Holmes v. Godinez

• Decision Date: 16 March 2021
• Docket Number: Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709,s. 20-2236 & 20-2709
• Citation: 991 F.3d 775
• Parties: Ralph HOLMES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Salvador A. GODINEZ, Acting Director of Illinois Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

991 F.3d 775

Ralph HOLMES, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.Salvador A. GODINEZ, Acting Director of Illinois Department of Corrections, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 20-2236 & 20-2709

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 22, 2021

Decided March 16, 2021

Robert L. Michels, Whitney Adams, Attorneys, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, Rachel Weisberg, Lark Eliot Mulligan, Attorneys, Equip for Equality, Incorporated, Chicago, IL, Alan S. Mills, Nicole Schult, Attorneys, Uptown People's Law Center, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff - AppelleeRalph Holmes.

Robert L. Michels, Attorney, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, Rachel Weisberg, Lark Eliot Mulligan, Attorneys, Equip for Equality, Incorporated, Chicago, IL, Alan S. Mills, Nicole Schult, Attorneys, Uptown People's Law Center, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs - AppelleesHannibal Eason, George Childress, Curtis Halterman, and Billy Johnson.

Priyanka Gupta, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Chicago, IL, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before Ripple, Kanne, and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Kanne, Circuit Judge.

This is a straightforward contract interpretation case.Plaintiffs are Illinois prison inmates with hearing problems.They executed a judicially enforceable Settlement with the Illinois Department of Corrections("IDOC") that requires IDOC to provide them with certain audiological care.

Two provisions of the Settlement are at issue: one grants the court power to award attorney fees to Plaintiffs if IDOC "has been in substantial non-compliance" with the Settlement, and the other requires IDOC to refer inmates in need for an audiological evaluation by a licensed audiologist.

Plaintiffs sued to enforce the Settlement and for attorney fees based on past violations of it.The district court obliged.

The district court correctly awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs based on IDOC's "substantial non-compliance" with the Settlement of referring about 700 inmates for inadequate evaluations.But the court incorrectly determined that IDOC was obligated to ensure that its prison inmates receive audiological evaluations (or re-evaluations) within a set timeframe—the Settlement contains no such requirement.We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the district court, and we terminate our stay of the district court's order.

I.BACKGROUND

In the underlying class action, Plaintiffs alleged on behalf of deaf and hard-of-hearing inmates in IDOC custody that IDOC unlawfully denied them "the assistance they need to communicate effectively and participate in IDOC programs and services."The parties executed a Settlement in July 2018 to resolve their dispute.

Among other things, the Settlement requires IDOC to screen inmates for hearing problems, to refer inmates in need to a licensed audiologist for a more thorough audiological evaluation, and then to maintain records of inmates’ evaluations and provide inmates with certain care according to the results of their evaluations.

For about a year after the court approved the Settlement, IDOC admits that it incorrectly referred about 700 inmates to licensed hearing instrument dispensers ("LHIDs")—i.e., hearing-aid salesmen—instead of audiologists for their audiological evaluations (the "LHID violations").IDOC discontinued the practice in July 2019 after the parties reached an out-of-court agreement to resolve it.

In 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the Settlement arguing that IDOC is not ensuring that the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable time period; they allege there is as much as an eight-month gap between their screenings and their audiological evaluations.Plaintiffs also sought attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of the LHID violations.

This motion to enforce the Settlement and for attorney fees involved two aspects of the agreement.First, the Settlement requires IDOC to ensure that inmates whose hearing screenings show that they are deaf or hard of hearing are "referred to an audiologist for an Audiological Evaluation at the earlier of: (a) thirty (30) days after arrival to their home facility; or (b) 45 days after being admitted into IDOC custody."Second, the Settlement states that if the court finds that IDOC "has been in substantial non-compliance" with the Settlement, the court"has the power to enter, and shall enter, whatever orders are necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the Settlement."That power includes awarding "reasonable attorney's fees for any work expended by Class Counsel in investigating and litigating such non-compliance."

The district court concluded that IDOC was in substantial non-compliance with the Settlement through the LHID violations, and it thus ordered IDOC to pay Plaintiffs about $54,000 in attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of those violations (the "attorney-fee decision").

The district court also determined that the Settlement requires IDOC to ensure the audiological evaluations are completed within a reasonable timeframe, which it defined as 90 days after a referral (the "evaluation decision").

Finally, the court ordered IDOC to ensure that the 700 inmates who received inadequate evaluations by LHIDs were given proper audiological evaluations by August 28, 2020—about twelve weeks after the date of the court's order (the "re-evaluation decision").

IDOC appeals these three decisions.We stayed the effect of evaluation and re-evaluation decisions during the pendency of this appeal, and we will address those two decisions in tandem.

II.ANALYSIS

The parties agree that because the Settlement is judicially enforceable, it is a consent decree.Doe v. Cook County , 798 F.3d 558, 563(7th Cir.2015)("[I]f an agreement is judicially enforceable—that is, if a violation means anything other than re-starting the litigation on the merits—the agreement must be treated as a ‘consent decree’ ....").

We review a district court's interpretation of a consent decree de novo .In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig ., 741 F.3d 811, 816(7th Cir.2014).Plaintiffs request that we show deference to the district court's order because we have "sometimes said that we will give an unspecified amount of deference to a district court's interpretation[of a consent decree] when that court has overseen the litigation for a long time and is familiar with the details of what may be a complex arrangement."Id .But de novo review is appropriate here because we are interpreting the terms of a consent decree that sets out the parties’ "substantive rights and obligations."Id.

"For purposes of construction, a judicially approved consent decree is essentially a contract."United States v. Alshabkhoun , 277 F.3d 930, 934(7th Cir.2002)(citingUnited States v. City of Northlake , 942 F.2d 1164, 1167(7th Cir.1991) ).It is thus interpreted according to principles of state contract law.City of Northlake , 942 F.2d at 1167.

Under Illinois law, which applies here, "the court's ‘primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intent of the parties.’The court must first ‘look to the language of [the] contract alone, as the language, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of the parties’ intent’ ...."Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Beazer E., Inc. , 802 F.3d 876, 881(7th Cir.2015)(alteration in original)(citation omitted)(quotingGallagher v. Lenart , 226 Ill.2d 208, 314 Ill.Dec. 133, 874 N.E.2d 43, 58(2007) )."[A]court will not rewrite a contract to suit one of the parties ...."Wright v. Chi. Title Ins. Co. , 196 Ill.App.3d 920, 143 Ill.Dec. 576, 554 N.E.2d 511, 514(1990)(citingA.A. Conte, Inc. v. Campbell–Lowrie–Lautermilch Corp. , 132 Ill.App.3d 325, 87 Ill.Dec. 429, 477 N.E.2d 30(1985) ).Illinois law imposes "a strong presumption against provisions that easily could have been included in the contract but were not."Id.(citingBraeside Realty Tr. v. Cimino , 133 Ill.App.3d 1009, 89 Ill.Dec. 25, 479 N.E.2d 1031(1985);Ebrahim v. Checker Taxi Co. , 128 Ill.App.3d 906, 84 Ill.Dec. 103, 471 N.E.2d 632(1984) ).And "a court will not add terms simply to reach a more equitable agreement."Id.(citingNat'l Tea Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. , 100 Ill.App.3d 1046, 56 Ill.Dec. 474, 427 N.E.2d 806(1981) ).

The district court followed these principles when it awarded attorney fees to Plaintiffs but did not precisely follow them when it ordered IDOC to ensure that audiological evaluations be completed within a certain timeframe.

A.The Attorney-Fee Decision

Once more, the Settlement states that if the court finds that IDOC "has been in substantial non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement, then the court has the power to enter, and shall enter, whatever orders are necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of the Settlement."That power includes awarding "reasonable attorney's fees for any work expended by Class Counsel in investigating and litigating such non-compliance."

IDOC admits that it was in "substantial non-compliance" with the Settlement when it committed the LHID violations.Thus, we easily conclude that the court had authority under the Settlement to award attorney fees for the investigation and resolution of that past non-compliance in order to ensure that it does not repeat.

IDOC provides two counter arguments, but neither is persuasive.First, IDOC argues that Plaintiffs should not have been permitted to seek attorney fees because the Settlement provides that the parties"shall meet and confer and attempt to resolve any issues of potential non-compliance prior to such issues being the subject of any motion with the Court."This argument is not well developed and, as we're able to construe it, is not convincing.IDOC correctly notes that the parties did meet and confer to resolve the LHID violation, so the meet-and-confer provision was satisfied.But IDOC still appears to argue that because the parties resolved the issue on their own, the court had no power to...