Holt v. Pitts

• Decision Date: 27 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-1561,78-1561
• Citation: 619 F.2d 558
• Parties: Gary William HOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry PITTS, Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 558

619 F.2d 558

Gary William HOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry PITTS, Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 78-1561.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 4, 1979.

Decided Feb. 27, 1980.

Gary William Holt, pro se.

Gus A. Wood, III, Morgan, Garner, Wood & Guthrie, Chattanooga, Tenn., for defendant-appellee.

Before WEICK and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, while he was incarcerated in the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, brought a pro se civil rights action against defendant Jerry Pitts, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ¹ The events which allegedly gave rise to plaintiff's cause of action occurred in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and plaintiff properly commenced his action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. ² When plaintiff did not appear at two preliminary hearings because of his custody in a federal penitentiary, the district court dismissed his action for failure to prosecute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). ³ Plaintiff has properly appealed this dismissal, ⁴ and we reverse.

The issues now before us concern the rights of an incarcerated criminal to prosecute a pro se civil rights action. This is an area of law that requires creative but cautious rulemaking. On the one hand, courts must be empowered to deal effectively with frivolous, repetitive, or unduly protracted law suits. See, e. g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Petty v. Manpower, Inc., 591 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1979); Hepperle v. Johnston, 590 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1979); Lopez v. Aransas County Independent School District, 570 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978); Hughley v. Eaton Corp., 572 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974); Conway v. Dunbar, 448 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1971); Mayberry v. Robinson, 427 F.Supp. 297 (M.D.Pa.1977). On the other hand, prison inmates must not be denied adequate means of securing redress for violations of their constitutional rights. We approach the present appeal with both of these considerations in mind.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In his pro se complaint, plaintiff stated that, prior to his confinement in the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, he had been temporarily confined in the Hamilton County jail in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Plaintiff alleged that, at the time of his confinement in Chattanooga, he had been denied various First Amendment rights by defendant Pitts, sheriff of Hamilton County, and by those who had worked under Pitts' supervision.

The district court, after a review of the record in the case, concluded that two of plaintiff's allegations could conceivably support a cause of action under section 1983; first, the allegation that Pitts had refused to provide plaintiff with various law books, and second, the allegation that Pitts had improperly interfered with so-called "legal mail" that had been sent to plaintiff at the county jail. The district court ordered defendant to respond to these allegations, and defendant filed an appropriate response in a timely fashion. Subsequently, both plaintiff and defendant exchanged sets of interrogatories and answers.

Within the course of these initial proceedings, plaintiff requested the district court to conduct a preliminary hearing, as authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). ⁵ The court granted plaintiff's motion, and the hearing was held, as scheduled, on June 28, 1978; however, plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing either in person or through counsel. As a result of this absence, the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to prosecute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

A short time after his complaint had been dismissed, plaintiff sent the district court a document that he had styled "Motion For Good Cause Shown." Therein, plaintiff asserted that he had not received notice of the June 28 hearing until July 6 because of his transfer from the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, to the federal penitentiary in Lompoc, California. In the light of plaintiff's assertion, the district court vacated its order of dismissal, and rescheduled the date of the preliminary hearing to August 16, 1978. Nine days later, plaintiff requested the district court to issue a special writ, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, ⁶ to require the penal authorities in California to produce him at the August 16 hearing in Tennessee. The court denied plaintiff's request on the ground that the underlying action was civil, and not criminal in nature. To no one's surprise, plaintiff failed to appear in person at the August 16 hearing. On that date, plaintiff was obviously in custody in the federal penitentiary in California. Further, plaintiff was not represented by counsel at the August 16 hearing. Apparently, plaintiff chose to continue the prosecution of his case on a pro se basis. As a result of this second absence, the district court for the second time dismissed plaintiff's complaint for failure to prosecute. This order of dismissal is the subject of the present appeal.

I

The first issue before the Court is whether the district judge acted properly in denying plaintiff's request for a writ, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651. We conclude that the district court's denial of plaintiff's request was an exercise of sound discretion.

Generally speaking, prisoners who bring civil actions, including prisoners who bring actions under the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, have no right to be personally present at any stage of the judicial proceedings. In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285-86, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), the Supreme Court stated this principle succinctly:

Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. Among those so limited is the otherwise unqualified right given by § 272 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 394 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1654) to parties in all courts of the United States to "plead and manage their own causes personally."

See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1977); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976); Matter of Warden of Wisconsin State Prison, 541 F.2d 177, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1976); Clark v. Hendrix, 397 F.Supp. 966, 969 (N.D.Ga.1975).

Nonetheless, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) provides that "the Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." This statutory provision empowers the federal courts to issue writs requiring penal authorities to produce prisoners at judicial proceedings in civil cases. However, it is settled law that the decision of a court to issue a § 1651 writ is a matter that rests solely within the court's discretion. Further, a court should issue a writ that requires the production of a prisoner only in those cases where the prisoner's physical presence will contribute significantly to a fair adjudication of his claims. In Price v. Johnston, supra, 334 U.S. at 284-85, 68 S.Ct. at 1059-1060, the Supreme Court outlined the considerations that an appellate court should weigh when deciding whether to issue a writ to enable a prisoner to argue his case personally: ⁷

(T)his discretion is to be exercised with the best interests of both the prisoner and the government in mind. If it is apparent that the request of the prisoner to argue personally reflects something more than a mere desire to be freed temporarily from the confines of the prison, that he is capable of conducting an intelligent and responsible argument and that his presence in the courtroom may be secured without undue inconvenience or danger, the court would be justified in issuing the writ. But if any of those factors were found to be negative, the court might well decline to order the prisoner to be produced.

Likewise, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Stone v. Morris, supra, 546 F.2d at 735-36, enumerated the considerations that a trial court should take into account when determining whether an inmate should be brought to the trial of his civil claims (specifically, his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983):

In making his determination the district judge should take into account the costs and inconvenience of transporting a prisoner from his place of incarceration to the courtroom, any potential danger or security risk which the presence of a particular inmate would pose to the court, the substantiality of the matter at issue, the need for an early determination of the matter, the possibility of delaying trial until the prisoner is released, the probability of success on the merits, the integrity of the correctional system, and the interests of the inmate in presenting his testimony in person rather than by deposition.

See also Ballard v. Spradley, supra, 557 F.2d 476, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1977).

In view of the factors set forth in cases such as Price and Stone, supra, it is readily apparent that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for a § 1651 writ. The cost and inconvenience that would have been involved in the transportation of plaintiff from the federal penitentiary in California to the district courthouse in Tennessee would have been entirely disproportionate to the prospective benefits. Further, and more importantly, plaintiff requested the issuance of the § 1651 writ during a pre-trial phase of the court proceedings. Although we recognize that a district court is obligated to make meaningful accommodations to an inmate at the time his civil action proceeds to trial, we conclude that the court is required to make a lesser degree of accommodation during the proceedings prior to trial. In other words, when an inmate's civil...