Holyfield v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:20-CV-00165-JAR
• Parties: HENRY HOLYFIELD and TARA HOLYFIELD, Plaintiffs, v. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

HENRY HOLYFIELD and TARA HOLYFIELD, Plaintiffs,
v.
CHEVRON U.S.A., INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-CV-00165-JAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION

April 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Syngenta Crop Protection, Syngenta Corporation, and Syngenta AG (collectively "Syngenta") (Docs. 26, 47) and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ("Chevron"). (Doc. 31). The motions have been fully briefed, and oral arguments occurred on January 11, 2021.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Henry Holyfield worked as an agricultural aircraft laborer from approximately 1965 to 1975. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 53). In this role, Mr. Holyfield was exposed to the pesticide paraquat as it was applied via crop dusting. (Id. at ¶ 54). Decades later, in 2015, Mr. Holyfield was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease. (Id. at ¶ 57). Mr. Holyfield and his wife allege that the exposure to paraquat caused or contributed to his development of Parkinson's disease. (Id. at ¶ 56). Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants designed, marketed, licensed, manufactured, distributed, and/or sold paraquat during the time Mr. Holyfield was exposed and should be held liable under Missouri law. (Id. at ¶ 8). Plaintiffs initially filed suit in state court in Missouri, but Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1). Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Doc. 22) includes the following counts:

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Count I: Design Defect
Count II: Failure to Warn
Count III: Negligence
Count IV: Breach of Implied Warranty
Count V: Loss of Consortium

In their motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), both Syngenta and Chevron argue that all of Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court must "accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences from the complaint must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2001). To survive the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary at this stage, Plaintiffs' obligation to provide the grounds of their entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Dismissal is warranted, moreover, if the Amended Complaint is "fatally flawed in [its] legal premises and designed to fail, thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity." Young, 244 F.3d at 627 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989)).

III. STATUTORY CONTEXT

FIFRA was enacted in 1947, but Congress adopted substantial amendments as part of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972). These amendments "transformed FIFRA from a labeling law into a comprehensive regulatory

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statute." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984).¹ Under FIFRA, as amended, all pesticides must be registered with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") before being distributed or sold in the United States.

The EPA will register the pesticide if it determines, among other requirements, that the pesticide will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment and its label is not misbranded. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(B-D). Unreasonable adverse effects on the environment include "any unreasonable risk to man." 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). A label is misbranded if it contains any false or misleading information, does not have adequate instructions for use, or omits necessary warnings or cautionary statements. 7 US.C. § 136(q)(1). "Because it is unlawful under the statute to sell a pesticide that is registered but nevertheless misbranded, manufacturers have a continuing obligation to adhere to FIFRA's labeling requirements." Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 438 (2005) (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E)).

Critically, FIFRA establishes that States "may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide . . . in the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use prohibited" by FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (emphasis added). States may not, however, "impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required" under FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added). The core question on these motions to dismiss, a question which has been addressed by numerous courts in one form or another, is whether FIFRA preempts Plaintiffs' claims.

IV. DISCUSSION

No one can sell a pesticide in the United States until the pesticide has been registered with the EPA pursuant to FIFRA. Once the pesticide has been registered, all distribution must

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conform with the labeling and packaging approved by the EPA. Defendants' argument in this case is straightforward and understandable: to hold them liable under Missouri law is fundamentally inconsistent with the EPA's registration of paraquat. Consistently relying on this general principle, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' claims are expressly and impliedly preempted by FIFRA and that this Court should defer to the EPA pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

A. Bates

Given its central role in the parties' briefing, it makes sense to discuss Bates explicitly before addressing Defendants' specific arguments. In Bates, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue of FIFRA preemption and determined that States retain "ample authority to review pesticide labels to ensure that they comply with both federal and state labeling requirements." Id. at 442. Bates "overturned thirteen years of precedent during which pesticide companies enjoyed relative immunity from tort liability" by taking a "narrow view" of FIFRA preemption. Joseph Frueh, Comment, Pesticides, Preemption, and the Return of Tort Protection, 23 YALE J. REG. 299, 299-300 (2006). The Supreme Court relied on 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a), which provides that States "may regulate" the sale or use of federally registered pesticides. Id. at 442 ("Nothing in the text of FIFRA would prevent a State from making the violation of a federal labeling or packaging requirement a state offense, thereby imposing its own sanctions on pesticide manufacturers who violate federal law."). Accordingly, per Bates, FIFRA does not expressly preempt all state tort law liability relating to registered pesticides.

Since Bates, courts have generally held that FIFRA does not preempt state law claims (with some exceptions). See Schoenhofer v. McClaskey, 861 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2017); Indian

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Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Prot., Inc., 617 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2010); Wuebker v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 418 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2005); In re Dicamba Herbicides Litig., 359 F. Supp. 3d 711 (E.D. Mo. 2019); In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Beyond Pesticides v. Monsanto Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 82 (D.D.C. 2018); Blitz v. Monsanto Co., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (W.D. Wis. 2018); Rawa v. Monsanto Co., No. 4:17-CV-01252 AGF, 2017 WL 3392090 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 7, 2017); Sheppard v. Monsanto Co., Civ. No. 16-00043 JMS-RLP, 2016 WL 3629074 (D. Haw. 2016); Hardeman v. Monsanto Co., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Carias v. Monsanto Co., No. 15-CV-3677 (JMA) (GRB), 2016 WL 6803780 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). But see Mirzaie v. Monsanto Co., No. CV 15-04361 DDP, 2016 WL 146421 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (D. Kan. 2015); Wilgus v. Hartz Mountain Corp., No. 3:12-CV-86, 2013 WL 653707 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 19, 2013). The cases finding FIFRA preempts state law claims have been routinely and convincingly criticized. See Carias, 2016 WL 6803780, at *6.

FIFRA's express preemption provision does provide that States "shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required" under FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (emphasis added). The Bates holding carefully follows this language. Per Bates, a State rule is preempted if it is (1) a "requirement 'for labeling or packaging'" and (2) "'in addition to or different...