Honest ABE Roofing Franchise, Inc. v. DCH & Assocs.

Decision Date03 November 2022
Docket Number2:22-cv-00387-JRS-MG
PartiesHONEST ABE ROOFING FRANCHISE, INC., Plaintiff, v. DCH & ASSOCIATES, LLC, HONEST ABE ROOFING OF MACON, GEORGIA, LLC, DAMEION HARRIS, and CHRISTINE HARRIS, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
DCH & ASSOCIATES, LLC

HONEST ABE ROOFING OF MACON GEORGIA, LLC

DAMEION HARRIS

CHRISTINE HARRIS

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

JAIES R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE

I. Introduction and Background

This is a business dispute between Honest Abe, a franchisor of roofing businesses, and Defendants, former franchisees.

Defendants made two franchise agreements with Honest Abe to operate roofing businesses in Georgia: the first, on April 8, 2021, was for a Macon area franchise and the second, on December 22, 2021, was for a Columbus area franchise. The franchises did not last long. By March of 2022 the Macon franchise owed $8,939.80 to Honest Abe in royalty fees, brand development fees, and technology fees. (ECF No. 1-8.) In May, Honest Abe sent the franchise a notice of termination, which demanded $19,834.71 in past-due fees plus $166,130.40 in "actual and consequential damages" arising from the Macon franchise's alleged breach of the franchise agreement. (ECF No. 1-11.) As for the Columbus franchise, it never got off the ground: in June 2 Honest Abe sent a termination notice because the franchise had not opened within five months of the date of the franchise agreement, as required by that agreement. (ECF No. 1-12.)

Now that Honest Abe has terminated Defendants' franchise agreements, it wants them out of the roofing business. The franchise agreements each contained a noncompete clause operative for two years in a 50-mile radius of the franchise site. Honest Abe alleges that Defendants are violating those clauses by operating a new roofing business called "Authority Home Service Professionals." (Compl. ¶ 75, ECF No. 1.) Honest Abe further alleges that the Authority business infringes on Honest Abe's trademark and misappropriates its business goodwill. (Id. ¶¶ 123, 189.)

Before the Court is Honest Abe's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, (ECF No. 3), which is unopposed.

II. Legal Standard

The Seventh Circuit recently reiterated the legal standard for preliminary injunctions:

Plaintiffs who seek a preliminary injunction must show that (1) they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, (2) traditional legal remedies are inadequate to remedy the harm, and (3) they have some likelihood of success on the merits. If those elements are shown, the court must then balance the harm the moving parties would suffer if an injunction is denied against the harm the opposing parties would suffer if one is granted, and the court must consider the public interest, which takes into account the effects of a decision on non-parties.

Camelot Banquet Rooms, Inc. v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 24 F.4th 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2022). That standard is applied against the background understanding that "a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (quoting Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948 (2d ed. 1995)).

III. Discussion

Honest Abe asserts Defendants' wrongful conduct amounts to three acts: (1) "Defendants are operating a competitive business in violation of their covenants not to compete," (2) "Defendants . . . infringe and counterfeit Honest Abe's registered trademarks by maintaining the registered business 'Honest Abe Roofing of Macon Georgia, LLC'" and (3) Defendants "refer to their competitive business as 'Honest Abe' to potential customers." (Pl.'s Motion 2, ECF No. 3.) Those acts, on their face, do not seem so portentous as to justify an "extraordinary and drastic remedy." Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972.

A. Irreparable Harm

Honest Abe must make a "clear showing" of irreparable harm. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972; Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) ("Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.") "Harm is irreparable if legal remedies are inadequate to cure it." Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 545 (7th Cir. 2021). "Inadequate 'does not mean wholly ineffectual; rather, the remedy must be seriously deficient as compared to the harm suffered.'" Id. (quoting Foodcomm Int'l v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 2003)).

The Court would like to say that business losses can never be "irreparable," because businesses are routinely valued in dollar terms-and, at worst, a business loss is the total value of the business, which is roughly known. In the Seventh Circuit, though, a business loss can be "irreparable" if calculating the amount of the loss is sufficiently uncertain. Life Spine, 8 F.4th at 546 (quoting Hess Newmark Owens Wolf, Inc. v. Owens, 415 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2005)) ("[I]t is precisely the difficulty of pinning down what business has been or will be lost that makes an injury 'irreparable.'"). Apparently overcompensating a business for its loss does not count as an adequate remedy. That said, "[a] district court is within its discretion to find an adequate remedy at law, and thus no irreparable harm, where the corporation seeking injunctive relief can reasonably estimate the value of its lost profits." DM Trans, LLC v. Scott, 38 F.4th 608, 620 (7th Cir. 2022).

Here then, the Court finds no irreparable harm on three alternate but mutually supporting grounds. First, Honest Abe has offered only speculative future harms, not well-evidenced likely harms. Cf. Bar Indy LLC v. City of Indianapolis, 508 F.Supp.3d 334, 360 (S.D. Ind. 2020) (holding that business' bare allegations of impending loss, without "particularized analysis" or "requisite financial details," are insufficient to meet burden of showing irreparable harm). So it has not made the "clear showing" required. Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. Second, even if monetary damages are an imprecise remedy here, those damages cannot be "seriously deficient as compared to the harm suffered" where the harm suffered is small. Life Spine, 8 F.4th at 545. And here, the alleged harms are minor: some competition from a former franchisee, some infringement resulting from the maintenance (but not, apparently, the open conduct) of an Honest Abe tradename, some trading off Honest Abe's goodwill. Third, the potential losses here are likely to be calculable. Honest Abe knows how much revenue it expects from a functioning franchise in these markets; it knows what business Defendants were doing as franchisees before they left; it can find out what business Defendants do in their competing guise; and so forth. It should be easy enough to come up with a lost-profit-per-month figure multiplied over the length this case is pending. Similarly, the possible damages from any trademark infringement- including disgorgement of profits, actual losses and attorneys fees-are of a calculable nature....

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