Holst v. Bowen, C-82-855 RJM.
Decision Date | 16 June 1986 |
Docket Number | No. C-82-855 RJM.,C-82-855 RJM. |
Citation | 637 F. Supp. 145 |
Parties | Donald L. HOLST, Plaintiff, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
Dana C. Madsen, Spokane, Wash., for plaintiff.
Richard H. Wetmore, Asst. Regional Counsel, D.H.H.S., Region X, Seattle, Wash., for defendant.
By order entered November 29, 1983 this matter was remanded for reconsideration in light of certain specified authorities.1 Administrative proceedings have now been concluded and the matter is once again before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
The supplemental record reflects a unique approach on the part of the ALJ in that he first acknowledged the Court's directions as set forth in the above-referenced order of remand, and then deliberately refused to abide by such directions on the basis that the Court was wrong:
With that, the ALJ proceeded through the steps of a full sequential analysis, and based on prodigious new evidence taken during the supplemental proceedings, held that claimant was not then disabled, and never had been.
The apparent theory is that Patti and progeny are inapplicable by virtue of some transmutation whereby the final decision of the Secretary affirming ALJ Baloun somehow became "unfinal" upon being appealed.2 No one appealed that portion of the decision which held that claimant fully met the disability requirements for the closed period. The unambiguous tenor of the order of remand necessarily assumed the validity of the finding that claimant was disabled between August 10, 1978 and March 1, 1981. The fact of Mr. Holst's disability during that period thereby became the law of the case and not subject to tampering in further administrative proceedings.3Hooper v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 1985); see also, Mefford v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 748, 756 (6th Cir.1967); Carillo v. Heckler, 599 F.Supp. 1164, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Brown v. Schweiker, 557 F.Supp. 190, 194 (M.D.Fla.1983).
As observed by the Mefford Court:
The Hearing Examiner was bound to obey the directions of the mandate without variation; and failure to follow the instructions therein given was error. He failed to follow the instructions of the District Court, and, instead, introduced a mass of evidence with the purpose of holding, contrary to the decision of the District Court, that appellee was not suffering from a heart condition which prevented him from carrying out the work in which he was previously engaged. In so doing, and in creating a new case, the Hearing Examiner committed error.
383 F.2d at 756; see generally, Valdez v. Schweiker, 575 F.Supp. 1203 (D.Colo.1983).
Where the district court is itself in error, the Secretary is not without remedies. Hooper, supra, 752 F.2d at 88; Valdez, supra, 575 F.Supp. at 1205. Among those remedies, however, is not the option of simply ignoring the mandate, nor, as in this case, of purporting to "overrule" such perceived error.
In disposing of the pending motions, several alternatives suggest themselves:
(1) The Court could disregard the procedural facts set forth above and proceed directly to the merits of the full record, taking into account all new evidence adduced at the supplemental hearing.
(2) The Court could reiterate its previous position with regard to applicability of the Patti rationale and test the record for substantial evidence while casting aside what the Mefford Court refers to as the "new case."
(3) The Court could refuse to condone an anarchical situation wherein the ALJ has presumed to substitute his function for that of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Valdez, supra, 575 F.Supp. at 1204-05.
The last of these possibilities seems both the most appropriate and the most prophylactically beneficial. Historically, the system has operated in hierarchical fashion with decisional power vested, in ascending order, in an administrative law judge, the Appeals Council, the district court, the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court.4 The Supreme Court overrules appellate court decisions, not the other way around. See, e.g., Thurston Motor Lines v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983). The court of appeals overrules decisions of the trial court, not the other way around. See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828, 103 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed.2d 65 (1982). And the district court overrules the Appeals Council, not the other way around.5Mefford, supra, 383 F.2d at 756; Valdez, supra, 575 F.Supp. at 1204-05.
The bottom line is that the ALJ and the Secretary may well be right in their legal analysis. If so, that position will be vindicated upon further appeal. But they are dead wrong in the ill-conceived assumption of a power not properly theirs.
THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
(2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
(3) The decision of the Secretary is REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to pay benefits.
(4) The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.6
1 The remand order directed as follows:
This case will be remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir.1983); Iida v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.1983); Lyle v. Secretary of H.H.S., 700 F.2d 566, 568 (9th Cir.1983); Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582, 586-87 (9th Cir.1982); see also, Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.1983) (Pregerson, J., concurring) ( ).
Stated in its simplest terms, the basis for remand lay in the observation that the ALJ found Mr. Holst disabled for a 30-month period up to point "X." He found Mr. Holst not disabled subsequent to point "X." He didn't say why.
The order also granted plaintiff's motion to remand for taking new evidence. The evidence sought to be introduced was attached to plaintiff's supporting brief and consisted of a small collection of letters and evaluation notes authored by various treating and consulting physicians. Nothing in the order of remand even remotely suggests that granting plaintiff's motion in this limited regard concurrently gave the ALJ leave to conduct de novo proceedings.
2 The Appeals Council posited a similar argument in affirming the ALJ's decision of nondisability. The prior determination that claimant was entitled to a closed period is of no legal effect, it is contended, because the Appeals Council vacated its previous...
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