Holveck v. Christiana Meadows Apartments
| Decision Date | 11 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CPU4-20-001503 |
| Parties | HEATHER HOLVECK and STEVEN MURPHY, JR., Plaintiffs, v. CHRISTIANA MEADOWS APARTMENTS, Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Common Pleas of Delaware |
Reserved: March 17, 2022
Heather Holveck and Steven Murphy, Jr. Pro Se Plaintiffs
Jillian M. Pratt, Esq. Counsel for Defendant
The instant matter is an action based upon a residential lease. On April 25, 2020, Heather Holveck and Steven Murphy, Jr. (collectively as "Tenants") filed a pro se Complaint against Christiana Meadows Apartments ("CMA"), in which they allege that CMA wrongfully withheld their security deposit.
A bench trial was held on March 17, 2022, during which Tenants testified during their case-in-chief, and property manager Crystal Rincon ("Rincon") testified for CMA. In addition, both parties submitted documents into evidence.[1] At the conclusion of trial, the Court reserved decision. This is the Court's Final Decision and Order.
The parties' testimony regarding the underlying events was largely consistent, diverging only on the issue of alleged damage to the carpet in Tenants' rental unit. Based on the testimony presented at trial and exhibits admitted into evidence, the Court finds the following relevant facts:
Tenants entered an agreement with CMA to lease a rental unit in CMA's apartment complex (the "Lease") commencing August 10, 2018. Consistent with the terms set forth in the Lease, Tenants tendered a total of $2, 750.00 in security deposits.[2]
The Lease terminated in March 2020. Of course, this coincided with self-isolation requirements and unprecedented shutdowns in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, CMA's office was closed to the public as of March 17, 2020, and it sent a text message to its residents (including Tenants) identifying a phone number and e-mail address for any communications during the shutdown.[3]On March 30, 2020, CMA sent another text message to its residents advising that its office was still closed, but reiterated that they were available by phone and e-mail, and that rent checks could be left in a mail slot in the office door.[4] The following day, March 31, Tenants vacated the unit. Prior to their departure, they cleaned the apartment and took photographs of the carpets, kitchen, and kitchen appliances, and they provided CMA with a forwarding address.
On April 16, 2020, CMA sent Tenants, via USPS mail, a security deposit disposition letter along with two checks (one for each Tenant) totaling $1, 690.00 (the "Checks").[5] In the disposition letter, CMA indicated that $1, 131.00 was deducted from the security deposit to pay for replacement of carpeting in the unit which, CMA claimed, was necessary due to "very black/stained" carpeting in the walkways.[6] On April 23, 2020, seven days after the security deposit disposition letter was mailed, Tenants contacted CMA via written e-mail, objecting to the security deposit deductions (the "Objections"). Tenants asserted that the darkened areas in the walkway amounted to normal wear and tear for a carpet in a common area, and they requested the return of their security deposit in full. Unfortunately, the parties could not reach a resolution on the issue. At some point, Tenants cashed the Checks, and on April 25, 2022, they initiated this litigation seeking double damages for the remainder of their security deposit.
At trial, the parties offered starkly different interpretations of the damage to the carpet. Both Tenants testified that the carpets exhibited normal wear and tear for being an area of high traffic in the apartment, and were not blackened and stained.[7]Holveck admitted that the carpeted walkways were used by Tenants daily to enter and exit the house; by guests who kept on their shoes; and by their dog, whose paws they did not wipe. However, Holveck argued that CMA should have first attempted to shampoo the carpet before replacing it. Holveck also took issue with the fact that the property manager relied on the representations of CMA's maintenance supervisor rather than personally examining the carpet.[8] Rincon, a property manager for CMA, testified that she personally performed a walk through of the unit and she agreed with the maintenance supervisor's evaluation that the carpet was blackened and stained beyond repair. She conceded that the maintenance supervisor did not endeavor to clean the carpet prior to replacement, but maintained that, based on CMA's prior experience, damage of the nature seen in the unit cannot be repaired by cleaning. Further, in her experience, when CMA cannot fix the damaged area, the entire carpet must be replaced.[9]
In closing, CMA raised three arguments: (1) Tenants did not object to the deduction in writing as statutorily required; (2) by cashing the Checks, Tenants waived their right to challenge the deductions, and; (3) the deduction was justified given the damage to the carpet.
Residential leases within the State of Delaware are governed by Delaware's Landlord-Tenant Code (the "Code"). Section 5514 of the Code regulates the procurement, use, and disposition of security deposits.[10] Three subsections of § 5514 are relevant to the Court's analysis in this case: § 5514(c), § 5514(f) and § 5514(h).
Section 5514(c) limits the landlord's use of a tenant's security deposit. Among other things, the landlord is permitted to use a security deposit as reimbursement for damages to the property which "exceed normal wear and tear, or which cannot be corrected by painting and ordinary cleaning."[11]
Section 5514(f) sets forth a strict series of events that must occur with regards to the return (or non-return) of a tenant's security deposit. It requires the landlord to provide the tenant with an itemized list of damages and the estimated costs of repairs, along with payment for the remaining balance (i.e., the security deposit minus the estimated repair costs).[12] If the tenant disagrees with the amount deducted for repairs, the tenant must "object in writing to the amount withheld by the landlord" within 10 days.[13]
Section 5514(h) dictates where the writings described in §5514(f) are to be issued.[14] It requires that the correspondence to the landlord be directed to the landlord at the address specified in the rental agreement. Similarly, any correspondence to the tenant must be sent to the tenant's forwarding address, so long as a forwarding address was timely provided.[15]
CMA first argues that, although Tenants asserted their Objections via e-mail within the proscribed period, such does not amount to a "writing" under the Code.
CMA contends that the Code addresses what constitutes a "writing" in § 5113, and that Tenants failed to comply with the requirements set forth in that provision.
CMA's argument is misguided. Section 5113 does not define-or even mention-the term "writing."[16] Rather, it specifies the methods of service required for "any notice or service of process required by [the] Code."[17] Based upon a plain reading of the statute, § 5113 does not necessarily apply to all correspondence regarding a tenant's security deposit as described in § 5514. Importantly, § 5514 does not categorize a tenant's written objections as a "notice" or otherwise require a tenant to formally serve written objections on the landlord.[18] In fact, § 5514(h) impliedly contemplates that such correspondence may be considered a mere "communication," and that it need only be "directed" to the landlord, rather than formally served;
(h) All communications and notices, including the return of any security deposit under this section, shall be directed to the landlord at the address specified in the rental agreement."[19]
Therefore, the question of whether Tenants satisfied their obligation to object in writing turns on (a) whether the e-mailed Objections constitute a "writing" in this context, and (b) whether the Objections were sent to an address specified in the rental agreement.
The term "writing" is not defined in the Code, but it is a well-established precept of statutory interpretation that "undefined words in a statute must be given their ordinary, common meaning."[20] E-mail communications logically fall within the ordinary, common usage of the word "writing" as e-mails are comprised of letters conveying ideas, chronicled in an electronically visible format.[21] The same conclusion has been reached by courts in numerous jurisdictions, [22] and e-mails are specifically recognized as a writing in the Black's Law Dictionary definition of the word.[23] For these reasons, the Court finds that the Tenants' e-mailed Objections satisfy the writing requirement set forth in § 5514(f).
Next, the Court must determine whether Tenants satisfied the requirements of § 5514(h) by sending the Objections "to the landlord at the address specified in the rental agreement."[24] In the Lease, which was admitted into evidence at trial, two addresses are identified: one for Tenants and one for CMA.[25] However, both addresses are listed generally. Furthermore, the Lease does not contain a provision specifying an address where communications and/or notices to CMA should be sent. Lastly, it is clear from the evidence adduced at trial that CMA explicitly directed Tenants to communicate with CMA via e-mail given the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the Court finds that Tenants' e-mailed Objections, which were directed to CMA at the e-mail address specified by CMA, was appropriate.
Second CMA argues that...
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