Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co.
| Decision Date | 19 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 30097 |
| Citation | 255 N.W.2d 6,75 Mich.App. 198 |
| Parties | Kenneth Paul HOLMES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HAUGHTON ELEVATOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. 75 Mich.App. 198, 255 N.W.2d 6, 22 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1186 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[75 MICHAPP 199] James F. Finn, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
John F. Brady, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.
Before KELLY, V. J. BRENNAN and O'HARA *, JJ.
The question presented by this case is really "what policy should an intermediate appellate court follow in applying a holding of that court's constitutional superior, the Michigan Supreme Court?" In this case this Court can apply the precedential opinion narrowly as did the trial court, or it can apply it broadly as plaintiff-appellant urges it should be applied.
The material facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff's employment by defendant was terminated. He claims it was discriminatory by reason of his age. Defendant says whether or not is not the point. Plaintiff didn't file his charge of discrimination with the Civil Rights Commission until more than 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act. This failure, says defendant, is jurisdictional; clearly 90 days is the limit. Defendant also contends the Civil Rights Commission route is plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
"Not so," replies plaintiff,
So there we are. Does Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971), indisputably control? Defendant urges that we disregard it because Pompey was a racial discrimination case and its effect should be limited to racial discrimination cases. Able counsel for defendant argues that because Pompey, at 551, 189 N.W.2d 243, by its terms uses the phrase, "this specific civil right" (Emphasis supplied.), the impact of the decision should be limited to a right based on racial discrimination only, thus, we should so limit it. The statute involved, the Fair Employment Practices Act, M.C.L.A. § 423.301 et seq.; M.S.A. § 17.458(1) et seq., recites that "(t)he opportunity to obtain (retain) employment without discrimination because of * * * age * * * is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right".
If age then is a defined civil right should we properly wait until our Supreme Court extends Pompey in express terms to age? We cannot with judicial candor answer affirmatively. The statute is remedial. Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. Oakland County Treasurer v. Auditor General, 292 Mich. 58, 290 N.W. 327 (1940).
Pompey shoots down the exclusivity argument in unequivocal terms:
"We hold that plaintiff can maintain a civil damage action for redress of his statutorily created right to be free from discrimination in private employment, and that this remedy may be pursued in addition to the remedial machinery provided by statute." Pompey, supra, 385 Mich. 560, 189 N.W.2d 255.
Next we examine defendant's contention that [75 MICHAPP 201] the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because of the time limitations contained in FEPA, M.C.L.A. § 423.307; M.S.A. § 17.458(7).
There is a vast deal of difference between subject-matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction to grant or deny a remedy because of what may loosely be called affirmative, or even jurisdictional defenses. Once they were known as defenses in bar. The statute itself and Pompey, supra, answer:
"it is transparently clear that plaintiff * * * is asserting a cumulative judicial remedy for redress of his civil right to freedom from...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kassab v. Michigan Basic Property Ins. Ass'n
...the Civil Rights Act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to provide a broad remedy, Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 75 Mich.App. 198, 200, 255 N.W.2d 6 (1977), aff'd 404 Mich. 36, 272 N.W.2d 550 Although no Michigan case law is dispositive of the issue raised here, and co......
-
Strachan v. Mutual Aid & Neighborhood Club, Inc., Docket No. 31118
...without discrimination on the basis of age is a civil right. M.C.L.A. § 423.301; M.S.A. § 17.458(1) 2; Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 75 Mich.App. 198, 200, 255 [81 Mich.App. 175] N.W.2d 6 (1977). In Pompey v. General Motors Corporation, 385 Mich. 537, 559-560, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971), the ......
-
Dudewicz v. Norris-Schmid, Inc.
...intended to be benefited. See Bierbusse v. Farmers Ins. Group, 84 Mich.App. 34, 37, 269 N.W.2d 297 (1978); Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 75 Mich.App. 198, 200, 255 N.W.2d 6 (1977), aff'd 404 Mich. 36, 272 N.W.2d 550 (1978). Simply stated, the Dickson Court erred in limiting the applicabi......
-
Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express Co.
...act is to be interpreted broadly. See Rookledge v. Garwood, 340 Mich. 444, 65 N.W.2d 785 (1954); Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 75 Mich.App. 198, 255 N.W.2d 6 (1977), aff'd 404 Mich. 36, 272 N.W.2d 550 (1978). In Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash.2d 384, 388, 583 P.2d 621, 623 (1978), the Wa......