HOLMES-MARTIN v. Sebelius
| Decision Date | 17 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 07-2128. |
| Citation | 693 F. Supp.2d 141 |
| Parties | Arthuretta HOLMES-MARTIN, Plaintiff, v. Kathleen SEBELIUS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
David H. Shapiro, Richard L. Swick, Ellen K. Renaud, Swick & Shapiro, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff.
Wyneva Johnson, U.S. Attorney's Office for D.C., Washington, D.C., for Defendant.
This matter is before the court on the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment.1 The plaintiff, the former Deputy Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization ("OSDBU"), commenced this action against her former employer, alleging that she was subjected to racially-motivated disparate treatment, retaliation and a hostile work environment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("§ 1981") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.2 The defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims because the actions she complains of are justified by legitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons, because many of those actions do not qualify as adverse employment actions and because she was not subjected to severe or pervasive hostile conduct based on her race or her involvement in protected activity.
For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that the plaintiff has raised an issue of material fact concerning whether the reassignment of her Deputy Director duties was motivated by discriminatory intent, and denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim premised on this conduct. The plaintiff, however, has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of her remaining claims, including her disparate treatment claims based on the reassignment of her project duties and her termination, her retaliation claims and her hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment to the defendant on these claims.
A more detailed presentation of the factual allegations underlying this case can be found in a prior decision of this court. See generally 569 F.Supp.2d 184 (D.D.C.2008). By way of brief background, in January 2000, the plaintiff, an African-American woman, began working as the Deputy Director of the OSDBU, an office within the Department of Health and Human Services. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 3. Her first line supervisor was Debbie Ridgely, a white female, the Director of the OSDBU. Id.
In 2004, Ridgely hired Clarence Randall, a white male, to serve as her "Special Advisor," a position created, the plaintiff claims, to supersede the plaintiff's position. Id. at 3. The plaintiff alleges that over the following months, Ridgely transferred many of the plaintiff's responsibilities to Randall, such that Randall effectively assumed the role of Ridgely's deputy. Id. Meanwhile, the plaintiff was relegated to working as a staffer on specific OSDBU projects and no longer held the broad supervisory authority she had exercised as the Deputy Director. Id. at 3-4 & Ex. 2 ("Pl.'s Decl.") ¶ 3.
The plaintiff asserts that not long after relegating her to project work, Ridgely began transferring the plaintiff's project responsibilities to other employees. Id. at 6. As a result of these reassignments, the plaintiff allegedly had nothing to do seventy-five to eighty percent of the work day. Def.'s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") at 7; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 15.
The plaintiff also contends that during this period, Ridgely subjected her to a pattern of hostile behavior. Pl.'s Opp'n at 10. For instance, the plaintiff states that Ridgely humiliated her in front of the staff by insinuating that she was incompetent and irresponsible and scrutinized her more closely than other employees. Id. Ridgely also purportedly undermined the plaintiff by telling other employees not to listen to her or respect her opinion, and directed the plaintiff to communicate with her exclusively by e-mail. Id. at 10-11. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that Ridgely mishandled a salary waiver request submitted by the plaintiff, imposed unrealistic deadlines on the plaintiff and included unwarranted criticisms in the plaintiff's 2004 performance evaluation. Id. at 12.
The plaintiff alleges that this mistreatment resulted in a rapid deterioration of her psychological and physical health, leading to severe depression and generalized anxiety disorder. Id. at 12-13. In June 2006, the plaintiff's physician recommended that the plaintiff, who had already missed a number of days of work, take extended leave to address her health issues, which she did. Id. at 13; Compl. ¶ 13. In an October 2006 letter, a Human Resources Specialist informed the plaintiff that "her . . . absence was placing a considerable strain on the staff and their daily operations" and that "she was required to return to her office on November 13, 2006." Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Partial Summ. J. ("Def.'s 1st Mot."), Ex. 35. The plaintiff's physician, however, recommended extending the leave for an undefined period, informing the agency that "it may be possible for the plaintiff to return to a position . . . in a part time capacity in 6-8 months." Def.'s 1st Mot. at 9 & Exs. 29, 40.
In January 2007, Ridgely proposed the plaintiff's removal, citing the plaintiff's inability to perform her job. Pl.'s Opp'n at 13; Compl. ¶ 14. In the notification of proposed removal, Ridgely informed the plaintiff that her decision was "based on the fact that the Agency needs someone in your position of record who can carry out the duties and responsibilities of the position on a full-time, regular basis." Def.'s Mot., Ex. 21 at 3. The defendant terminated the plaintiff from employment in June 2007. Compl. ¶ 15.
After exhausting her administrative remedies, the plaintiff filed a complaint in this court in November 2007 alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 16-19. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment in February 2008. See generally Def.'s 1st Mot. In her opposition to that motion, the plaintiff for the first time raised claims of a hostile work environment and disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. See generally Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss. In August 2008, the court dismissed the plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim but denied the remainder of the defendant's motion. See generally Mem. Op. (Aug. 8, 2007).
Following discovery, the defendant filed this renewed motion for summary judgment in July 2009. See generally Def.'s Mot. With the motion now fully submitted, the court turns to an analysis of the applicable legal standards and the parties' arguments.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "failed to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.
The nonmoving party may defeat summary judgment through factual representations made in a sworn affidavit if he "supports his allegations . . . with facts in the record," Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999) (quoting Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993)), or provides "direct testimonial evidence," Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, for the court to accept anything less "would defeat the central purpose of the summary judgment device, which is to weed out those cases insufficiently meritorious to warrant the expense of a jury trial." Greene, 164 F.3d at 675.
Finally, the D.C. Circuit has directed that because it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish proof of discrimination, the court should view summary judgment motions in such cases with special caution. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 879-80 (D.C.Cir.1997), overturned on other grounds, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.Cir.1998) (en banc); see also Johnson v. Digital Equip. Corp., 836 F.Supp. 14, 18 (D.D.C.1993).
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