1. The SBE's Resolution requested a proclamation from the Governor declaring “a state of emergency . . . effective immediately in the . . . District” and stating that, “contingent upon” such proclamation, the District would be “abolish[ed].” SBE Resolution [18-3] at 2. The SBE would then “exercise all powers which were held by the previously existing school board and the previously existing superintendent of schools.” Id.

The following day, August 4, 2021, Petitioners, including the District, its superintendent, and the members of its board of trustees, filed their Emergency Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Complaint for Discovery. The Petition alleges two federal due-process claims under § 1983, a claim that Respondents violated Mississippi's Open Meetings Act, and a request for declaratory relief.

At 10:21 a.m. on August 5, 2021, Petitioners filed a motion for a TRO without an accompanying memorandum of law. At 1:25 p.m. that day (before the Court and counsel could agree to a briefing schedule on the TRO motion), Governor Reeves issued a proclamation declaring a state of extreme emergency in the District. That proclamation triggered SBE's resolution, effectively abolishing the District and inserting SBE into its role.

Petitioners immediately responded with an Urgent and Necessitous Motion for Writ of Mandamus [6] and, a few days later, with an amended motion [16]. The Court then set a briefing schedule on the mandamus motion, but the resulting briefs raised jurisdictional concerns. So, on August 20, 2021, the Court entered an Order directing Petitioners “to show cause . . . why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Order [20] at 2. The parties have now briefed the jurisdictional issues.

II. Analysis

A. Jurisdiction and the Court's Show-Cause Order

“The Eleventh Amendment bars an individual from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly and validly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2002). “The state need not be the named party in a federal lawsuit, for a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an ‘alter ego' or ‘arm' of the state.” Id. The Eleventh Amendment bar, when it applies, implicates the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996).

Petitioners acknowledge the Eleventh Amendment issue but say their official-capacity, due-process claims against the individual defendants fall within the narrow Ex parte Young exception to that immunity. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). “Under Ex parte Young, a litigant may sue a state official in his [or her] official capacity if the suit seeks prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law.” Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “There are three basic elements of an Ex parte Young lawsuit. The suit must: (1) be brought against state officers who are acting in their official capacities; (2) seek prospective relief to redress ongoing conduct; and (3) allege a violation of federal, not state, law.” Id.

In this case, Ex parte Young is largely inapplicable. To begin, the Eleventh Amendment bars Counts I and II to the extent Petitioners assert due-process claims against MDE, the SBE, and the Commission; those entity defendants constitute arms of the state, not state officers. See McIntosh v. Barbour, No. 4:10-CV-72-P-S, 2010 WL 5169045, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 14, 2010) (concluding MDE is arm of the state); see also Perez, 307 F.3d at 326 (“[A] state's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to any state agency or entity deemed an ‘alter ego' or ‘arm' of the state.”). The Eleventh Amendment also bars Count III in its entirety because it reflects a claim that Defendants violate Mississippi's Open Meetings Act. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from “instruct[ing] state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law”). Nor may Petitioners sue Defendants Aultman, Manners, and Wright in their official capacities for past harms. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).

None of that is seriously disputed, but the Court also finds that the Eleventh Amendment bars Petitioners' claims for declaratory relief stated in Count IV. In that count, Petitioners seek two declarations related to the federal-law claims: (1) that “the deliberations and votes taken by Defendants in secrecy and other Commissioners and Board Members are invalid, and violate due process” and (2) “that Defendants' policies, procedures, hearings, and actions have violated Portioners' [sic] rights under the Due Process Clause.” Pet. [1] ¶¶ 51, 52 (emphasis added).

The Fifth Circuit addressed similar declarations in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Abbott, a case that arose when Texas denied a foundation's request to erect a display on capitol grounds. 955 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2020). There, the complaint properly sought prospective declaratory relief by seeking a declaration that the state's criteria for public displays, ‘“as applied by Defendants, violate' the First Amendment.” Id. at 424. But the trial court ultimately entered a declaration “that Defendants violated [the plaintiff's] First Amendment rights.” Id. at 423 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding:

The backwards-looking, past-tense declaratory judgment issued by the district court is “tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of law, even though styled as something else.” [Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)]; see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68-69, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred a claim for declaratory relief once the claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot). While it is true that the declaratory judgment could have some future effect by clarifying the contours of the

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