Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, New York
| Decision Date | 15 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95 Civ. 10409 (WCC).,95 Civ. 10409 (WCC). |
| Citation | 950 F.Supp. 1267 |
| Parties | Joseph H. HOLZAPFEL, and Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF NEWBURGH, NEW YORK, and Charles M. KEHOE, Chief of Police, Town of Newburgh Police Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Chamberlain and Kaufman, Albany, NY (Alan S. Kaufman, of counsel), for Plaintiffs.
Drake, Sommers, Loeb, Tarshis & Catania, P.C. Newburgh, NY (Daniel J. Schneider, of counsel), for Defendants.
Following a jury trial resulting in a verdict in favor of defendants Town of Newburgh and Charles M. Kehoe, plaintiff Joseph Holzapfel moves for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 and for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motions are denied.
Plaintiff has been a police officer in the Town of Newburgh Police Department since September 1990. Approximately one year after joining the police force, plaintiff was selected to be a police dog ("K-9") handler and was assigned a German Shepherd named Bandit. Under the Town of Newburgh's Standard Operating Procedures, each K-9 officer keeps his police dog at his home. The Town of Newburgh (the "Town") pays for the dog's food, for any necessary equipment, and for veterinary care. The officer is responsible for feeding, grooming, exercising, and training the dog. In addition, the officer must provide the dog with suitable shelter, ensure that the dog receives appropriate veterinary care, and take every reasonable precaution to maintain a high standard of health for the dog. The officer is also required to maintain the cleanliness of the patrol vehicle to which the officer and dog are assigned.
On December 11, 1995, plaintiff filed this suit against the Town and Charles Kehoe, the chief of police for the Town of Newburgh Police Department. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by failing to compensate him adequately for "off-the-clock" activities that he performed as a police dog handler and assistant trainer. Prior to May 9, 1995, when an injury rendered plaintiff unable to perform his patrol duties, plaintiff worked approximately forty hours per week and received two hours per week of overtime pay for his efforts in tending to Bandit during off-duty hours. Plaintiff, however, asserts that he is entitled to approximately forty-three hours per week of additional overtime pay for time that he claims to have expended on Bandit since 1992. In addition, plaintiff, who is certified as an assistant trainer of police dogs, alleges that between April 1995 and May 9, 1995, he and Anthony Patricola, another Town police officer who had been assigned to be a K-9 officer and whose dog was in training during that time, attended numerous training sessions run by the Orange County Sheriff's Department. The Town of Newburgh did not have its own training program and had contracted with the Orange County Sheriff's Department to provide training for Officer Patricola's dog. Plaintiff claims that he assisted in training Officer Patricola's dog at these sessions in addition to completing his regular forty hours per week of patrol work and caring for Bandit while off duty. Therefore, according to plaintiff, he is entitled to overtime compensation for his efforts with regard to Officer Patricola's dog.
This court conducted a jury trial in September 1996. The case was submitted to the jury on special verdict questions. The questions, with the jury's answers, are as follows:
1. Has the plaintiff Joseph H. Holzapfel proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he spent additional time, over and above the 40 hours of regular time plus 2 hours of overtime per week for which he was compensated, in performing work which was (1) reasonably necessary to his duties of feeding, grooming, caring for and training the K-9 unit dog assigned to him and (2) which could not reasonably be performed within such 42 hours of compensated time per week?
Yes ____ No X
2. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he performed additional work in training the K-9 unit dog assigned to Police Officer Anthony Patricola at the direction of defendant Town of Newburgh Police Department or with their knowledge and acquiescence and with the reasonable expectation that he would be compensated for such work?
Yes ____ No X
[If your answer to both Question 1 and Question 2 is "No," you need answer no other questions.]
3. If your answer to either Question 1 or Question 2 is "yes," how many hours of such additional work do you find that plaintiff performed during the following periods:1
December 1992 — December 1993 ____hours
December 1993 — May 1995 ____hours
4. Has plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the credible evidence that defendant Town of Newburgh Police Department either deliberately or with reckless disregard of its obligations, failed to pay plaintiff compensation to which he was entitled for work performed during the period from December 1992 to December 1993?
Yes ____ No ____
In light of the jury's answers to the special verdict questions, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
On the instant motion, plaintiff seeks two types of relief: judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 and a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.2
Rule 50(a) authorizes entry of judgment as a matter of law "only if, `without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.'" Caruso v. Forslund, 47 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 1095, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989)). Rule 50(b) further provides, however, that a motion for judgment must be "made at the close of all the evidence...." In interpreting this provision, the Second Circuit has held that "judgment as a matter of law is limited to those issues `specifically raised in [a] prior motion for a directed verdict.'" Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of IBEW, 34 F.3d 1148, 1155 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1993)). "The rule is well established that a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite [for judgment as a matter of law]." Hilord Chemical Corp. v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc., 875 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir.1989). "Moreover, this procedural requirement may not be waived as a mere technicality." Cruz, 34 F.3d at 1155 (citing Redd v. City of Phenix City, Ala., 934 F.2d 1211, 1214 (11th Cir.1991)).
In this case, plaintiff failed to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the evidence on the grounds he currently asserts. Indeed, he failed to make such a motion on any ground. Thus, because of his procedural default, plaintiff now is precluded from asserting that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3
Plaintiff contends that the jury's conclusions in this case should be set aside because the substance of the court's special verdict questions and accompanying instructions to the jury constituted legal error and because the jury's findings were against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial under Rule 59, unlike his motion for judgment as a matter of law, is not procedurally barred.4 Moreover, a less stringent standard applies to a motion for a new trial than to a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970 (2d Cir. 1987). "The district court's grant of a new trial motion is usually warranted only if it `is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dept., 971 F.2d 864, 875 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir. 1988)). Unlike judgment as a matter of law, a new trial may be granted even if there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir.1992). In evaluating a motion for a new trial, the court "is free to weigh the evidence ... and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner." Id. (quoting Bevevino v. Saydjari, 574 F.2d 676, 684 (2d Cir.1978)).
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court improperly framed the issues presented in the first special verdict question. In plaintiff's view, the first question suffered from three serious flaws. In addition, plaintiff asserts that even if the first verdict question was properly phrased, a new trial on that question is justified because the jury's conclusion was against the weight of the evidence.
According to plaintiff, the first verdict question erroneously saddled him with the burden of proving that the overtime work he claims to have performed was reasonably necessary. Plaintiff argues that under pertinent federal employment law jurisprudence there is no requirement that work suffered or permitted by an employer must be reasonably necessary before the employer is obligated to compensate the employee for his or her efforts. According to plaintiff, any amount of time, no matter how lengthy, that a K-9 officer spends on off-duty, dog-care activities should be compensable work time.
We disagree. Employees are entitled to compensation only for "work." Reich v. New...
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