Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., Civ. No. B-82-119(EBB).

• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Connecticut)
• Writing for the Court: Deborah Green, Staff Atty., Com'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, Hartford, Conn., for defendant
• Citation: 631 F. Supp. 653
• Parties: Veronice A. HOLT v. The CONTINENTAL GROUP, INC., et al.
• Decision Date: 15 May 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. No. B-82-119(EBB).

631 F. Supp. 653

Veronice A. HOLT
v.
The CONTINENTAL GROUP, INC., et al.

Civ. No. B-82-119(EBB).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

May 15, 1985.

631 F. Supp. 654

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

631 F. Supp. 655

Veronice A. Holt, pro se

Deborah Green, Staff Atty., Com'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, Hartford, Conn., for defendant.

RULING ON STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ELLEN B. BURNS, District Judge.

I. Background

Plaintiff initially filed this action against her former employer, The Continental Group, Inc. ("Continental"), seeking reinstatement to her former position as a securities lawyer. Plaintiff had been employed by Continental since October, 1976, holding several positions within the corporation and its subsidiaries. Plaintiff came to believe that the compensation structure used by Continental discriminated against women and minorities. After voicing her concerns to senior Continental officials, plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (the "CCHRO").

In Count I of her complaint, plaintiff details her allegations that she became the target of harassment designed as retaliation after filing charges with the CCHRO. Plaintiff eventually filed a second charge of retaliation with the CCHRO. On January 21, 1982, plaintiff was informed that she was terminated by Continental. Plaintiff amended her retaliation charge with the CCHRO to include a claim of retaliatory discharge.

The instant action was filed on February 16, 1982, seeking a preliminary injunction requiring Continental to reinstate plaintiff to her former position. Finding no irreparable injury, Judge Zampano of this court denied plaintiff's application and dismissed her complaint because no relief was sought other than a preliminary injunction. Holt v. Continental Group, 542 F.Supp. 16 (D.Conn.1982). On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that plaintiff had asserted that Continental's conduct had imposed a "chilling effect" on the exercise of her Title VII rights by intimidating potential witnesses favorable to her. Because such a chilling effect, if proved, would constitute irreparable injury, the case was remanded for further consideration. Holt v. Continental Group, 708 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.1983).

On remand, the case was reassigned to this judge, and extensive hearings have been held on the question of irreparable injury. The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction will be decided in a separate ruling after consideration of the final submissions by the parties.

On November 27, 1984, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Count I of the amended complaint realleges the facts set out in the sixty-six paragraphs of the original complaint. Count II adds the CCHRO, the Executive Committee of the CCHRO (the "Executive Committee") and the State of Connecticut as defendants. Because Arthur Green, Director of the CCHRO, Joseph Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Governor O'Neill are mentioned in the caption and in the body of the complaint, they will also be treated as defendants. The defendants named in the second count will be referred to collectively as the "state defendants." Count II includes 128 paragraphs alleging facts which plaintiff asserts establish that the defendants knowingly and intentionally stalled the investigation of her charges and prevented her from obtaining an investigation by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). The third count realleges the 194 paragraphs of the previous two counts and adds a single allegation that Continental and the

631 F. Supp. 656

state defendants acted in concert to deprive plaintiff of her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e et seq.

The second count of plaintiff's complaint asserts that her cause of action arises under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. Although the complaint does not specify the section(s) upon which she relies, in her memoranda plaintiff clarifies that her cause of action is based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983").¹ On page nine of her memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, she states:

The heart of Plaintiff's claim against all state Defendants is that they have implemented policies and procedures which prevent her free exercise of her right to obtain a a sic federal investigation of her Title VII charges and thereafter exacerbated that denial by consistently refusing to investigate the allegations of Plaintiff's charges.

Plaintiff also argues that her complaint establishes that she was deprived of equal protection because, by its actions, the state defendants have denied her "rights, privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens of the several states...." Plaintiff's reply memorandum at 13. She further asserts that her claim "is not a procedural due process claim." Id. at 14. The gravamen of Count II of plaintiff's complaint appears to be that the policies and procedures of the state defendants, combined with the failure to properly process her charges, prevented her from enforcing her rights created by Title VII.

Count III of the amended complaint appears to be alleging concerted activity on the part of Continental and the state defendants to preclude plaintiff's enforcement of her Title VII rights. This count appears to assert a cause of action under either section 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("section 1985(3)"), or both.²

631 F. Supp. 657

The state defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for a number of reasons. They have asserted that the defendants are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, that they are protected by qualified immunity, that the court should dismiss based upon the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and that the complaint fails to state a claim. Because the court determines that the allegations set forth in the second and third counts of the amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the other grounds for dismissal are not addressed.

II. Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiff's section 1983 claim alleges that policies and practices of the state defendants precluded her from enforcing rights established by Title VII. Plaintiff acknowledges that this court is without authority to require the state defendants to enforce rights established solely under state law. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).

The CCHRO is a state agency established under state law to enforce statecreated rights. See Conn.Gen.Stat. §§ 46a-52, 54, 56, 60, 82. Although many discriminatory practices made illegal under federal law are also made illegal under Connecticut statutes, the Connecticut antidiscrimination laws are more extensive than their federal counterparts. Compare Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42a-60 with Title VII. To the extent that a discriminatory practice which is illegal under federal law is also illegal under Connecticut law, the CCHRO may assert jurisdiction over the claim. However, the mere fact that the CCHRO may assert jurisdiction over a practice that is illegal under federal law does not give a claimant a federal right to a CCHRO investigation.

In drafting and amending Title VII, the Congress adopted a comprehensive enforcement scheme that includes both administrative and judicial forums for the resolution of employment discrimination claims. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2450, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). In recognition of state attempts to also combat employment discrimination, Congress provided that the EEOC should defer action for 60 days in states with administrative remedies for such discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The purpose of this deferral provision was to give state agencies a limited opportunity to resolve discrimination complaints at a local level before triggering federal involvement. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262, reh. den. 458 U.S. 1133, 103 S.Ct. 20, 73 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1982). However, the requirement that the EEOC defer to a state agency for sixty days before asserting...