Hood v. Orthopaedics

Decision Date28 October 2014
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 14-3427 (MLC)
PartiesSHANYON HOOD, Plaintiff, v. MERCER-BUCKS ORTHOPAEDICS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COOPER, District Judge

The Plaintiff, Shanyon Hood, initiated this action against two separate Defendants, Mercer-Bucks Orthopaedics ("MBO") and Mercer County Surgery Center ("MCSC"). (See dkt. entry no. 8, Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 5, 6.) Hood, who is profoundly deaf, sought medical treatment at the Defendants' facilities. (See id. at ¶¶ 4, 13, 20.) Her claims stem from the Defendants' alleged failure to provide access to live interpreter services during the course of medical treatment. (See generally id.) Hood seeks remedies, in part, under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") due to the Defendants' alleged failure to "provide reasonable accommodations for [her] disability and for discrimination based on disability." (See id. at ¶ 1.)

MBO now moves to dismiss the ADA claim insofar as it is asserted against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(1) for lack of standing. (See dkt. entry no. 12-1, MBO Br. at 3.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion.

BACKGROUND

Hood communicates through American Sign Language. (See Am. Compl. at ¶ 4.) She allegedly visited MBO from 2008 through 2013 to undergo "several surgeries," medical treatment, and physical therapy. (Id. at ¶ 13.)1 According to Hood, throughout this time period, MBO failed to provide "any forms giving her notice of her communication options" and denied her requests for an interpreter. (Id.)

Although Hood's mother and friend accompanied her to MBO, neither companion "could help her communicate effectively" because her "mother does not sign and her friend is deaf." (Id.) Hood alleges that MBO provided an interpreter on January 7, 2009, however, she allegedly communicated with medical staff without this service on several occasions. (Id.) During several office visits, medical staff allegedly communicated with Hood through handwritten notes. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) This practice, Hood alleges, prevented medical staff from addressing "many of her questions ... while in the facility." (Id. at ¶ 14.)

Hood alleges that she visited MBO for physical therapy sessions as early as January 2009, however, the "staff made no attempts to obtain an interpreter" and continued to communicate through handwritten notes. (Id.) According to Hood, "all requests for interpreters were ignored." (Id.) This alleged oversight purportedly caused communication problems between Hood and the MBO medical staff, because she was "unable to participate in and ask questions about her medical treatment, diagnosis, [and] prognosis." (Id. at ¶ 15.)

Hood identifies two dates that MBO staff allegedly denied her access to an interpreter. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Hood alleges, as one example, that MBO physician Dr. Eingorn documented that the July 20, 2011 visit was "complicated" because he "had to write everything out for" Hood. (Id.) As a second example, Hood alleges that MBO physician Dr. Aita documented that the "interpreter was not available" during a June 1, 2009 visit. (Id.) Dr. Aita allegedly communicated with Hood through "handwritten notes." (Id.)

Hood alleges that without an interpreter, she was "unable to communicate effectively [with MBO medical staff] during critical aspects of her treatment," because the conversations often concerned "her medical treatment ... [and] diagnosis." (Id. at ¶ 15.) Hood also alleges that MBO required her to "sign consent forms and other forms involving procedures without an interpreter present." (Id. at ¶ 17.) According to Hood, due to MBO's failure to provide an interpreter, she "did not fully understand what treatment was to be performed on her and was often unaware of her diagnosis [and] prognosis." (Id.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Governing Standard

Hood argues that Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(f) govern MBO's motion. (See dkt. entry no. 16, Hood Br. at 2-3.) The Court rejects this argument, because a motion to dismiss for lack of standing implicates Rule 12(b)(1). Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Kessler Inst. for Rehab., Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Essex Fells, 876 F.Supp. 641, 653 n.2 (D.N.J. 1995) ("Although Defendants' Notice of Motion to Dismiss relies upon ... Rule ... 12(b)(6), dismissal for failing to state a claim, lack of standing is more appropriately characterized as an absence of subject matterjurisdiction, which is a basis for dismissal under ... Rule 12(b)(1) and can be raised by the Court on its own initiative."). Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(1) governs the pending motion, because the standing challenge implicates this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) ("A motion to dismiss for want of standing is ... properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing is a jurisdictional matter.").

II. Method of Attack

When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) standing challenge, the Court must determine whether the attack is facial or factual. In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d. Cir. 2012). "A facial attack, as the adjective indicates, is an argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because ... it does not present a question of federal law, or because ... some other jurisdictional defect is present." Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). When reviewing a facial attack, a "court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Gould Elec. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Although the plaintiff bringing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, upon reviewing a facial attack, a "court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

Factual attacks, in contrast, argue that subject matter jurisdiction is improper "because the facts of the case ... do not support the asserted jurisdiction." Aichele, 757F.3d at 358. The presumption of truth does not extend to factual attacks, "and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. Courts are permitted, however, to weigh and consider facts "outside the pleadings" to decide whether subject matter jurisdiction is proper. Aichele, 757F.3d at 358.

III. Applicable Standard

The Court has discretion to decide whether a Rule 12(b)(1) motion presents a facial or factual attack. Byers, 564 F.Supp.2d at 397. No party in this case raises a compelling argument to guide this determination. (See generally MBO Br.; dkt. entry no. 17, MBO Reply Br.; Hood Br.) MBO primarily argues that because Hood discontinued medical treatment at MBO, the Court cannot redress her ADA claim against it. (See generally MBO Br.; MBO Reply Br.) MBO, in support of this argument, cites precedent holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the Court can redress the alleged injury in order to establish standing. (See generally id.)

Hood counters that "[u]nder these circumstances ... there is a 'real concrete threat' that [she] will once again be under [MBO's] care and that [MBO] will once again discriminate against her." (Hood Br. at 8) Because the dispute hinges upon a factual issue giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court finds that MBO brings a factual attack. See Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358. Accordingly, without granting Hood the presumption of truth, the Court will consider both parties' arguments and supplemental documents to determine whether jurisdiction is proper. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

DISCUSSION
I. Standing Limitation

MBO argues that Hood lacks standing to proceed with the ADA claim against it. (See MBO Br. at 3.) Standing limits Article III federal jurisdiction under the case or controversy requirement of the United States Constitution. Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 907 F.2d 1408, 1412-13 (3d Cir. 1990). The standing limitation requires that a plaintiff allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy so as to warrant ... federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on the plaintiff's behalf." Id. at 1412. "Absent Article III standing, a federal court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address a plaintiff's claims, and they must be dismissed." Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009).

A plaintiff must establish the following in order to demonstrate standing: (1) an "injury in fact" occurred; (2) the injury is linked to the defendant's acts at issue in the case; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). An Article III injury in fact must be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation omitted); see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983) (explaining that "plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical") (internal quotation omitted); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994,998 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that litigant only has standing based on a threatened future injury if she can demonstrate that the injury "is credible and immediate, and not merely abstract or speculative").

Standing is not merely a pleading requirement ...

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