Home Mutual Benefit Association v. Keller

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HART, J.,
• Citation: Home Mutual Benefit Association v. Keller, 148 Ark. 361, 230 S.W. 10 (Ark. 1921)
• Decision Date: 25 April 1921
• Docket Number: 297
• Parties: HOME MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION v. KELLER

230 S.W. 10

148 Ark. 361

HOME MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION v. KELLER

No. 297

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 25, 1921

Appeal from Polk Circuit Court; James S. Steel, Judge; reversed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

I. T Keller sued the Home Mutual Benefit Association to recover on two benefit certificates issued by the association at his application upon the life of E. W. Moore.

The Home Mutual Benefit Association was incorporated under the laws of the State of Arkansas for the purpose of conducting a life and accident insurance business in this State. I. T Keller applied to the Home Mutual Benefit Association to issue two benefit certificates to him as the beneficiary upon the life of E. W. Moore, and they issued in the sum of $ 1,000 each, on the 4th day of May, 1915. At the time E. W Moore resided with I. T. Keller, who had married his daughter, and had one child by her. E. W. Moore owned the farm on which they resided, and Keller cultivated the land for a part of the crop. Two years later Keller moved to town and borrowed $ 1,000 from Moore with which to run a garage. Moore moved to town and lived with Keller for a while. Subsequently he married again and died on the 14th day of May, 1920. After he married the second time Moore said to his wife that he had loaned Keller $ 1,000, and that the latter had been as good to him as if he had been his own son. Moore was very much attached to his grandson, who was the son of his daughter and Keller. After Moore died Keller paid to his estate $ 1,000 which he had borrowed from him. Keller took out the policy as a good investment because Moore was about sixty years of age and resided with Keller at the time the latter took out the insurance.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and from the judgment rendered the defendant has appealed.

Judgment reversed and cause of action dismissed.

Norwood & Alley, for appellant.

1. Keller had no insurable interest in the life of Moore, and a verdict should have been directed for defendant. 132 Ark. 461. The mere fact that he is the son-in-law does not give him an insurable interest. 98 Ark. 52; 132 Id. 458; 35 L. R. A. 692; 14 R. C. L. 97-8; 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 941.

2. The court erred in its instructions given and refused.

Pole McPhetridge, for appellee.

Keller has an insurable interest in Moore. Appellee was living with the insured and was a son-in-law and treated as a son and had an interest in Moore's life, and would derive more benefit from his life than his death. 154 Penn. St. 99; 26 A. 253; 83 S.E. 1045; 1 Bacon on Life & Acc. Ins. (4 ed.), § 296; Id. 300; 104 U.S. 779. A primary interest is not required. 8 Elliott on Cont., § 4068; 172 Ky. 444. 98 Ark. 52, nor 132 Ark. 458 are in point. Act No. 462, Acts 1917, defines those who have an insurable interest, and there is no error in the instructions. The testimony and the law sustain the verdict.

OPINION

HART, J., (after stating the facts).

The defense of the insurance company to the suit is that Keller did not have an insurable interest in the life of Moore, and on this account the policy is void. Hence it is earnestly insisted by counsel for the defendant that the court erred in not directing a verdict in its favor, and in this contention we think counsel are correct.

What constitutes an insurable interest in the life of another is clearly stated in Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 26 L.Ed. 924, as follows:

"It is not easy to define with precision what will in all cases constitute an insurable interest, so as to take the contract out of the class of wager policies. It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor or of surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation, for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent, a husband in the life of his wife and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful, as operating more efficaciously to protect the life of the insured, than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or of affinity to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured, otherwise the contract is a mere wager by which ...