Holmes v. Colo. Coal. for the Homeless Long Term Disability Plan
Decision Date | 12 August 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13–1175.,13–1175. |
Citation | 762 F.3d 1195 |
Parties | Lucrecia Carpio HOLMES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. COLORADO COALITION FOR the HOMELESS LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Brian A. Murphy, Lakewood, CO, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Richard N. Bien (Robyn L. Anderson, with him on the brief), Kansas City, MO, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Lucrecia Carpio Holmes appeals the district court's ruling that her claim for disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is barred due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Ms. Holmes is a former employee of the Colorado Coalition for the Homeless (the Coalition) and participated in an employee benefits plan funded, in part, by a disability insurance policy through Union Security Insurance Company (Union Security).1 The benefits were provided by Union Security under Group Policy 4048742 (the Policy). The benefits plan is subject to the requirements of ERISA.
While employed by the Coalition, Ms. Holmes presented with a number of medical conditions, including breast cancer, cataplexy, apnea, blackouts, diabetes, carpal tunnel syndrome, and neuropathy. As a result, she filed a claim for disability benefits with Union Security on March 10, 2005. Union Security sent written notification to Ms. Holmes on May 27, 2005 that it had denied her claim because she failed to prove she was disabled as defined by the Policy. The denial letter included an explanation of Ms. Holmes's right to internal review of the decision and attached a copy of a Group Claim Denial Review Procedure (the Denial Review Procedure), which describes a two-level review process.
On November 21, 2005, in accordance with the Denial Review Procedure, Ms. Holmes filed a request for review of the denial (the first-level review). Union Security issued a decision on the first-level review 137 days later on April 7, 2006, when it informed Ms. Holmes in writing that it had affirmed the denial of benefits. Union Security's April 7, 2006, letter contained a second copy of the Denial Review Procedure, which informed Ms. Holmes that she “may request another review of [Union Security's] decision,” and that this second-level review is the “final level of administrative review available.” Aplt.App. 235–36; 294–97. The Denial Review Procedure further states that if Ms. Holmes's claim is denied “as part of the [second-level review],” she will “have a right to bring a civil action.” Id. at 236.
Rather than pursuing further administrative remedies at that time, Ms. Holmes took no action for over two years. Then, on April 28, 2008, she filed a civil action against the Colorado Coalition for the Homeless Long Term Disability Plan (the Defendant) in Colorado state court pursuant to ERISA's civil enforcement provisions. See29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The Defendant was unaware of the lawsuit and the state court entered default judgment against it. Upon learning of the suit, the Defendant removed the action to federal court and moved to have the default judgment set aside. The district court granted the Defendant's motion, holding that Ms. Holmes had not validly served process on it.
The proceedings in the district court continued and both parties sought summary judgment based on the undisputed facts in the Administrative Record. While those cross motions were pending, Ms. Holmes filed a motion to stay decision, reopen discovery, and proceed to trial, if necessary (the discovery motion). The basis of Ms. Holmes's discovery motion was that further discovery was needed to identify which document or set of documents actually constitutes the plan.
The district court denied the discovery motion and granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. It held Ms. Holmes's claim was barred because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not seeking a second-level review as required by the plan. The court rejected Ms. Holmes's arguments that she should be deemed to have exhausted her administrative remedies because Union Security failed to render a timely decision on her first-level review or because Union Security did not provide notice of the two-level review process as required by ERISA. It concluded that although Union Security did not render a decision until 137 days after Ms. Holmes sought a first-level review, 67 of those days were attributable to Ms. Holmes's delay in providing Union Security with requested medical records. As a result, the district court held Ms. Holmes had forfeited her right to enforce the ERISA deadlines. The district court also held Union Security had complied with the applicable ERISA notice and disclosure requirements.
Ms. Holmes claims the district court erred by determining she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. In addition, she appeals two interlocutory decisions: the district court's order setting aside default judgment against the Defendant and its order denying her discovery motion. Ms. Holmes has not met her burden of adequately briefing her challenges to the interlocutory orders on appeal and we will not consider them further. Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, Colo., 518 F.3d 1217, 1223 n. 6 (10th Cir.2008) ( ); Adler v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir.1998) (); Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n. 2 (10th Cir.1994) ( ); see alsoFed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (). Our review is therefore limited to determining the scope of Ms. Holmes's internal review obligations and whether the district court properly granted the Defendant summary judgment based on Ms. Holmes's failure to exhaust those administrative remedies.
This court reviews summary judgment orders de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Cardoza v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 708 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.2013). Summary judgment is available “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
According to Ms. Holmes, the undisputed facts of this case show that she, rather than the Defendant, is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. She offers two separate arguments in support. First, she contends she cannot be required to engage in a second-level review before bringing a civil action because such a requirement is not included in the summary plan description (SPD) provided by Union Security to plan participants. Second, and in the alternative, Ms. Holmes argues that even if such a requirement does exist, she should be deemed to have exhausted her administrative remedies due to Union Security's failure to comply with ERISA's timing and notice requirements. We address each of these arguments in turn, beginning with the level of internal review required by the plan.
To determine whether Ms. Holmes was required to pursue a second-level review before she could file a civil action, we must first identify the documents that control her obligations under ERISA. ERISA addresses two categories of documents relevant here, which each serve a different purpose. The first is the plan document, which must specify in writing the basis on which payments are to be made under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(4). Second, ERISA requires plan administrators to provide participants with a “summary plan description,” which must reasonably apprise participants of their rights and obligations under the plan. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A), 1021(a), 1022, 1024. Although the plan documents contain the enforceable terms of the benefit plan, the summary plan description is intended to communicate the contents of the plan in understandable language to participants. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 1877, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011).
Ms. Holmes argues she cannot be required to engage in a second-level review because the SPD provided by Union Security does not describe a two-level review process. In response, the Defendant asserts that the two-level review process was incorporated into the SPD by reference. The underlying assumption of both arguments is that the enforceability of the two-level review process is dependent upon whether it is part of the SPD. However, this analytical approach is unsound because it is inconsistent with the distinct purposes of the SPD and the plan documents as established by ERISA.
In Amara, the Supreme Court clarified that the requirements of an ERISA plan must be based on the terms of the plan document, which do not include the summary plan description in all circumstances.2131 S.Ct. at 1878 () (emphasis in original); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1537, 1548, 185 L.Ed.2d 654 (2013) . The Supreme...
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