Holmes v. Steelman

• Decision Date: 15 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. SC 97983,SC 97983
• Citation: 624 S.W.3d 144
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: Michael HOLMES, Respondent, v. Sarah STEELMAN and Eric Schmitt, Appellants.

624 S.W.3d 144

Michael HOLMES, Respondent,

v.Sarah STEELMAN and Eric Schmitt, Appellants.

No. SC 97983

Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.

Opinion issued June 15, 2021

The state was represented by Solicitor General D. John Sauer and Zachary M. Bluestone of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City and Katherine S. Walsh of the attorney general's office in St. Louis, (573) 751-3321.

The city, its mayor and its police board were represented by Julian Bush, Nancy R. Kistler, Robert H. Dierker Jr. and Mark E. Lawson of the St. Louis city counselor's office in St. Louis, (314) 622-3361.

Holmes was represented by David B. Owens of Loevy & Loevy in Chicago, Illinois, (312) 243-5900; and James W. Eason of The Eason Law Firm LLC in Clayton, (314) 932-1066.

Patricia Breckenridge, Judge

The commissioner of the office of administration and the attorney general appeal a judgment in favor of Michael Holmes on his claim that the state legal expense fund (SLEF) is obligated to pay his 2016 judgment against two former officers of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD). The state claims the circuit court erred in applying the version of section 105.726.3 in effect in 2003, when the former police officers filed a false report that caused his wrongful arrest and conviction, rather than the version in effect when Mr. Holmes filed his claim in a lawsuit against the former officers. Because a right to payment from SLEF does not arise until a claim is made, section 105.726.3, RSMo Supp. 2013, governs Mr. Holmes's claim and prohibits SLEF from paying any claim or judgment against the police officers. The circuit court's judgment in Mr. Holmes's favor is vacated, and the cause is remanded.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2003, Mr. Holmes was arrested after officers of SLMPD allegedly found cocaine base at his grandmother's home. Then-officers Shell Sharp and Bobby Garrett¹ conspired together to include false information in a police report, stating Mr. Holmes had engaged in drug-related activities in front of the house and was found in possession of cocaine base inside the home. As a result of the former officers’ false report, Mr. Holmes was prosecuted for federal drug crimes.² Based in part on the former officers’ testimony at trial, Mr. Holmes was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment due to a prior felony drug-trafficking conviction.

A subsequent SLMPD investigation into the former officers uncovered misconduct, including false accusations of drug crimes and fabrication of evidence in other cases. Based on this new information, Mr. Holmes sought to vacate his sentence, and, in 2011, a federal court vacated Mr. Holmes's conviction because the former officers’ testimony had been discredited. Federal prosecutors decided not to retry the case and dismissed the indictment against Mr. Holmes.

In December 2012, Mr. Holmes filed a lawsuit in federal court, under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, against the mayor of the City of St. Louis, the board of police commissioners for the City of St. Louis, and the former officers. In his complaint, he alleged the former officers wrongfully caused his arrest and prosecution and, as a result, he spent more than five years wrongfully imprisoned. The federal court dismissed the mayor and the board of police commissioners on summary judgment, and Mr. Holmes proceeded to trial against only the former officers. The attorney general's office represented the former police officers after the board tendered the defense pursuant to SLEF's statutory requirements. A jury returned a verdict of $2.5 million in Mr. Holmes's favor, finding the former officers in 2003 fabricated evidence in violation of Mr. Holmes's due process rights, falsely arrested him, and maliciously initiated his prosecution. The district court entered its judgment accordingly and awarded attorney fees and costs.

Mr. Holmes then sought payment of the judgment from SLEF by means of a demand letter sent to the attorney general, but payment was denied. In February 2015, Mr. Holmes filed the present declaratory judgment action against the commissioner of the office of administration and the attorney general (collectively, the "State"),³ as well as the City of St. Louis, the city's mayor, and members of the St. Louis police board, seeking a declaration that either the state of Missouri, through SLEF, or, alternatively, the City of St. Louis is obligated to pay the judgment.

All parties filed motions for summary judgment. In Mr. Holmes's motion, he sought a declaration that either the State, through SLEF, or the city is obligated to pay his judgment against the former officers. The State sought, in its cross-motion for summary judgment, a declaration that SLEF is not obligated to pay the judgment. In its cross-motion, the city sought a declaration that it has no obligation to the pay the judgment or, in the alternative, that Mr. Holmes may collect the judgment from SLEF. The circuit court sustained Mr. Holmes's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in his favor, declaring that the State, through SLEF, was obligated to pay his judgment against the former officers.

The circuit court's grant of summary judgment was based on its findings that (1) section 105.726.3 excludes SLEF coverage only for the board of police commissioners and not for police officers and (2) in the absence of section 105.726.3, SLEF covers the former officers pursuant to section 105.711.2(2). The State appealed, and this Court ordered transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

Standard of Review

A circuit court's grant of summary judgment is subject to de novo review on appeal. Knopik v. Shelby Invs., LLC , 597 S.W.3d 189, 191 (Mo. banc 2020). Summary judgment will be affirmed when the moving party has established a right to judgment as a matter of law "on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute." Newton v. Mercy Clinic E. Comtys. , 596 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo. banc 2020). "This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered." Id.

Analysis

On appeal, the State claims the circuit court erred in granting Mr. Holmes summary judgment because, as a matter of law, SLEF coverage does not arise until a claim is made or a judgment is entered. At the time Mr. Holmes made his claim against the officers, section 105.726.3, RSMo Supp. 2013, prohibited SLEF from paying claims or judgments against police officers employed by a police board established under chapter 84, RSMo. Mr. Holmes and the city claim the circuit court correctly applied the statutes in effect in 2003 when the former officers’ conduct occurred. At that time, section 105.711.2(2), RSMo 2000, provided for the payment of claims or judgments against the former officers and no other section limited that provision.

Determination of which version of the statutes governs Mr. Holmes's demand for payment of his judgment against the former officers depends on when the former officers’ rights to payment from SLEF first attached. Sections 105.711 and 105.726 must be examined to make that determination. Matters of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo. Sun Aviation, Inc. v. L-3 Commc'ns Avionics Sys., Inc. , 533 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Mo. banc 2017). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to discern the legislature's intent as evidenced by the text and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton , 318 S.W.3d 660, 665 (Mo. banc 2010). In determining the meaning of words in a statute, the words should not be read in isolation but rather "must be considered in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia , as well as cognate sections, must be considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words." Cosby v. Treasurer of State , 579 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Mo. banc 2019).

The legislature established SLEF in 1983 to replace the tort defense fund. Cates v. Webster , 727 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Mo. banc 1987). Moneys in SLEF are used to pay claims or judgments against the state, its agencies, any officer or employee of the state or its agencies, and certain other designated individuals and entities. As relevant to this case, the statute governing payment of claims in 2003, when the officers’ conduct occurred, was section 105.711.2(2), RSMo 2000,⁴ which provided:

Moneys in the state legal expense fund shall be available for the payment of any claim or any amount required by any final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction against ... [a]ny officer or employee of the State of Missouri or any agency of the state, including, without limitation, elected officials, appointees, members of state boards or commissions and members of the Missouri national guard upon conduct of such officer or employee arising out of and performed in connection with his or her official duties on behalf of the state, or any agency of the state[.]

In 2003, section 105.726, RSMo 2000, contained only two subsections. Subsection 1 provided the statutes governing SLEF were not intended to broaden the liability of the state or to abolish or waive any defense at law available to any agency, officer, or employee of the state; subsection 2 provided the creation of SLEF and payments therefrom were "deemed necessary and proper public purposes for which funds of this state may be expended." Sections 105.726.1-.2, RSMo 2000.

In 2005, this Court interpreted section 105.711.2(2), RSMo 2000, to find SLEF provided representation by the attorney general, reimbursement for expenditures in defending lawsuits, and satisfaction of judgments or settlements pertaining to lawsuits brought against members of the St. Louis board of police commissioners because the board was an agency of the state. Smith v. State , 152 S.W.3d 275, 278 (Mo. banc 2005). It further found SLEF was obligated to provide coverage to SLMPD officers because such officers were – and always had been...