Holyfield v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 1985
• Docket Number: No. 13967,13967
• Citation: 711 P.2d 834,101 Nev. 793
• Parties: Napolean HOLYFIELD, Jr. and Duane Narvell Townsell, Appellants, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 834

711 P.2d 834

101 Nev. 793

Napolean HOLYFIELD, Jr. and Duane Narvell Townsell, Appellants, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent.

No. 13967.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Dec. 20, 1985.

Samuel T. Bull, Reno, for appellants.

Brian McKay, Atty. Gen., Carson City, Mills Lane, Dist. Atty., Edward B. Horn, Deputy Dist. Atty., Reno, for respondent.

OPINION

GUNDERSON, Justice.

In this consolidated appeal, the central issue is whether police officers may subvert a suspect's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution and article 1 section 8 of the Nevada Constitution by bargaining to have a self-interested, twice-convicted felon and escapee conduct a custodial interrogation that the police could not lawfully conduct themselves. We hold they may not do so. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm appellant Townsell's judgment of conviction, but we reverse the conviction of appellant Holyfield.

The convictions of Holyfield and Townsell stem from an armed robbery at the Sierra Schools Credit Union in Reno on July 16, 1980. On that morning, two young black men entered the credit union brandishing handguns. After taking $6,700 in cash from the tellers' drawers, the robbers confined the credit union employees and a customer in a vault. As they fled, the robbers encountered the credit union's manager in the parking lot. They took her purse, papers, and a banking bag containing a deposit slip in the amount of $20,000. Then, they forced her into the trunk of her car where she remained for two hours.

Earlier that morning, at around 9:30 a.m., a witness driving by the credit union had observed three black males, wearing colored bandanas, sitting in a gold Chrysler automobile parked near the credit union. At approximately 11:20 a.m., the witness again drove by and noticed the same Chrysler. The Chrysler, still carrying three black men, pulled sharply in front of the witness into his lane of traffic, and ran two stop signs. The witness followed the car for some distance and, believing that the occupants were acting suspiciously, recorded the vehicle's license number. After reading about the robbery in the newspaper the next day, the witness reported his observations to the police.

Although the police determined then that the vehicle was registered to Townsell, they allegedly could not locate the vehicle until two weeks later, on August 1, when it was being driven not by Townsell but by Holyfield. The police stopped the vehicle and arrested Holyfield on an outstanding warrant for an unrelated robbery of a Sparks movie theatre. The police seized Holyfield's glasses because, although they differed in color, they were similar in shape to glasses that reportedly had been worn by one of the robbers of the credit union. Holyfield was subsequently taken to the Sparks Police Department, given his Miranda warnings, and questioned directly by the police about the credit union robbery. ¹ Holyfield denied any involvement in the credit union robbery.

While Holyfield was in custody in the Sparks City Jail, the Reno police detectives investigating the credit union robbery enlisted the aid of a long-time criminal and former San Quentin inmate named Obbie Jacobs, alias "George Shaw," who had a history of serving as an informant or "fink" to purchase favorable treatment for himself, and who was then residing in the Washoe County Jail. On or about August 24, 1980, police detectives placed Jacobs in the jail cell with Holyfield, admittedly to obtain incriminating statements about both the cinema robbery for which Holyfield had been arrested, and about the credit union robbery of which they had concluded Holyfield was also guilty. Upon exiting the cell the next day, Jacobs immediately related to the detectives his version of the statements Holyfield had allegedly made to him concerning both the cinema robbery and the credit union robbery. According to Jacobs, Holyfield admitted that he and two others had committed the credit union robbery. ² After receiving Jacobs' taped statement, on August 28 Reno police formally arrested Holyfield, who was still in jail, for the credit union robbery. It was not until September 18, 1980, however, that both Holyfield and Townsell were formally charged with burglary, two counts each of robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and two counts each of kidnapping for the credit union incident. Holyfield was also charged with being an ex-felon in possession of a concealed firearm.

At trial, none of the six victims of the robbery or any other witness was able to identify Holyfield or Townsell as the perpetrators of the credit union robbery. Nor were any of these individuals able to identify Holyfield and Townsell in any of the pretrial lineups. Consequently, without any direct evidence, the state was forced to rely in large part upon Jacobs' testimony and upon that of three other witnesses, two of them convicted felons, who were acquainted with appellants.

For example, Michael King, an ex-felon on probation, testified that on August 20, 1980, he gave a taped statement to the Reno police detectives following his arrest for a different offense. King told the police that he had a conversation with Townsell in August. According to King, he saw Townsell with about $5000, and Townsell admitted to King that he and another person had robbed the credit union and fled with a third accomplice. King further described to the police the details of the robbery as allegedly related to him by Townsell. Additionally, according to King, Townsell stated that he left the Reno area because he knew police were looking for him for the credit union robbery and knew his car had been impounded. Interestingly, none of Townsell's statements to King implicated Holyfield.

The jury subsequently found Holyfield and Townsell guilty of all the counts charged. This appeal followed.

Appellants contend that the district court erred by refusing to suppress Jacobs' testimony concerning the incriminating statements Holyfield allegedly made to Jacobs while the two were confined in jail. Specifically, appellants contend that admission of this evidence violated Holyfield's constitutional right against self-incrimination because Jacobs was, in fact, an agent of the police and he had not advised Holyfield of his Miranda rights prior to speaking with him. We agree.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." The ruling of Miranda applies to statements taken during a "custodial interrogation," which the Court defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (footnote omitted). As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, Miranda requires that prior to questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, that he has the right to have an attorney present, and that one will be appointed for him if he cannot afford one. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. Because it is conceded that Holyfield was not given any of these warnings before he was subjected to inquiry by Jacobs, the issue presented is whether Holyfield's alleged admissions were the product of custodial interrogation initiated by the police.

We note initially that, although Holyfield was incarcerated on other charges at the time he allegedly made the incriminating statements to Jacobs, he was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda. See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968). As the Court in Mathis concluded, nothing in the Miranda opinion makes the necessity for warnings dependent on the particular reason the defendant is in custody. Id. at 4-5, 88 S.Ct. at 1504-05. As soon as a person is incarcerated for any reason, he must be given his Miranda warnings before he is interrogated. Therefore, we conclude, and the state concedes as much, that Holyfield was indeed "in custody" for purposes of Miranda when Jacobs conversed with him.

Second, there is no doubt that Jacobs, upon agreeing to foster police efforts to inculpate Holyfield, became an agent of the police. Police detectives placed Jacobs in the jail cell with Holyfield, admittedly to seek incriminating statements about both the robbery for which Holyfield had been arrested and the credit union robbery of which he was suspected. Although the prosecution maintains that the police instructed Jacobs not to question Holyfield, the prosecution has conceded that the police in fact expected him to do so, and that Jacobs knew he was expected to elicit information from Holyfield. ³ The only question that remains, then, is whether Jacobs' conversation with Holyfield amounted to interrogation for purposes of Miranda.

The state maintains that Holyfield was not subjected to police interrogation, for several reasons. First, the state contends that Holyfield was not questioned by any figure of authority. Second, the state contends, there was no environment or atmosphere which in any way could be described as intimidating or coercive because Jacobs and Holyfield conversed in a dormitory cell which housed twelve other inmates. The state argues that Holyfield did not have to talk to Jacobs; he could have simply walked away. Third, the state contends that the police instructed Jacobs not to ask Holyfield any direct questions or attempt to initiate an interview with him. Fourth, the state argues that the police did not give Jacobs any details concerning the credit union robbery and, therefore, Jacobs was not in a position...