Holmes v. Donovan
| Decision Date | 25 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-6467,91-6467 |
| Citation | 984 F.2d 732 |
| Parties | 142 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2329, 124 Lab.Cas. P 10,561 James W. HOLMES; John Johnson; Ervin Bradley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Charles Todd, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ray DONOVAN, Secretary, United States Department of Labor; William Anderson; Robert Holmes; Local 149 of the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers Union, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Elizabeth L. Gilchrist (argued and briefed), Jackson, MS, for plaintiffs-appellants.
James W. Holmes, pro se.
John Johnson, pro se.
Ervin Bradley, pro se.
Mark Allen (argued and briefed), Lynn Agee, Agee, Allen, Godwin, Morris & Laurenzi, Memphis, TN, for defendants-appellees.
Before: BOGGS and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal consists of two consolidated actions brought in the Western District of Tennessee involving labor claims against the same union, as well as two of its officers and the Department of Labor. 1 Plaintiffs James Holmes and Ervin Bradley appeal the dismissals of their actions as time-barred. Plaintiff John Johnson appeals the district court's ruling finding that he had failed to exhaust his internal union remedies and failed to allege facts to support his emotional distress claim. For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court's application of statute of limitations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) to Bradley's Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) claim and REMAND for application of Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). In all other regards, we AFFIRM.
On January 15, 1985, Holmes brought suit against Local 149 of the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers Union (Local 149), Business Agent William Anderson, and the Department of Labor. Holmes alleges that, during a celebrity roast in September 1983, Local 149 and William Anderson accepted a "thing of value" from an employer in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 186. 2 Defendants challenged the action as time-barred. Noting that § 302 does not have a correlating statute of limitations, the court borrowed the six-month statute of limitations contained in National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), which expressly governs claims of unfair labor practices under NLRA, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158. 3 The court dismissed Holmes's action on March 4, 1988.
On March, 21, 1986, Bradley filed suit against Local 149, Anderson, and Union President Robert Holmes, alleging that he was expelled from the union without notice or a hearing as required by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). 4 Defendants also challenged this action as time-barred. Because LMRDA § 101 is also without a corresponding statute of limitations, the district court again applied the six-month statute of limitations contained in § 10(b) of the NLRA and dismissed Bradley's claim.
On March 21, 1986, Johnson filed suit against Local 149, Anderson, and Holmes, alleging that the union violated LMRDA § 101 by not allowing him to present certain motions at a meeting of the union's executive board. Johnson also seeks damages for emotional distress. Upon conclusion of a bench trial, the district court ruled that Johnson's claim was barred because he had failed to exhaust internal union procedures before filing suit. The court also held that he had failed to show any physical manifestation of emotional distress upon which to award damages.
Collectively, plaintiffs raise the following four issues:
(1) whether the district court erred by applying the six-month statute of limitations to Holmes's LMRA § 302 claim rather than applying a state statute of limitations;
(2) whether the district court erred by applying the six-month statute of limitations to Bradley's LMRDA § 101(a)(5) claim rather than Tennessee's statute of limitations for personal injury actions;
(3) whether the district court erred in holding that Johnson's claim was barred because he had failed to exhaust internal union procedures; and
(4) whether the district court erred in holding that Johnson was not entitled to damages for emotional distress.
Selection of an appropriate statute of limitations is a conclusion of law which we review de novo. Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Educ., 917 F.2d 1391, 1399-1400 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2851, 115 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1991). See Taylor and Gaskin, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 732 F.2d 1273, 1277 (6th Cir.1984) ().
As to Johnson's bench trial judgment, we review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); In re Edward M. Johnson & Assocs., Inc., 845 F.2d 1395, 1398 (6th Cir.1988); Dayton Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 843 F.2d 947, 954 (6th Cir.1988); Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Phillips ECG, Inc., 835 F.2d 652, 658 (6th Cir.1987).
Our first task on review is to examine the district court's decision to borrow the statute of limitations contained in NLRA § 10(b) to govern Holmes's claim under LMRA § 302, rather than the Tennessee statute of limitations for either breaches of corporate fiduciary duties, misdemeanors, state racketeering violations, or the state's residual statute of limitations. 5 In general, when Congress does not specify a statute of limitations to govern a federal action, the standard practice is to borrow an analogous statute from state law. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); Reed v. United Transport. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323-24, 109 S.Ct. 621, 625, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). This practice "rests on the assumption that, absent some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow their previous practice of borrowing state provisions." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2287 n. 12. Nevertheless, state law should not be borrowed "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking...." Id. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294.
The district court relied on DelCostello, which involved two consolidated actions brought by employees against their employers under LMRA, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, 6 for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and claims against their unions under the implied duty of fair representation. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decision to apply state statutes of limitations. Id. at 154-55, 103 S.Ct. at 2285.
The Court explained that, although simple LMRA § 301 claims are analogous to state breach of contract claims, the analogy did not neatly apply to "hybrid" suits brought under both LMRA § 301 and the implied duty of fair representation. While a LMRA § 301 action involves only the breach of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer, a hybrid suit also involves the "discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory" action of the union which represents the employee. Id. at 164, 103 S.Ct. at 2290. The employee "must not only show that [the employer's action] was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union." Id. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1566, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976))). Thus, a hybrid suit could not be treated as a "straightforward breach-of-contract suit" for purposes of choosing an appropriate statute of limitations. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291.
The Court decided that hybrid suits should be governed by the six-month statute of limitations ... of NLRA § 10(b), rather than state statutes of limitations for arbitration or legal malpractice, finding that "the family resemblance [between charges of unfair labor practices, which are expressly governed by NLRA § 10(b), and breaches of the duty of fair representation] is undeniable." Id. at 170, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. 7 Both duty of fair representation claims and charges of unfair labor practices by unions are based on allegations of "unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory treatment of workers by unions." Id. Moreover, NLRA § 10(b) addresses the same concerns appropriate for a statute of limitations which governs hybrid suits, namely the balance "between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system." Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294 (quoting United Parcel Service, 451 U.S. at 70, 101 S.Ct. at 1568 (Stewart, J., concurring)). Based on all of these considerations, the Court applied NLRA § 10(b) to the hybrid suits.
Like the hybrid suits in DelCostello, claims under LMRA § 302 bear a marked similarity to certain claims of unfair labor practices. Section 302(a) prevents unions from accepting a "thing of value" from an employer. Similarly, NLRA § 8(b)(6) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--
(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for...
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