Homecare, Inc. v. Acquarulo

• Decision Date: 15 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 13215,13215
• Citation: Homecare, Inc. v. Acquarulo, 663 A.2d 412, 38 Conn.App. 772 (Conn. App. 1995)
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: HOMECARE, INC. v. Mary Ann ACQUARULO et al.

Page 412

663 A.2d 412

38 Conn.App. 772

HOMECARE, INC. v. Mary Ann ACQUARULO et al.

No. 13215.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 14, 1995.

Decided Aug. 15, 1995.

Michael P. Lawlor, New Haven, for appellants (defendants).

Ann Farrell Leslie, with whom was Gerald E. Farrell, Sr., Wallingford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and FOTI and LAVERY, JJ.

DUPONT, Chief Judge.

The defendants appeal from the trial court's judgment requiring the defendants to pay money damages to the plaintiff for home care services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendants' mother. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with findings of fact determined by an attorney fact finder pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549n. ¹ The defendants claim that (1) the trial court improperly accepted the fact finder's findings of fact, and (2) the plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of frauds, General Statutes § 52-550. ²

The plaintiff filed an action seeking money damages for the defendants' alleged failure to pay for past services rendered to their mother, Concetta Santino, ³ and the action was subsequently referred to a fact finder. Practice Book § 546D. The fact finder conducted a hearing to determine whether the defendants expressly or impliedly "obligated themselves, individually to pay for the health care for their late mother, Concetta Santino, or whether the home care undertaken was exclusively the obligation of Mrs. Santino."

The fact finder found that the defendant Mary Ann Acquarulo initially contacted the plaintiff requesting services for Santino, and that, thereafter, both she and the defendant Catherine Koch had a number of contacts with the plaintiff in order to extend or alter care provider shifts for their mother. The fact finder also found that all bills were sent by the plaintiff to Acquarulo and that neither of the defendants had any intent to defraud the plaintiff. The fact finder concluded by finding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover $3651 as the remaining balance on the account for past services rendered. ⁴

The defendants filed an objection to the acceptance of the findings of fact on the ground that the conclusions of fact stated in the finding were not properly reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found or on the basis of evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing. The objection also claimed that the finding did not address the special defense raised by the defendants asserting that the plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of frauds.

In response to the defendants' objection, the fact finder issued a supplemental finding of fact. In this supplemental finding, the fact finder found the defendants' special defense regarding the statute of frauds to be without merit because the defendants' mother was "not a necessary party [to the contract] since there never was any agreement with the plaintiff and the mother...." Accordingly, the statute of frauds was not implicated because the debt in question was that of the defendants, while the mother was merely an incidental beneficiary of the agreement.

Pursuant to Practice Book § 546H, the defendants filed an objection to the acceptance of the supplemental findings of fact. The defendants claimed that the supplemental finding of fact that "there was never any agreement with the plaintiff and the mother" was inconsistent with the testimony of the plaintiff's only witness, Glenda Esposito. Esposito, the plaintiff's comptroller, testified that she was in possession of a written contract signed by the plaintiff and Santino. Neither party, however, sought to introduce the contract into evidence at the hearing, and the precise provisions of the contract are unknown. The trial court overruled the defendants' objection to the supplemental finding and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly accepted the fact finder's determination that an implied contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendants. A contract implied in fact depends on an actual agreement that there be an obligation created by law that imposes a duty to perform, and it may be inferred from words, actions or conduct. Therrien v. Safeguard Mfg. Co., 180 Conn. 91, 94-95, 429 A.2d 808 (1980). "It is not fatal to a finding of an implied contract that there were no express manifestations of mutual assent if the parties, by their conduct, recognized the existence of contractual obligations." Rahmati v. Mehri, 188 Conn. 583, 587, 452 A.2d 638 (1982). "Whether and on what terms a contractual commitment has been undertaken are ultimately questions of fact which, like any other findings of fact, may be overturned only if the trial court's determinations are clearly erroneous." Id.

The trial court's decision to accept the fact finder's determination that an implied contract existed was not clearly erroneous. There was undisputed evidence to support that conclusion, including testimony that the defendants made arrangements for the type of service and requested additional service from time to time, and that Acquarulo received the invoices for these services without objection.

The defendant argues that an...