Hood v. Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals

• Citation: 744 F.Supp.2d 590
• Decision Date: 07 October 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:10CV104–SA–JAD.
• Parties: Jim HOOD, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, ex rel. the State of Mississippi, Plaintiffv.ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS, LP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

744 F.Supp.2d 590

Jim HOOD, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, ex rel. the State of Mississippi, Plaintiff

v.ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS, LP, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:10CV104–SA–JAD.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

Oct. 7, 2010.

Fletcher V. Trammell, Bailey Perrin Bailey, Houston, TX, William Monroe Quin, II, McCraney Montagnet & Quin, PLLC, Ridgeland, MS, for Plaintiff.Stephen Lee Thomas, Jack L. Wilson, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SHARION AYCOCK, District Judge.

Before the Court is the State of Mississippi's Motion to Remand [8]. After reviewing the motion, response, rules, and authorities, the Court finds as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2010, the State of Mississippi filed the instant action against AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, L.P., AstraZeneca, L.P., AstraZeneca P.L.C., AstraZeneca, A.B., and AstraZeneca U.K. Limited, in the Circuit Court of Chickasaw County, Mississippi. The Complaint states the following claims: knowingly making or causing to be made false statements of material fact for use in determining rights to a Medicaid benefit in violation of the State's Medicaid law under Miss.Code Ann. § 43–13–101, et seq. (1972 as amended); violation of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 75–24–1, et seq. (Rev. 2005); fraud and misrepresentation; unjust enrichment; negligence and gross negligence; and injunctive relief.

On April 26, 2010, Defendants removed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1331, 1441, and 1446, alleging diversity jurisdiction and that the Complaint raises substantial issues of federal law. The State filed its Motion to Remand on April 28, 2010.

II. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Removal and Remand Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Epps v. Bexar–Medina–Atascosa Counties Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 665 F.2d 594, 595 (5th Cir.1982). The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the districts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). This Court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court also has original jurisdiction when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Addo v. Globe Life and Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 761 (5th Cir.2000).

Once a motion to remand is filed, the burden falls on the party seeking to maintain this Court's removal jurisdiction to show that the requirements for removal have been met. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.1995). After removal of a case, the plaintiff may move for remand, and “[i]f it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The Fifth Circuit has held that the removal statutes are to be construed “strictly against removal and for remand.” Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 106 (5th Cir.1996); Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941).

In this case, Defendant asserts that federal jurisdiction exists because: (1) there is complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requisite, and (2) that Plaintiff's Complaint raises substantial issues of federal law.

Diversity Jurisdiction

Plaintiff asserts that remand is warranted because there is no complete diversity between the parties. Although the parties appear to agree that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Plaintiff contends that complete diversity is destroyed because the Plaintiff is the State of Mississippi, which is not a citizen for purposes of establishing diversity. Consequently, Plaintiff argues that removal is improper, notwithstanding the fact that it is undisputed that Defendants are not citizens of Mississippi.

Defendants oppose remand on the ground that, despite the fact that the caption of the Complaint names the “State of Mississippi” as the only Plaintiff, the Complaint also asserts claims on behalf of the Schools Employees Life and Health Plan (“Employees Plan”). Defendants assert that complete diversity is satisfied because the Employees Plan is a Mississippi citizen, a real party in interest,¹ and a separate and distinct entity from the State.

Since there is no dispute that the amount in controversy is met in this case, the Court will focus its analysis on determining whether this lawsuit involves citizens of different states in order to confer diversity jurisdiction.

a. Real Party in Interest

To determine whether diversity jurisdiction exists, courts must look beyond the named parties and consider the citizenship of the real parties in interest. Navarro Savings Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460, 100 S.Ct. 1779, 64 L.Ed.2d 425 (1980); Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir.2003). Accordingly, this Court “must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.” Id. The State, as a quasi-sovereign, is the real party in interest when an action concerns a type of “injury” that the state either has addressed or would likely attempt to address through its laws to further the “well-being of its populace.” Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R., 458 U.S. 592, 602, 605, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). Courts analyze real party in interest questions by examining the State's interest in a lawsuit as a whole. See Moore v. Abbott Laboratories, 900 F.Supp. 26, 28–29, 31 (S.D.Miss.1995).

Here, the State of Mississippi, through the Attorney General, has addressed the injury at issue in this case under its Medicaid laws, consumer protection laws, and various state law tort actions. Under Mississippi common law, the Attorney General

is a constitutional officer possessed of all the power and authority inherited from the common law as well as that specifically conferred upon him by statute. This includes the right to institute, conduct and maintain all suits necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the State, preservation of order and the protection of public rights.

Gandy v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 279 So.2d 648, 649 (Miss.1973); State ex rel. Allain v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 418 So.2d 779, 781 (Miss.1982). Mississippi statutory law also supports this proposition. Consistent with the Mississippi Supreme Court's reference to the Attorney General being a constitutional officer and possessed with common law duties, Section 7–5–1 of the Mississippi Code provides in part as follows:

The Attorney General provided for by Section 173 of the Mississippi Constitution shall be elected at the same time and in the same manner as the Governor is elected.... He shall be the chief legal officer and advisor for the State, both civil and criminal, and is charged with managing all litigation on behalf of the State. No arm or agency of the State government shall bring or defend a suit against another such arm or agency without prior written approval of the Attorney General. He shall have the powers of the Attorney General at common law and is given the sole power to bring or defend a lawsuit on behalf of a State agency, the subject matter of which is of statewide interest....

The Attorney General in this case is bringing suit on behalf of the State, and the State is the party with a substantial interest in the outcome. See Dunn Const. Co. v. Craig, 191 Miss. 682, 2 So.2d 166, 174 (1941) (discussing that when the subject matter of litigation is of statewide interest, the Attorney General is the one with the right to represent the State); see also Alfred L. Snapp and Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 602, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) (Broadly stated, quasi-sovereign interests “consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.... Although the articulation of such interests is a matter for case-by-case development-neither an exhaustive formal definition nor a definitive list of qualifying interests can be presented in the abstract-certain characteristics of such interests are so far evident”); Kelley v. Carr, 442 F.Supp. 346, 356–57 (W.D.Mich.1977) (“some of the most basic of a state's quasi-sovereign interests include maintenance of the integrity of markets and exchanges operating within its boundaries, protection of its citizens from fraudulent and deceptive practices, support for the general welfare of its residents and its economy, and prevention of its citizens' revenues from being wrongfully extracted from the state.”). The fact that another party may benefit from a favorable resolution of this case does not minimize or negate the State's substantial interest. State of Alabama ex rel. Galanos v. Star Service & Petroleum Co., 616 F.Supp. 429, 431 (S.D.Ala.1985) (“[w]hether other parties will benefit from this action does not affect the state's valid interest in enforcing this statutory scheme.”). Thus, the State of Mississippi is a real party in interest in this suit as to all of the claims that the State asserts.

b. Complete Diversity

Since this Court has established that the State of Mississippi is a real party in interest, the Court must take the State into consideration for diversity purposes. Defendants contend that complete diversity exists because the Employees Plan is also a real party in interest.² Thus, under Defendants' view, the Court must take into consideration the following parties: (1) the State of Mississippi, (2) the Employees Plan, which is a Mississippi entity,...