Holohan v. Massanari
| Decision Date | 17 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-16090,00-16090 |
| Citation | 246 F.3d 1195 |
| Parties | (9th Cir. 2001) ANNE J. HOLOHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LARRY G. MASSANARI, Acting Commissionerof SSA, <A HREF="#fr1-*" name="fn1-*">* Defendant-Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Phyllis A. Matyi, Larkspur, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.
David W. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General, Robert S. Mueller, III, United States Attorney, Janice L. Walli, Chief Counsel, Region IX, Jeffrey H. Baird, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, San Francisco, California, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-99-2518 CRB.
Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge BETTY B. FLETCHER; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge FERNANDEZ.
Anne Holohan appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim objecting to the termination of her disability benefits, awarded under Title II of the Social Security Act. We reverse and restore her benefits.
On November 28, 1994, Anne Holohan filed an application for Social Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401-433 (the Act). She claimed eligibility for the benefits on the basis of disability due to depression, anxiety attacks, alcoholism, coordination problems, memory problems, loss of physical strength, and concentration problems. On March 1, 1995, the Social Security Administration (SSA) found Holohan disabled as defined by the Act and eligible to receive disability benefits. In its notice to Holohan, the SSA explained that it
In 1996, Congress amended Title II by eliminating drug and alcohol dependency as bases for disability findings. See Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996 105, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(C). In order to implement Congress' mandate, the SSA sent termination notices to persons receiving disability benefits who had been found to be disabled by virtue of drug or alcohol dependency. The notice informed the recipients that their benefits would terminate unless they had another basis to support a disability finding. Holohan received such a notice and requested a redetermination of her claim, asserting that she was disabled within the meaning of the Act, even without considering her alcoholism. The SSA reviewed Holohan's case and concluded that she did not qualify for disability benefits. Holohan filed a request for a hearing, which was held on July 29, 1997.
At the hearing, Holohan was represented by a law student. Holohan testified that she was unable to work due to, among other things, depression and severe anxiety with panic attacks. In his decision, issued on September 25, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewed the evidence of Holohan's medical history and then engaged in the five step sequential evaluation process for evaluating disability claims set forth at 20 C.F.R. 404.1520.
First, if a claimant is found to be currently working and engaged in substantial gainful employment, she is not disabled under the Title II regulations. Id. 404.1520(b). The ALJ found that Holohan was not gainfully employed.
Second, in order to qualify as disabled, a claimant must have a severe impairment. Id . 404.1520(c). The ALJ found that while Holohan had no severe physical impairment, she did have severe mental impairments, namely, dysthymia, and alcohol abuse in full remission.
Third, if a claimant's severe impairment meets or exceeds a listed impairment in Appendix 1 to Part 404 of the regulations implementing Title II, then this is sufficient for finding the claimant to be disabled. Id. 404.1520(d). The ALJ found that Holohan's mental impairments did not meet or exceed the functional limitations listed in the appendix. In considering Holohan's functional capacity, the ALJ specifically found Holohan's statement that her condition had deteriorated since she began her treatment with Dr. Oh to lack credibility, stating that Dr. Oh's treatment records indicated improvement.
Fourth, if a claimant's severe impairment does not qualify as a disability by virtue of meeting or exceeding the requirements of Appendix 1, then the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work. Otherwise, the claimant is not disabled under the implementing regulations. Id. 404.1520(e). Giving Holohan "the benefit of all doubt," the ALJ found that she could no longer perform her previous work as a newspaper advertising account executive.
Finally, in order to be disabled, the claimant's impairment must prevent her from doing any other work. In determining whether a claimant's impairment prevents her from doing other work, one must consider the claimant's "residual functional capacity," age, education, and past work experience. Id. 404.1520(f). Considering these factors and relying on the Commissioner's Medical-Vocational Guidelines the ALJ found that Holohan "can physically perform work at all exertional levels and mentally she is capable of performing at least simple, repetitive type work." The ALJ therefore concluded that Holohan was not disabled within the meaning of the Act and upheld the SSA's determination that Holohan was not eligible to receive disability benefits under Title II.
In reaching the conclusion that Holohan did not meet or exceed a listing in Appendix 1 (at step three of the evaluation) and that she had sufficient residual functional capacity to perform simple, repetitive work (at step five), the ALJ specifically rejected the opinions of James Oh, Holohan's treating psychiatrist, and Wynne Hsieh, Holohan's primary care provider, that Holohan's severe mental impairments prevent her from working. The ALJ "rejected the opinion of Dr. Oh" concerning Holohan's functional limitations because he found it to be "totally inconsistent with [Dr. Oh's ]own treatment notes and records at [San Francisco General Hospital]." He rejected Dr. Hsieh's opinion because she did not have first-hand knowledge of Holohan's impairments and limitations and because, he concluded, it was contradicted by the weight of the most recent evidence in the record.
The Appeals Council of the SSA denied Holohan's request for review, making the ALJ's opinion the final decision of the Commissioner of the SSA. Holohan filed for review of the ALJ's decision in the district court. The district court summarily upheld the ALJ's denial of benefits. With regard to the ALJ's treatment of Drs. Oh and Hsieh's opinions, the district court held that the ALJ "gave specific, legitimate reasons, based on substantial evidence in the record" and so was entitled to reject the opinions of Holohan's physicians. With regard to the ALJ's credibility finding, the district court concurred that Dr. Oh's treatment records indicated that Holohan was improving with treatment rather than deteriorating as she claimed.
The district court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (). Holohan filed a timely notice of appeal. We therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
We review de novo a district court's decision upholding the Commissioner's denial of benefits. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). We must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Evidence can be "substantial" if it is more than a scintilla, even though less than a preponderance. Id. at 1098. If the evidence can support either outcome, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Id. However, we cannot affirm the Commissioner's decision "simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, we must consider the record as a whole, "weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts" from the Commissioner's conclusion. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Title II's implementing regulations distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: "(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant [but who review the claimant's file] (nonexamining [or reviewing] physicians)." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d). Generally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician's. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d). In addition, the regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to those that are not, see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(d)(3), and to the opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over that of nonspecialists, see id. 404.1527(d)(5).
In disability benefits cases, physicians typically provide two types of opinions: medical opinions that speak to the nature and extent of a claimant's limitations, and opinions concerning the ultimate issue of disability, i.e., opinions about whether a claimant is capable of any work, given her or his limitations. Under the regulations, if a treating physician's...
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Case index
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Table of Cases
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