Holmes v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 December 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 54500
• Citation: Holmes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 616, 119 Mich.App. 710 (Mich. App. 1982)
• Parties: Timothy HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and Jan Janowiak, Defendants-Appellees. 119 Mich.App. 710, 326 N.W.2d 616
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 616

326 N.W.2d 616

Timothy HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY and Jan JanowiakDefendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 54500.

119 Mich.App. 710, 326 N.W.2d 616

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 21, 1982.

Decided Sept. 22, 1982.

Released for Publication Dec. 3, 1982.

[119 MICHAPP 711]Cockrel, Cooper & King by Anthony J. Vigliotti, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Franklin, Petrulis, Lichty & Mellon, P.C. by Bruce W. Franklin and Irene A. Bruce, Troy, for defendants-appellees.

[119 MICHAPP 712]Before CYNAR, P.J., and KAUFMAN and MAHINSKE, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff seeks damages from defendants for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in the handling of plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits claim.M.C.L. Sec. 418.101 et seq.;M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(101) et seq. A jury trial commenced on March 29, 1979.After a lengthy presentation of plaintiff's case, defendants moved for a directed verdict on April 26, 1979.Finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial judge granted defendants' motion.Plaintiff appeals from an order, entered December 26, 1979, denying his motion for a new trial.

Plaintiff injured his lower back at work on September 22, 1970.He received workers' compensation benefits from Allstate Insurance Company(Allstate), the worker's compensation carrier for plaintiff's employer, which continued without interruption until April 23, 1974.Plaintiff's benefits were stopped at that time when he failed to attend vocational rehabilitation and failed to provide necessary medical reports regarding inability to do so.On the advice of counsel to the effect that plaintiff's benefits were wrongly cut off without a hearing by the Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation, Allstate resumed plaintiff's workers' compensation payments on August 12, 1974.Payment for all past due sums was agreed to on August 14, 1974.

During the course of treatment for his back injury, plaintiff was operated on twice by Dr. Sidney Charnas.Allstate paid all of the medical bills for treatment of plaintiff by Dr. Charnas and [119 MICHAPP 713] numerous other doctors.Plaintiff continued to treat with Dr. Charnas until December 19, 1972.Plaintiff alleged at trial that he had requested to see Dr. Charnas in January and again in February of 1974 because of a "knot" in his back.Allstate, stating that no relationship was shown to plaintiff's work-related injury, initially refused to authorize the treatment and later stated it would authorize payment for such treatment only after receiving a report from the doctor showing that the "knot" was related to plaintiff's work-related injury.

Whenever a fact question exists upon which reasonable minds may differ, the trial judge may not direct a verdict.On the other hand, when no fact question exists, the trial judge may properly grant such a verdict.Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 407, 231 N.W.2d 46(1975);Light v. Schmidt, 84 Mich.App. 51, 59, 269 N.W.2d 304(1978).A reviewing court must review all the evidence presented to determine if a fact question exists.In doing so, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, granting him every reasonable inference and resolving any conflict in the evidence in his favor.If the evidence viewed in that manner establishes a prima facie case, i.e., presents a question upon which reasonable minds could differ, the trial court's grant of a directed verdict must be reversed.Light, supra;Cody v. Marcel Electric Co., 71 Mich.App. 714, 717, 248 N.W.2d 663(1976), lv. den.399 Mich. 851(1977).

In this case, plaintiff alleged at trial that defendants' actions in handling his claim for workers' compensation benefits created a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.This Court is faced with the question of whether there was sufficient evidence presented at the conclusion [119 MICHAPP 714] of plaintiff's proofs to raise the question of whether defendants committed this tort.

Although there has been confusion regarding a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as distinguished from damages for mental anguish incident to an independent tort, and the Michigan Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, the Michigan Court of Appeals has delineated intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action which is not necessarily parasitic to another cause of action as an aggravating element of damages.Mosley v. Federal Dep't Stores, Inc., 85 Mich.App. 333, 338, 271 N.W.2d 224(1978).See also, Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271(CA 6, 1980).The Court has explicitly adopted the definition found in the Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d Sec. 46, pp. 71-72, which provides:

"(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.* * * ".

See, Ross v. Burns, supra, p. 273;Warren v. June's Mobile Home Village & Sales, Inc., 66 Mich.App. 386, 390, 239 N.W.2d 380(1976);Frishett v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 3 Mich.App. 688, 692, 143 N.W.2d 612(1966), lv. den.378 Mich. 733(1966).

As explained in the Restatement, Sec. 46, comment d, p. 73:

"It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.Liability[119 MICHAPP 715] has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'

"The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."SeeWarren, supra, 66 Mich.App. pp. 390-391, 239 N.W.2d 380.

In defining the types of situations where these rules may be applied, the Warren Court explained:

"The extreme and outrageous character of a defendant's conduct may arise in a number of situations.It may occur by virtue of an abuse by defendant of a relationship which puts him in a position of actual or apparent authority over plaintiff or gives defendant power to affect plaintiff's interests.The landlord-tenant relationship is one such situation.The tort may arise where defendant acts notwithstanding the knowledge that plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because of defendant's actions.However, conduct may be privileged under some circumstances.For example, an actor is not liable 'where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional distress'.Restatement, supra, Sec. 46, comment g, p. 76."Warren, supra, p. 391, 239 N.W.2d 380.

Based on these standards, the Warren Court held that a...