Holz v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 March 1929 |
| Docket Number | No. 27055.,27055. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
| Parties | HOLZ v. CHICAGO, M., ST. P. & P. R. CO. |
Appeal from District Court, Winona County; Karl Finkelnburg, Judge.
Action by Oswald W. Holz against the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company. From an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed.
F. W. Root, C. O. Newcomb and A. C. Erdall, all of Minneapolis, and Webber, George & Owen, of Winona, for appellant.
Tautges, Wilder & McDonald, of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Appeal by defendant from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial.
Defendant is a common carrier by railway, engaged in both interstate and intrastate transportation of passengers and freight. Plaintiff was employed as a brakeman or switchman in defendant's yards at Dubuque, Iowa. He was injured there while between two freight cars, engaged in opening by hand the coupler on one of these cars, and brings the action to recover for the personal injury sustained. He bases his action upon the Federal Safety Appliance Act and Employers' Liability Act, title 45, §§ 2 and 51, U. S. Code (45 USCA §§ 2, 51).
At the time of the accident, the crew of which plaintiff was a member was engaged in switching operations in the Dubuque yards. The yards were used for switching operations in both interstate and intrastate commerce. In these yards are a main track, a passing track, some eight switch tracks, numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, and a lead track. The switching operations were conducted on the passing track, the lead and track No. 9. A string of more than twenty cars was standing on the passing track. Seventeen of these cars were pulled out from this track and were being distributed onto track No. 9 and the lead and passing tracks. Coal cars destined for Green Island, Iowa, were being taken out of the string and placed on track No. 9 for a train soon to leave for that place. Other cars in the string were being kicked back onto the passing track, except one which was shunted down the lead track. The cars were being kicked in on the different tracks without any one on the cars to control them, and without any notice or warning to the fieldman. They moved in until they came to rest or were stopped by coming up against cars already standing on the different tracks. That was the customary way of switching in this yard, and plaintiff was familiar with the custom and the work being done. He was what is called the field man of the crew. It was his duty, as testified by the foreman, to go around on the different tracks being used to see that the joints were made and that the coupler knuckles were open to see that the cars went into the clear, and to stop them and give signals and throw switches if wanted. The other switchman in the crew generally opened and closed the switches and followed the engine. The foreman gave directions and signals, and sometimes made the cuts when cars were to be separated.
The accident happened shortly before midnight. Plaintiff tesified that it was his duty to walk along the strings of cars to see that the cars were coupled together and the draw bars lined up, and that he was so engaged; that it was his duty to open the knuckles of the couplers so that the cars would couple on impact; that they were breaking up the string of cars on the passing track and making up a train on that track to go to Savannah, Illinois, these cars to be picked up later by a train to go to that place. He testified that two cars were kicked in on the passing track; that he heard them moving down the track, went down to examine them, and found them standing uncoupled some 2 to 3 feet apart; that he found the couplers between them closed; that he tried to open the coupler on one of these cars by using the lever extending to the outside; that the lever would not lift the pin or open the coupler; that he then went between the cars to open the coupler on one of the cars by hand, and that, while so doing, another car or cars kicked in on the track by the engine came and collided with the car on which he was working and bumped it up against the next car so that his hand was caught and crushed; that he did not hear or know of the car or cars being so kicked in and received no signal or notice thereof. The cars between which he was working were billed to Savannah, Illinois. The foreman of the crew knew that plaintiff was out in the yard, but did not know at what place or what he was doing.
1. It is plaintiff's claim that he was at the time engaged in interstate commerce; that the coupler device was defective in that the coupler could not be opened by use of the lever, and that it was necessary for him to go between the cars to open the coupler by hand; that the Safety Appliance Act and Employers' Liability Act apply and entitle him to recover.
It is contended by defendant that the collision of cars, the kicking of the cars down the track so that they collided with the car on which plaintiff was working, and not the condition of the coupler, was the proximate cause of the accident, and that the collision was an independent and unintended happening.
The collision can hardly be said to have been unintended. The natural and probable result of kicking the cars down the track toward cars standing thereon a short distance away would be just such a collision, and the persons so moving the cars must be held to have intended the natural and probable consequences of their acts.
If, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was engaged in the performance of his regular duties as servant of the defendant, and both parties were engaged in interstate commerce in these switching operations, then, under the facts shown, the condition of the coupler might well be held a proximate cause of the accident. The primary purpose of the Safety Appliance Act, as to couplers, is to protect employees from the peril of having to go between cars to couple or uncouple them, but, as held in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 37 S. Ct. 456, 61 L. Ed. 931, the act has a broader application and makes carriers liable regardless of the position the employee may have been in or the work he may have been doing at the time, if the carrier's failure to comply with the act is the proximate cause of injury to the employee while engaged in the discharge of his duty in an interstate operation. Burho v. M. & St. L. R. Co., 121 Minn. 326, 141 N. W. 300; Ahrens v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 121 Minn. 335, 141 N. W. 297; Hurley v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 133 Minn. 101, 157 N. W. 1005; Goneau v. M., St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 154 Minn. 1, 191 N. W. 279; Id., 269 U. S. 406, 46 S. Ct. 129, 70 L. Ed. 335; Bohm v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co., 161 Minn. 74, 200 N. W. 804; Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239, 44 S. Ct. 64, 68 L. Ed. 284; M. & St. L. R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, 37 S. Ct. 598, 61 L. Ed. 995; Chicago, G. W. R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U. S. 287, 45 S. Ct. 303, 69 L. Ed. 614.
2. Under plaintiff's theory and evidence, he was engaged in interstate commerce. His testimony is to the effect that the two cars had been set out on this track, billed to a point in another state, and were to be coupled up to go into a train destined for that point, and that the switching crew was engaged in the work of making up such train, or a part thereof.
If, at the time of his injury, the employee was engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of such transportation, then he comes within the act. Hurley v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., supra; Witort v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 170 Minn. 482, 212 N. W. 944; Johnson v. So. Pac. R. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 S. Ct. 158, 49 L. Ed. 363; Southern R. Co. v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2, 56 L. Ed. 72; Pederson v. D., L. & W. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 S. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125; North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 34 S. Ct. 305, 58 L. Ed. 591; U. S. v. Erie R. Co., 237 U. S. 402, 35 S. Ct. 621, 59 L. Ed. 1019; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260, 35 S. Ct. 780, 59 L. Ed. 1298; Great Northern R. Co. v. Otos, 239 U. S. 349, 36 S. Ct. 124, 60 L. Ed. 322; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352, 36 S. Ct. 126, 60 L. Ed. 324; Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 36 S. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 482, 60 L. Ed. 874; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Polk, 256 U. S. 332, 41 S. Ct. 518, 65 L. Ed. 958; B. & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Burtch, 263 U. S. 540, 44 S. Ct. 165, 68 L. Ed. 433.
Other cases cited by defendant on the question of proximate cause and interstate commerce, such as Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Calhoun, 213 U. S. 1, 29 S. Ct. 321, 53 L. Ed. 671; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 33 S. Ct. 858, 57 L. Ed. 1179; Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S. 42, 34 S. Ct. 581, 58 L. Ed. 838; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U. S. 243, 35 S. Ct. 785, 59 L. Ed. 1290; Lang v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 255 U. S. 455, 41 S. Ct. 381, 65 L. Ed. 729; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Eisenhart (C. C. A.) 280 F. 271; McCalmont v. Penn. R. Co. (C. C. A.) 283 F. 736; Rittenhouse v. St. Louis-San F. R. Co., 299 Mo. 199, 252 S. W. 945; Illinois State Trust Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (Mo. Sup.) 5 S.W.(2d) 368, have been examined and found instructive. We shall not attempt to analyze or distinguish them. Upon the record here, we hold that the questions of proximate cause and interstate commerce were questions of fact for the jury. Burho v. M. & St. L. R. Co., supra.
3. As to negligence, the rule is that a coupler which fails to work, when an honest and reasonable effort is made to operate it, does not comply with the act in question, and such failure to operate is sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding it defective and in finding the carrier negligent. Burho v. M. &...
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