Honrath v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 September 1937
• Docket Number: 7943
• Citation: 65 S.D. 480,275 N.W. 258
• Parties: LOUISA HONRATH, Respondent, v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

65 S.D. 480

275 N.W. 258

LOUISA HONRATH, Respondent,

v.

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Minnehaha County, SD Hon. John T. Medin, Judge #7943—Reversed. Bailey, Voorhees, Woods & Bottum, Sioux Falls, SD Attorneys for Appellant. Krause & Krause, Ervin P. Van Buren, Dell Rapids, SD Attorneys for Respondent. Opinion filed Sept 24, 1937

RUDOLPH, P. J.

This action was instituted by Louisa Honrath to recover on a life insurance policy issued by the defendant to Francis Honrath, son of the plaintiff, in which policy the latter was named as a beneficiary.

The policy was issued July 31, 1933, and was in force at the time of death. Under the heading “Other Provisions,” the policy among other paragraphs contains the following: “In event of self destruction during the first two insurance years, whether the Insured be sane or insane, the insurance under this Policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon which have been paid to and received by the Company and no more.” A contract for double indemnity attached as a rider to the policy reads in part as follows:

“This agreement is issued as a part of and attached to policy No. 12,093,608 on the life of Francis Honrath, the Insured. In consideration of the payment in advance of an additional annual premium the New York Life Insurance Company agrees to pay to the beneficiary under said policy in addition to and together with the amount payable under the terms of said policy, upon the death of the Insured, Two Thousand Dollars upon receipt of due proof that the death of the Insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means and occurred within ninety days after such injury and prior to the anniversary of the Policy on which the Insured’s age at nearest birthday is 65; provided, however, that such Double Indemnity shall not be payable if the Insured’s death resulted, directly or indirectly, from (a) self-destruction, whether sane or insane; (b) the taking of poison or inhaling of gas, whether voluntary or otherwise. The company shall have the right and opportunity to examine the body and to make an autopsy unless prohibited by law.”

The insured died at his home in Hartford, S. D., on January 21, 1935. Proof of death was furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant company within the time and as required by the policy, but the insurance company refused to pay plaintiff the amount claimed, Defense to the action was made on the grounds that the insured came to his death by self-destruction during the first two insurance years and that the refusal of plaintiff to permit an autopsy to determine whether or not death was caused by strychnine poisoning constitutes a breach of the contract.

The cause was tried before a jury and a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. From a judgment entered accordingly and an order denying motion for new trial the defendant has appealed.

No claim is made under the double indemnity rider attached to the policy. The provision that “the company shall have the right and opportunity to examine the body and to make an autopsy unless prohibited by law” is contained in the contract for double indemnity. If such rider were not attached to the policy, it is manifest that there would be no contractual right to, an autopsy. There being neither in the rider nor in the principal contract any expression of intention that the provision referred to shall govern other than in the separate agreement, the trial court gave to the policy the only construction which it can reasonably bear.

Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The evidence of the defendant all clearly pointed to the fact that the insured committed suicide while insane by taking strychnine. However, the plaintiff placed on the stand a competent and qualified physician who testified that in his opinion the insured died from a disease which he described as Jacksonian epilepsy. A review of the evidence would serve no useful purpose. Sufficient to say is that we have carefully considered the entire record and are convinced that the evidence of the doctor just above referred, to was sufficient to take the case to the jury.

The evidence in this case disclosed that Francis Honrath at the time of his death was insane. The physician who examined Francis a short time prior to his death determined the form of in sanity to be that of dementia praecox. According to, the testimony, “Dementia praecox is a term given to describe a form of mental disease in which dementia weakens the mind. The loss of intellectual power comes on early in the course of the disease.” The people for whom Francis worked shortly before his death testified that Francis was “downcast”; that “he got so he wouldn’t speak to us”; that “there was something wrong with him.” The plaintiff, the mother of Frances, testified: “I observed that his mind was affected. ... He told me he felt he should do away with himself and I told the Doctors that. ... I had been taking some precautions for sometime to keep any means of destruction of life away from him, because he was very melancholy, he told us he didn’t have anything to live for, I didn’t know what could turn up. The only thing I can remember that we kept out of his way that was dangerous was the knives. We had no guns.” The pastor in charge of the Catholic Church at Hartford talked to the plaintiff “about the advisability of bringing a brother home from the C.C.C. camp” to be with Francis. This brother did come home and was with Francis at the time of his death. The testimony of the physician to the effect that Francis was insane stands undisputed in this record. The record throughout establishes without question that Francis was insane, and there was no attempt on behalf of the plaintiff to in any way dispute this fact. In view of the record as above disclosed, we believe, it was error for the trial judge to instruct the jury in this case regarding the presumption against suicide.

Whether this presumption should he a matter for the jury to consider under any circumstance where there is evidence regarding the death is questionable. This court in the case of Peters v. Lohr, 955, said:

“A presumption is not evidence of anything, and only relates to a rule of law as to which party shall first go forward and produce evidence sustaining a matter in issue. A presumption will serve as and in the place of evidence in favor of one party or the other until prima facie evidence has been adduced by the opposite party; but the presumption should never be placed in the scale to be weighed as evidence. The presumption, when the opposite party has produced prima facie evidence, has spent its force and served its purpose, and the party then, in whose favor the presumption operated, must meet his opponent’s prima facie evidence with evidence, and not presumptions, A presumption is not evidence of a fact, but purely a...