Honchariw v. Cnty. of Stanislaus
| Decision Date | 12 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-cv-00801-SKO |
| Parties | NICHOLAS HONCHARIW, Trustee, Honchariw Family Trust, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(Doc. 35)
Before the Court is Defendant County of Stanislaus' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw's First Amended Complaint[1] (the “Motion”). (Doc. 35.) On January 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition (Doc. 38) and Defendant filed its reply on February 3, 2023 (Doc. 39).[2] The hearing set for March 8, 2023, on the Motion was vacated by the undersigned and the matter was taken under submission.[3] (Doc. 40.) Having considered the briefing, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion will be GRANTED with leave to amend the remaining two causes of action. ///
In considering Defendant's Motion, the Court accepts as true all of the following factual allegations contained in the FAC. See, e.g., Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S.Ct. 355, 359 n.1 (2019) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)).
Plaintiff, in his capacity as trustee for the Honchariw Family Trust, sought to divide land in the Knights Ferry area of Stanislaus County into a development of several residential lots and one undeveloped parcel (FAC ¶¶ 1-3). See also Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus, 51 Cal.App. 5th 243, 246-47 (2020).[4] The Board of Supervisors of the County of Stanislaus approved the vesting tentative map application for Plaintiff's development subject to several conditions of approval. Id. at 249. One of these conditions of approval was a site improvement request for an extension of fire hydrants to provide a higher level of fire protection for the development. Id. at 250.
The current dispute between the parties stems from Plaintiff's submission of a proposed final subdivision map in April 2016, along with plans and specifications in accordance with Defendant's previously requested conditions of approval (FAC ¶¶ 49-50). See also Honchariw, 51 Cal.App. 5th at 250. In November 2016, Stanislaus County's Department of Public Works (“DPW”) sent Plaintiff's engineers a letter stating it could not approve the proposed plans for the water system without further information about several items, including fire hydrants (FAC ¶ 51). Honchariw, 51 Cal.App. 5th at 250-51. At a meeting in March 2017 with DPW, Plaintiff was informed that his proposed plans did not comply with the conditions of approval. Id. at 251. DPW interpreted the conditions of approval as requiring a fire suppression system based on functional fire hydrants, which were hydrants that could meet fire flows for volume and pressure required by the California Fire Code (FAC ¶ 51). Honchariw, 51 Cal.App. 5th at 251-53. In June and July of 2017, Plaintiff and DPW exchanged correspondence in an effort to resolve their dispute. Id. at 251-52.
Having reached an impasse, in August 2017, Plaintiff filed a Verified Petition for Writ of' Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Damages in state court raising three state law claims (FAC ¶ 58; see Doc. 1 at 8-16). Honchariw, 51 Cal.App. 5th at 253. In May 2018, the trial court issued a judgment denying the petition, and Plaintiff appealed. Id. In June 2020, the California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Defendant had misinterpreted the conditions of approval and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine the terms of the writ of mandate, which, at a minimum, would require Defendant and its officials to interpret the conditions of approval in accordance with its opinion (FAC ¶ 58). Honchariw, 51 Cal.App. 5th at 246, 256.
In April 2021, Plaintiff filed a Verified Supplemental and Amended Complaint[5] in state court asserting three state and federal claims arising from Defendant's rejection of his April 2016 proposed final subdivision map for his failure to comply with the conditions of approval. Plaintiff alleged (1) a violation of California Government Code § 815.6 ; (2) inverse condemnation and temporary taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article I, Section 19 of the California Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; and (3) denial of his substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Article 1, Section 7 of the California Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .
In May 2021, Defendant removed the action to this federal court. (Doc. 1.) On December 3, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that Plaintiff's claims were procedurally and/or substantively defective. (Doc. 15.) On November 7, 2022, this Court granted Defendant's motion in part, dismissing without leave to amend Plaintiff's claim under California Government Code § 815.6, and dismissing with leave to amend Plaintiff's takings and substantive due process claims. (Doc. 29.)
Plaintiff timely filed his FAC, proceeding with the remaining two claims. (Doc. 32.) On December 22, 2022, Defendant filed the instant Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that Plaintiff's complaint, as amended, fails to state plausible claims for relief. (Doc. 35.)
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim,'” and dismissal is “proper if there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.'” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's complaint ‘must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”'” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“At this stage, the Court must take all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Great Minds v. Office Depot, Inc., 945 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2019). “[Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64. “‘[I]n practice, a complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's review is generally limited to the “allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.'” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010).
To the extent the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, the plaintiff should be afforded leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990); Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) advises that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” “This policy is ‘to be applied with extreme liberality.'” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). However, “that liberality does not apply when amendment would be futile.” Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2016).
“The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Bridge Aina Le‘a, LLC v. Land Use Comm'n, 950 F.3d 610, 625 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A classic taking occurs when the ‘government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.'” Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)). The Supreme Court has recognized that if a regulation goes too far, it will qualify as a taking. Bridge Aina Le‘a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 625 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)); accord Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1937 (2017). “This area of the law is characterized by ‘ad hoc, factual inquiries, designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.'” Id. ).
The Supreme Court has identified two guidelines that are relevant for determining when a government regulation constitutes a taking. Murr, 137 S.Ct. at 1937. “First ‘with certain qualifications . . . a regulation which “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land” will require compensation under the Takings Clause.'” Id. (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)). “Yet even the complete deprivation of use under Lucas will not require compensation if the challenged limitations ‘inhere . . . in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and...
To continue reading
Request your trial