Hood v. Mississippi Dept. of Wildlife Conservation

• Citation: 571 So.2d 263
• Decision Date: 28 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-CA-378,89-CA-378
• Parties: Francis F. HOOD v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 263

571 So.2d 263

Francis F. HOOD v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF WILDLIFE CONSERVATION.

No. 89-CA-378.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Nov. 28, 1990.

Dixon L. Pyles, Sr., Pyles & Tucker, Jackson, for appellant.

Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., T. Hunt Cole, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and ROBERTSON and BLASS, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

This case asks that we identify the procedural remedies available to one dismissed from state civil service employment. The discharged employee asserts claims that the state has denied rights secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States, and by the constitution and laws of this state as well, and the question is whether our statutory civil service appeals process is adequate that he may have asserted those rights. We hold that it was. The January, 1986, Mississippi Employee Appeals Board decision upholding his discharge precludes further litigation of all claims that were or might have been made.

II.

Francis F. Hood was born December 30, 1941. He was first employed by the Mississippi Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWC) ¹ on December 6, 1967. His first assignment was as a game warden. After serving a twelve-month probationary period, Hood achieved permanent state service status. In 1972 DWC promoted Hood to supervisor in charge of Copiah, Lincoln, Jefferson and Claiborne Counties.

In February 1985, Hood was indicted in Copiah County on a charge of conspiracy to commit vote fraud, a charge related to his employment only in the sense that he is said to have pursued his illegal conduct on state time. Together with four co-defendants, Hood stood trial, and in May, 1985, a Copiah County jury found him guilty as charged. On June 21, 1985, DWC terminated Hood's employment. ² Hood appealed his discharge to the Mississippi Employee Appeals Board (EAB), see Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-131(1) (Supp.1990). On January 9, 1986, EAB affirmed. See Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-131(2) (Supp.1990). Hood did not seek judicial review in the Circuit Court.

Meanwhile, Hood appealed his vote fraud conspiracy conviction, and, because of irregularities in the grand jury proceedings, this Court reversed and ordered the indictment quashed. Hood v. State, 523 So.2d 302 (Miss.1988). Hood then made a plea bargain, wherein he waived the necessity for a new indictment and entered a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging vote fraud. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 23-15-753 (Supp.1988). On April 5, 1988, the Circuit Court accepted the plea, adjudged Hood guilty, and sentenced him to serve six months in the Copiah County Detention Center, but suspended service of the sentence, conditioned upon Hood's good behavior for a period of two years. The Court also ordered that Hood pay a five hundred dollar ($500.00) fine.

Some four and a half months later, on August 24, 1988, Hood requested that DWC reinstate him to his previous employment and position and that the Department make him whole. DWC denied these requests.

On September 21, 1988, Hood commenced the present civil action by filing his complaint in the Chancery Court of Copiah County, Mississippi. He charged that DWC breached its contract of employment with him, first, by firing him without cause, and, second, by refusing to reinstate him. He also charged that DWC violated rights secured to him under state and federal constitutions, and in this latter regard Hood invoked 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. He demanded a declaratory judgment, a mandatory injunction, monetary damages and punitive damages.

DWC answered and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Hood's exclusive remedy had been that provided by statute, first to the Employee Appeals Board and thereafter judicial review in the circuit court and ultimately this Court. According to DWC, when Hood suffered denial of his claims at EAB's hands and appealed no further, that ended the matter. On March 16, 1989, the Chancery Court granted DWC's motion and dismissed the action.

Hood now appeals to this Court.

III.

The Chancery Court held it was without subject matter jurisdiction and, on this ground dismissed Hood's complaint, and our first question is whether that Court was correct. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is a challenge to the Court's "authority to speak at all," Petters v. Petters, 560 So.2d 722, 723 (Miss.1990), an authority that turns on "the type of case at issue." Common Cause of Mississippi, Inc. v. Smith, 548 So.2d 412, 414 (Miss.1989); Riley v. Moreland, 537 So.2d 1348, 1351 (Miss.1989). In "typing" the case we look to "the nature of the controversy and the relief sought," Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So.2d 947, 952 (Miss.1988), and we take as true the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Athens Stoveworks, Inc., 481 So.2d 292, 296 (Miss.1985).

For one thing, Hood states a claim for violation of his federally-secured civil rights and demands relief under the authority of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ³ This state has authority to adjudge such claims, concurrent with that of the United States. City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So.2d 1212, 1219 (Miss.1990). We have held that our chancery courts in particular may hear Section 1983 claims. Burrell v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 536 So.2d 848, 863-64 (Miss.1988); Marx v. Truck Renting & Leasing Association, Inc., 520 So.2d 1333, 1346 (Miss.1987). It matters not that Hood's complaint does not expressly name Section 1983. McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1989); Marx, 520 So.2d at 1346. Beyond all of this, his suit for injunction presents a traditional subject of equity jurisdiction. Southern Bus Lines v. Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees, 205 Miss. 354, 374, 38 So.2d 765, 768 (1949); Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice Secs. 24, 434 et seq. (2d Ed.1950). All other claims may be heard pendent to these. See, e.g., Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 464 (Miss.1983); Shaw v. Owen Gin Co., 229 Miss. 126, 132-33, 90 So.2d 179, 181 (1956). Accepting that for subject matter jurisdiction purposes we may look only to the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, and taking those as true, we must hold that the Chancery Court erred when it saw itself without subject matter jurisdiction.

IV.

This hardly ends our inquiry, for just because the Chancery Court had subject matter jurisdiction in the premises does not mean it was this state's only tribunal with such authority. More to the point, our question becomes whether the state statutorily prescribed employee appeals procedure, with its judicial review component, was a vehicle through which Hood might have asserted his various claims and, if so, whether that procedure was Hood's exclusive remedy such that DWC may have before the Chancery Court--and here on appeal--asserted the point defensively and in bar of the action.

The Mississippi Statewide Personnel System statutes consolidated the state's civil service system. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-105 (Supp.1990). This system has been designed to establish a structure and practice of personnel administration that would ensure the fair and efficient use of employees in state service. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-101 (Supp.1990). There is no dispute that prior to his termination, Hood had attained permanent employee status under the civil service system. See Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-121 (Supp.1990).

The statute prescribes a remedial process available to state employees aggrieved regarding the terms and conditions of their employment. No employee of any state agency may be dismissed unless there is good cause and after written notice and hearing. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-127 (Supp.1990). Employees affected by adverse decisions may appeal to the Employee Appeals Board (EAB) for de novo hearing, then to circuit court for judicial review on the record, and finally to this Court. Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 25-9-131 and 25-9-132 (Supp.1990). Review by the circuit court is limited to determinations of whether the EAB's actions are supported by substantial evidence, are arbitrary or capricious, or are in violation of some statutory or constitutional right of the employee. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-131 (Supp.1990). Appeal to the circuit court must be within thirty days of the board's decisions and a bond is required, see Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 25-9-131 (Supp.1990), subsection (3) of which declares the legislative purpose to "replace any existing statutory procedure conflicting in whole or in part...."

While few cases under this process have reached this Court, we have on a number of occasions considered the analogous municipal civil service system, and these may be examined for guidance. In Scott v. Lowe, 223 Miss. 312, 78 So.2d 452 (1955), a city civil service employee sought judicial review via injunction in chancery court. This Court held that the civil service act provided a plain, speedy, adequate and complete remedy for all the rights which were obtained under the act. Scott, 223 Miss. at 318, 78 So.2d at 454-55. To the point, Scott held the civil service remedy exclusive. Scott, 223 Miss. at 321-22, 78 So.2d at 456. To like effect are City of Jackson v. Thomas, 331 So.2d 926, 927 (Miss.1976); Tennant v. Finane, 227 Miss. 410, 414-15, 86 So.2d 453, 454 (1956).

Mississippi Forestry Commission v. Piazza, 513 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1987), addresses the state civil service procedure. Piazza, 513 So.2d at 1246. An employee of the Mississippi Forestry Commission sued in chancery court to enjoin his transfer to another district. Piazza, 513 So.2d at 1243. Reversing the grant of a permanent injunction, this Court held that whether the Forestry Commission could authorize an involuntary transfer was a matter for the State Personnel Board, and its alter ego, the Employee Appeals Board. Piazza, 513 So.2d at 1249. Piazza would seem to preclude all of Hood's claims...