Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 August 1995
• Docket Number: 15052,Nos. 15051,s. 15051
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HOME INSURANCE COMPANY v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.

Page 1001

663 A.2d 1001

235 Conn. 185

HOME INSURANCE COMPANY v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.

Nos. 15051, 15052.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 1, 1995.

Decided Aug. 15, 1995.

Lois B. Tanzer, with whom, on the brief, was Donald W. O'Brien, Hartford, for appellant in Docket No. 15051 (plaintiff's judgment debtor).

Joseph A. O'Brien, with whom, on the brief, was Edward W. Case, West Hartford, for appellant in Docket No. 15052 (defendant).

William F. Gallagher, with whom, on the brief, were Cynthia C. Bott and Roger B. Calistro, New Haven, for appellee in both cases (plaintiff).

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

These certified appeals arise out of litigation stemming from a fire started by Barry Schuss on August 15, 1983, that caused extensive damage to the Emanuel Synagogue in West Hartford. The plaintiff, Home Insurance Company (Home), which was the synagogue's insurer, obtained a judgment against Schuss and, thereafter, brought this subrogation action against the defendant, Aetna Life and Casualty Company (Aetna), the insurer of Schuss' parents. After the trial court, Hodgson, J., had denied Home's motion for access to certain of Schuss' psychiatric records, Aetna filed a motion for summary judgment. Home opposed Aetna's motion on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the applicability of an exclusion in Aetna's policy for property damage arising from an insured's intentional misconduct. The trial court, Gordon, J., granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon.

Home appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had: (1) denied its request for access to Schuss' psychiatric records; and (2) granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Court agreed with both of Home's claims and, accordingly, reversed the judgment of the trial court. Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 35 Conn.App. 94, 644 A.2d 933 (1994).

We granted Schuss' petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Home was entitled to access to his psychiatric records. We also granted Aetna's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the issue of whether there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning the applicability of the policy exclusion in the circumstances of this case. ¹ We conclude that the trial court properly denied Home's motion for access to Schuss' psychiatric records and properly granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "This is a subrogation action to recover an amount paid by [Home] for damages caused by a fire at the Emanuel Synagogue in West Hartford. The fire was set by Barry Schuss who pleaded guilty to arson in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-113(a). ² Schuss' parents are insured by [Aetna].

"[Home], as the insurer and assignee of the Emanuel Synagogue, paid its insured $696,539.71 for the damage caused by the fire and commenced an action against Schuss to recover the amount paid. As a special defense, Schuss initially pleaded that he had been 'exposed to various experiences in his personal life so as to result in a growing psychological vulnerability [and] ... his loss of a substantial ability to control himself.' Schuss later withdrew the special defense, and the court rendered judgment, in accordance with a stipulation, against Schuss for $696,539.71 plus interest. [Home] and Schuss stipulated that [Home] would seek to satisfy the judgment only to the extent that Schuss had insurance coverage. ³

"[Home] then commenced a subrogation action against [Aetna], the insurer of Schuss' parents, to recover the amount of the judgment obtained against Schuss. ⁴ [Aetna] did not deny that Schuss qualified as an insured under a general liability policy it issued to Schuss' parents. [Aetna], however, pleaded as a special defense that it had no obligation to pay the judgment because Schuss' conduct of August 15, 1983, fell within an exclusion of the policy's coverage. The exclusion provides that the insurer is not liable for property damage 'which is expected or intended by the insured.'

"[Home] filed an application for an order pursuant to General Statutes § 52-146f for the release of certain confidential psychiatric records of Schuss. ⁵ [Home] claimed that [Aetna's] special defense made Schuss' mental condition an issue in the case. The trial court denied [Home's] application on the ground that [Aetna], not Schuss, introduced Schuss' mental condition as an issue in the case. The court also concluded that under the principles of subrogation [Home] held the contractual rights of Schuss but not his personal rights such as the privilege of confidentiality.

"After the denial of the plaintiff's application, [Aetna] filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that Schuss' plea of guilty to arson in the third degree conclusively established that he intended to cause damage to the synagogue, which would prevent him from being covered by the insurance policy. After the trial court denied the motion, [Aetna] filed a second motion for summary judgment, contending that statements made by Schuss in a deposition of December 18, 1990, indicated that he intended or expected to damage the synagogue, which allegedly would trigger the application of the policy exclusion. The trial court granted this motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no evidence before the court 'except that which indicates Schuss intended to start the fires and do damage.' " Id., at 95-98, 644 A.2d 933.

Home appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had: (1) denied Home's application for an order releasing Schuss' psychiatric records; and (2) granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Court reversed on both issues, concluding that "[a]lthough the patient, Schuss, introduced his mental condition in [Home's] action against Schuss, and not in [Home's] action against [Aetna] ... the actions are one and the same because the action against Schuss is the underlying action to the subrogation action against [Aetna]." Id., at 99, 644 A.2d 933. Having determined that Schuss had, in effect, placed his mental condition at issue in Home's subrogation action against Aetna, the Appellate Court concluded that Home was entitled to access to Schuss' psychiatric records pursuant to § 52-146f(5); id., at 99-101, 644 A.2d 933; and that the issue of whether Schuss had "expected or intended" to cause damage to the synagogue within the meaning of the insurance policy's intentional act exclusion clause was a question of fact to be decided by the jury. Id., at 101-107, 644 A.2d 933. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. This appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, Schuss claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that Home is entitled to access to his psychiatric records under § 52-146f(5), and Aetna claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there existed a genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicability of the exclusion in its policy for property damage intentionally caused by an insured. We agree with both of these claims and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court, and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

I

Home acknowledges that Schuss' psychiatric records fall within the ambit of General Statutes § 52-146e, ⁶ which establishes the confidentiality of communications and records relating to the psychiatrist-patient relationship. See General Statutes § 52-146d. ⁷ Home posits three arguments, however, in support of its claim that it nonetheless is entitled to access to Schuss' psychiatric records. ⁸ First, Home maintains that because Schuss placed his mental condition at issue in Home's action against Schuss by asserting the special defense of " 'psychological vulnerability [and] ... loss of a substantial ability to control himself,' " Schuss' psychiatric records are disclosable to Home pursuant to § 52-146f(5). Second, Home contends that as the subrogee of Schuss' rights under Aetna's insurance policy, pursuant to § 38a-321; see footnote 4; Home itself is empowered to waive the confidentiality of Schuss' records. Third, Home claims that the stipulation entered into by Home and Schuss imposed on Schuss an implied obligation not to frustrate Home's efforts to collect from Aetna on the judgment it had obtained against Schuss. We are not persuaded.

A

Under § 52-146f(5), communications or records that are otherwise subject to the psychiatrist-patient privilege under § 52-146e "may be disclosed in a civil proceeding in which the patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense." ⁹ Although Home concedes that Schuss has not introduced his mental condition as an element of his defense in this case, Home maintains that nonetheless it is entitled to Schuss' psychiatric records because Schuss did place his mental condition at issue in Home's action against Schuss. ¹⁰ In support of its interpretation of § 52-146f(5), Home argues that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that "under the principles of subrogation, a party that obtains a judgment against an insured defendant is substituted in place of the defendant for the purposes of an action against the insurer on the insurance policy.... This principle of substitution links the action against the insured and the subsequent subrogation action against the insurer to such an extent that they can be regarded as one cause of action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 99-100. We do not agree.

Home's argument is contrary to the plain language of ...