Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Rhode Island Dept. of Environmental Management

Decision Date05 June 1991
Docket NumberNo. 89-595-M,89-595-M
Citation592 A.2d 841
PartiesHOMETOWN PROPERTIES, INC. et al. v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT et al. P.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This controversy is before us on a petition for certiorari brought by the defendants, the town of North Kingstown, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), and Robert L. Bendick in his capacity as the director of DEM. 1 The defendants seek review of a decision of the Superior Court that reversed a final Decision and Order of DEM that denied the application of the plaintiffs, Hometown Properties, Inc. (Hometown), and Homevest, Inc. (Homevest), for a license to expand the operation of a sanitary-waste landfill located in North Kingstown, Rhode Island.

A brief synopsis of the relevant facts is in order before reaching the merits of defendants' appeal. Hometown, a Rhode Island corporation, operates a sanitary-waste facility in the town of North Kingstown (town). Homevest, also a Rhode Island corporation, holds title to the real estate on which the sanitary-waste facility is located.

The defendant DEM is the Rhode Island State agency that receives and processes applications for permission to operate sanitary-waste facilities like Hometown's landfill. Hometown first received a license from DEM to operate the landfill on November 12, 1980, and continued to operate the landfill over the next seven years. In each of those years, DEM relicensed the sanitary-waste facility.

In July 1987 Hometown submitted an application to the Division of Air and Hazardous Materials (division), the DEM department responsible for issuing licenses for solid-waste-management facilities. The division classified Hometown's submittal as an "application to expand the existing solid waste management facility located on Drybridge Road" in North Kingstown. The application for expansion sought to add approximately nine additional acres to the existing landfill for the disposal of demolition waste. The application was filed pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 23-18.9-9.1, 2 which governs the disposal of solid waste over drinking-water sources.

In August 1987 the division denied Hometown's application for expansion in a decision signed by the division's chief, Thomas Getz (Getz). In denying the application, Getz concluded that "the licensing of an expansion of the Homevest landfill is prohibited by operation of R.I.G.L. § 23-18.9-9.1(b) and Rule 10.05 of the Rules and Regulations for Solid Waste Management Facilities." Rule 10.05 and § 23-18.9-9.1(b) were the only bases for the denial contained in the decision.

Subsequently, on August 21, 1987, Hometown instituted an administrative appeal of that decision by requesting a hearing to challenge the propriety of the denial. The town was permitted to intervene in the proceeding. At the hearing, DEM's argument in support of the denial of Hometown's application consisted of two parts. More specifically, in the words of the administrative-hearing officer:

"First is the location. We believe this is a critical factor, that the landfill overlies a designated ground-water aquifer, and the [DEM] is very concerned about the close proximity of this landfill to the town wells.

"[DEM also] believe[§ Hometown] has not demonstrated an ability to comply with the solid waste regulations based on past practices."

The administrative-hearing officer issued a Decision and Order on September 2, 1988, containing numerous legal and factual findings and recommended to the DEM director that the application for licensure of the expanded solid-waste-management facility be denied on the basis of § 23-18.9-9.1(b). The hearing officer's Decision and Order became a final order of DEM when the DEM director endorsed it on September 6, 1988.

Shortly thereafter, on September 28, 1988, Hometown filed a complaint in the Superior Court against DEM and the town seeking judicial review of DEM's Decision and Order pursuant to G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) chapter 35 of title 42, the Administrative Procedures Act. The complaint averred that the Decision and Order "violates certain constitutional and statutory provisions, was made upon unlawful procedure, was affected by errors of law, was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and characterized by an abuse of discretion."

The Superior Court justice rendered a decision reversing DEM's Decision and Order and directing that Hometown's application be granted. The trial justice found, among other things, that the Decision and Order violated provisions of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. Following entry of final judgment, DEM then timely filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision and final judgment of the Superior Court pursuant to § 42-35-16. We granted the petition.

In its brief, Hometown now reasserts the same arguments on which it prevailed in the Superior Court to support its position that the Superior Court justice did not err in his decision. Conversely it is of no surprise that DEM and the town vigorously assert that the trial justice erred in all his determinations. We believe, however, that there is no necessity for us to address all the issues touched upon by the Superior Court justice in order for us to make our determination. Since the sole basis for the application denial articulated in the final DEM Decision and Order was § 23-18.9-9.1(b), 3 we are of the opinion that our attention should properly focus on whether the conditions precedent to the application of that statute were indeed met at the time of the denial.

Concerning our scope of review when reviewing a judgment of the Superior Court on a petition for certiorari, we have said on numerous occasions that the writ brings up the record of the lower court for review of questions of law only. Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, 414 A.2d 480, 482 (R.I.1980). "Questions of law * * * are not binding upon the court and may be reviewed to determine what the law is and its applicability to the facts." Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 607, 376 A.2d 1, 6 (1977). In this regard we have said before that a determination of whether conditions precedent to the application of a statute have been satisfied is a question of law that a trial justice may properly review pursuant to his or her authority under § 42-35-15. See DeFalco v. Voccola, 557 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I.1989).

With these standards in mind, we now turn our attention to the statute in question. The relevant portion of § 23-18.9-9.1, 4 as it existed in 1987, provided as follows:

"(b) No person shall dispose of solid waste on or in the ground overlying groundwater reservoirs or groundwater recharge areas, as identified on a map entitled 'State of Rhode Island "208" Areawide Water Quality Management Plan--Water Related Sensitive Areas' prepared by the Statewide Planning Program (project number FRC-JF-01-13); Provided, That such groundwater reservoirs or groundwater recharge areas have been designated on the basis of hydrogeologic data, as an existing or planned public drinking water source by the municipality in which such reservoir or recharge area is located and that such municipality has enacted a municipal ordinance relating to groundwater reservoirs or groundwater recharge areas.

"(c) Where an existing solid waste management facility-landfill overlies such groundwater reservoir or groundwater recharge area designated by the municipality in accordance with subsection (b) hereof, the director is authorized to order cessation of solid waste disposal operations and closure of said landfill under the following conditions:

(1) The municipality has, after notice and public hearing, by resolution to the director requested the director to determine whether the continued operation of any solid waste management facility-landfill on or over any such reservoir or recharge area presents a hazard to the public drinking water source; and

(2) The director after investigation, notice and hearing to said landfill, determines that such existing solid waste management facility-landfill does present a hazard to the public drinking water source.

"(d) Any party aggrieved by a decision of the director under this section may obtain judicial review of such decision in accordance with the provisions of §§ 42-35-15 and 42-35-16 of the administrative procedures act."

Subsection (b) of § 23-18.9-9.1 governs the issuance of new licenses and licenses for expansion whereas subsection (c) controls closure of existing solid-waste landfills that overlie groundwater reservoirs or groundwater recharge areas. In short, the 1987 version of § 23-18.9-9.1(b) prohibited the disposal of solid waste on or in the ground overlying groundwater reservoirs or recharge areas, as identified on the 208 map, only if such groundwater reservoirs or recharge areas had been designated as existing or planned public drinking-water sources by the municipality in which the reservoirs or recharge areas were located, the designation had been made on the basis of hydrogeologic data, and the municipality had enacted an ordinance relating to groundwater reservoirs or recharge areas.

Reviewing these criteria in light of the evidence contained in the administrative record, the trial justice concluded that the conditions precedent to the application of the 208 statute had not been satisfied. His determinations are worth repeating here. With respect to whether the town properly designated the landfill site in an ordinance on the basis of hydrogeological data, the trial justice stated:

"It is questionable whether or not the landfill is located in an area...

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