Holt v. People
| Decision Date | 02 May 1865 |
| Citation | 13 Mich. 224 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | William Holt v. The People |
Heard April 28, 1865
Error to the recorder's court of Detroit.
J Logan Chipman, for plaintiff in error, cited 16 N. Y., 501; 1 Arch. Cr. P. & P. (Waterman's Notes), 551; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio 307; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cow. 562; People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 121; Com. v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 499; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 241; Trimble v. State, 2 Greene 404.
G. V N. Lothrop, for the people, cited 1 Burr's Trial, 415; Durell v. Mosher, 8 Johns. 445; People v Vermilyea, 6 Cow. 562; S. C., 7 Cow. 121; People v Mather, 4 Wend. 233; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio 308; People v. Honeyman, 3 Denio 123; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 34; Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 77; Gardner v. People, 3 Scam. 88; McGregg v. State, 4 Blackf. 104; Bradford v. State, 15 Ind. 347; Thomson v. People, 24 Ill. 60; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 297; Moses v. State, 10 Humph. 458; S. C., 11 Humph. 232; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J., 198; Sam v. State, 13 Sm. & M., 194; State v. Potter, 18 Conn. 171; Osiander's Case, 3 Leigh 785; State v. Williams, 3 Stew. 465; State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & Bat., 213; State v. Davis, 29 Mis. 397; Rex v. Edmonds, 4 B. & Ald., 471.
Martin Ch. J. was absent.
Cooley J.:
The defendant, having been convicted, in the recorder's court of Detroit, on an information for murder, removes the case to this court for review, upon exceptions. The only question which the record presents is, whether the circuit judge holding the court was correct in overruling a challenge to a juror. It appears, from the bill of exceptions, that "one Frederick H. Eberts was called, who was examined, upon his oath, relative to his competency to sit on the panel as a juror, and, upon his oath, did say: 'I have formed a partial opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, from rumors heard in the street, but not a positive opinion;' whereupon said respondent, by his counsel, did then and there challenge said Eberts for cause; and thereupon the said circuit judge ruled that the said Frederick H. Eberts was competent to sit as a juror on the panel for the trial of the said issue."
It is argued by the counsel for the people, that the challenge to Eberts must be regarded as a principal challenge, and not a challenge for favor; that a challenge for favor, though triable under our statute by the court, presents for decision a question of fact, and that the conclusion arrived at cannot be reviewed, except so far as some question of law may be involved, which was distinctly presented to and passed upon by the court below, and which is now to be found in the record. And as it does not appear by this record that any ruling upon points of law was required of the court below, the defendant, if he insists that his challenge is for favor, has no standing in this court. And, as a cause for principal challenge, the statement of the juror, it is said, is insufficient, because it does not, in itself, show such a state of mind--such absolute bias or favor--as disqualifies him.
Section 4400 of the Complied Laws provides that "in all cases of challenge for cause, such cause shall be immediately assigned, and the truth thereof shall be determined by the court." This provision is in harmony with many others in the statutes, which have referred to the court the trial of contested questions of fact, either absolutely, or at the option of the court or of the parties. Unlike other provisions, however, the one in question does not point out any mode by which the decision of the court, on any question of fact, can be reviewed by an appellate tribunal, nor does it require the court, on the demand of the party, to find the facts in writing, with the conclusions of facts therefrom, that it may be seen whether those conclusions are legitimate, or whether the error, if there be one, is one of fact or of law.
It is plain, we think, that, by this statute, the distinction between challenges for principal cause and to the favor is practically abolished. All are classed under the same general head of challenges for cause, and all are tried in the same manner. It is true that some of them will be of a character to present a naked question of law, while others will require the court to enter upon the examination of disputed questions of fact; but the court, in its decision, only declares that a sufficient cause for challenge does or does not exist, and is not required to classify it according to any previous distinctions. The sufficiency of the cause will still be determined by common law rules; but neither the party, in making his challenge, nor the court, in passing upon it, has any regard to the former classification.
If, as suggested by the counsel for the people, there may be difficulties in the way of a review of decisions on questions of fact, we do not think those difficulties are to be met with in a case like the present. Here the juror was himself placed upon the stand, and a single question put to him. It is upon his reply to that question that the judge's decision was based. The facts were undisputed, and the question of their sufficiency, as a cause for challenge, was purely a question of law. The decision of the judge upon that question is as fairly presented for review by the exception thereto as if the judge had proceeded to find the facts in the words of the juror, and had then spread upon the record his conclusion that the state of mind in the juror thus found was not, as a matter of law, a ground of disqualification.
This brings us to the main question in the case: whether the cause shown was sufficient. And, for the investigation of this, some principles were laid down by the counsel for the defendant on the argument, in the light of which it is urged that the examination should be made.
It is, first, said that the presumption of the innocence of the defendant is to avail him in all these preliminary inquiries, in so far that he is entitled to the benefit of all doubts. We concede that, on the question of guilt or innocence, the inquiry is to be conducted with this presumption prevailing; and that the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to overcome it, as respects all the facts necessary to constitute the offense. And we also think that, in criminal cases, whenever, after a full examination, the evidence given upon a challenge leaves a reasonable doubt of the impartiality of the juror, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt.
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People v. Miller
...Justice Cooley, writing for this Court, explained, jurors are "presumed to be ... impartial, until the contrary is shown." Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224, 228 (1865). The burden is on the defendant to establish that the juror was not impartial or at least that juror's impartiality is in reaso......
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Lopez v. State
...a voir dire examination disclosing any bias on the one significant issue to be submitted. This Court also said, quoting from Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224, at 12 Wyo. 64, 73 P. '* * * 'Where the answer of the juror is fairly susceptible of a construction consistent with his impartiality, the......
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Singer v. State
...challenge leaves a reasonable doubt of the impartiality of the juror, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt.' [Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224, 227.] * * In O'Connor v. State, 9 Fla. 215, supra, at page 222, this Court said: 'We make the suggestion upon the ground that jurors ......
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State v. Bryant
... ... expression of an opinion as to the guilt of an accused, ... disqualified a juror. As was said by Marcy, J., in People ... v. Mather , 4 Wend. 232: "The law attaches the ... [6 S.W. 107] ... disqualification to the fact of forming and expressing an ... opinion, ... jury.' Art. 6, sec. 28. Of course, no legislation can ... take this right away. In Holt v. People , 13 Mich ... 224, decided long before the act of 1873 was passed, it was ... decided by this court that the law did not require that a ... ...