Holt v. Acme Mattress Co.

• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: TOWSE
• Citation: Holt v. Acme Mattress Co., 40 Haw. 660 (Haw. 1955)
• Decision Date: 14 January 1955
• Docket Number: NO. 2962.,2962.
• Parties: LAWRENCE R. HOLT, STATUTORY ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF ELLEN YUK LIN YIN ALSO KNOWN AS ELLEN YUK CHOY YIN, DECEASED v. ACME MATTRESS COMPANY AND LONDON GUARANTEE AND ACCIDENT COMPANY, LIMITED.

40 Haw. 660

LAWRENCE R. HOLT, STATUTORY ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF ELLEN YUK LIN YIN ALSO KNOWN AS ELLEN YUK CHOY YIN, DECEASED

v.ACME MATTRESS COMPANY AND LONDON GUARANTEE AND ACCIDENT COMPANY, LIMITED.

NO. 2962.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued December 3, 1953.

Decided January 14, 1955.

ERROR TO CIRCUIT COURT FIRST CIRCUIT, HON. A. R. HAWKINS, JUDGE.

Syllabus by the Court

Where decedent, an elderly woman afflicted with hypertension for approximately eight years preceding death was employed as a cloth cutter, complained of “feeling tired and dizzy,” returned home from work and after retiring suffered a cerebral hemorrhage resulting in death, compensation claim will be denied in the absence of evidence establishing that decedent had in fact overexerted herself by lifting heavy bolts of cloth or that the performance of her normal duties including limited overtime work constituted the cause of the injury.

To warrant compensation it must appear that a claimant personally received injury (1) by accident (2) arising out of and (3) in the course of his employment. All must coexist at the time of the accident, and the absence of any one will defeat compensation.

To constitute an “accident” within the provisions of section 4403 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, as amended, a claimant need only establish that either the cause of the injury was accidental in character or that the effect suffered by him was the unforeseen result of performance of his routine duties. If the strain of claimant's normal and usual exertions in the course of employment operates upon a pre-existing condition and in fact directly causes a collapse from an ailment such as a cerebral hemorrhage, heart failure, hernia or the like, compensation will be allowed. Such circumstances, however, do not operate to exclude the necessity of establishing a causal relationship between normal and usual exertion and the resulting injury as proof that the alleged injuries arose out of the employment.

In order that an accident “arise out of employment” a causal connection reasonably apparent between the conditions under which work is required to be performed and the resulting injury must be established, and the injury alleged must reasonably appear to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence thereof.

The burden of proof is upon a claimant to establish all facts necessary to entitle him to an award. No facts or other elements necessary to support a claim will be left to surmise, conjecture or speculation; nor will proof of facts equally consistent with a right to compensation and those consistent with the absence of such right be considered sufficient.

The credibility of witnesses, including experts, and the weight to be accorded their testimony, is to be determined by the trier of facts in the light of all of the facts and circumstances presented.

An appeal from the findings of an appellate board to a circuit court contemplates a trial de novo (R. L. H. 1945, § 4433 as am.); and where, as here, there is evidence amounting to more than a scintilla to support the findings of a trial judge, jury waived, such findings will not be disturbed on review.

While the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed, it is not intended as, nor will it be interpreted as a complete substitute for life insurance, or sick and accident insurance.W. Y. Char (also on the briefs) for plaintiff in error.

E. J. Botts (also on the brief) for defendants in error.

TOWSE, C. J., LE BARON AND STAINBACK, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY TOWSE, C. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court denying a claim for workmen's compensation filed by the statutory administrator of the estate of Mrs. Ellen Yuk Lin Yin, deceased, under the provisions of Chapter 77 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, as amended. The claim was based upon death resulting from a cerebral hemorrhage alleged to have constituted an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of decedent's employment with the Acme Mattress Company.

An award granted by the director of the bureau of workmen's compensation was affirmed by the labor and industrial relations appeal board, but was reversed by the circuit court after a trial de novo, jury waived. Appellant now seeks by writ of error to reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

The material facts developed below were that the Acme Mattress Company and its predecessor in business employed the decedent for approximately ten years, first as a seamstress and thereafter as a cloth cutter. Her duties as a cutter consisted of cutting slip and mattress covers by use of a circular electric knife and “feeding” the cut material to six other employees who performed various sewing operations. While standing, the decedent was required to cut the pieces of cloth to size as they hung suspended from a rack, the cloth having theretofore been unrolled from bolts of rolled material varying in weight from 35 to 70 pounds suspended from the racks. It was the duty of designated male employees to lift the heavier bolts of rolled material onto a measuring table where the cloth was unrolled and placed upon the racks in preparation for the cutting operation performed by the decedent.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on September 25, 1951, the decedent complained to her sister, who was also employed at the factory, of being tired and dizzy. She thereupon stopped work and instead of returning home for dinner as was her custom, she requested her sister to accompany her to a restaurant where they dined. The decedent then returned home at approximately 7:00 p. m. and retired early, remarking to her daughter with whom she resided, that “she was feeling rather tired that night.” At 2:00 a. m. she awoke complaining of “feeling uncomfortable” and “numb.” At 4:00 a. m. her daughter summoned the decedent's physician, who on arrival, found her unconscious, and ordered her transferred to a hospital. The decedent received hospitalization treatment for cerebral hemorrhage, and within a month recovered sufficiently to be discharged. She returned home and thereafter received weekly treatment from her physician until July 10, 1952, when she suddenly succumbed. Her physician testified at trial that death was caused by the cerebral hemorrhage. The record does not indicate that an autopsy was performed. Upon the decedent's medical history her physician testified that he first treated her in April of 1943 for hypertension which “fluctuated from normal up to moderate high.” About that time, he testified that he had inspected the factory of the appellee company, and in view of the nature of her work and her then physical condition had advised her to “lighten up on her job” by reducing her working day from eight to five hours. He treated the decedent approximately once a month thereafter from 1943 until February, 1951, during which time her blood pressure continued to fluctuate. From February, 1951, to September 26, 1951, he did not attend her until summoned on the morning of her hemorrhage.

While the foregoing facts were uncontroverted at trial, issue was taken first, as to whether in the course of her employment the decedent had ever lifted any of the heavy bolts of rolled material from the floor of the factory onto the measuring table, and second, if she had not, whether any other incidents of her employment had aggravated her preexisting condition of hypertension in such a degree as to be considered the cause of the fatal cerebral hemorrhage.

Upon the first issue the evidence is in conflict. Two coemployees of the decedent testified that they had observed her lift heavy bolts of material from the floor onto the measuring table at various times during her employment. This was contradicted by the shop foreman and one of the partners of the appellee company, both of whom testified that the male employees only were required to perform that particular task. By the foreman: “* * * the women folks are not supposed to lift that heavy stuff at all. They are told not to.” By the partner: “Actually I stress if there is anything that is heavy, have the men lift it for her. Of course, there was some light bolts that they can very well lift themselves, but I have always stressed that if there was anything heavy that she wasn't able to lift, or even if it would be a little too heavy, to have the men lift it.” Both witnesses testified that they had never seen the decedent perform any heavy lifting operations such as is claimed. It was not established that the decedent had in fact lifted any bolted material at any time during the work day of September 25, 1951, at which time the first symptoms of the hemorrhage appeared.

The trial judge found that there had been “no showing that her unconsciousness of September 25th was brought on by lifting a heavy bolt of fabric. The evidence is that the lifting of the heavy full bolts were handled by men or by other women assisting the claimant, and that the lifting of such heavy bolts was not part of the duties of the claimant.”

Upon the second issue of reasonable causation between the conditions of employment and the injury sustained, the evidence consisted in part of decedent's employment record for the period April, 1951, to September 25, 1951. It reflected that decedent's employment during that period consisted of a normal schedule of forty-eight hours per week including an average of 3.9 hours of overtime per week. While orders and contractural obligations of the appellee company required such overtime operations in order to meet delivery commitments, the evidence established that all overtime in excess of forty hours per week was optional and voluntary on the part of the employees.

During her last period of employment the decedent's daily work schedule consisted of: Friday, September 21, eight hours; Saturday, September 22, five hours; Sunday, September 23, day off; Monday, September 24, ten hours; Tuesday, September 25, ten...