Hood v. Valle

Citation979 So.2d 961
Decision Date16 January 2008
Docket NumberNo. 3D06-2991.,3D06-2991.
PartiesMarvin HOOD, et al., Appellants, v. Mirna M. VALLE, etc., Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)

Friedin & Dobrinsky and Manuel Dobrinsky; Lauri Waldman Ross and Theresa L. Girten, Miami, for appellee.

Before COPE, SHEPHERD, and SALTER, JJ.

SALTER, J.

Marvin Hood and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company appeal a jury verdict, judgment, and order denying a motion for new trial in this wrongful death case. The plaintiff below, Mirna Valle, is the sister and personal representative of the estate of Maria Valle. She also brought the lawsuit on behalf of her mother. Maria Valle died at age thirty-three as a result of an automobile collision caused by Hood while he was intoxicated.

Hood and State Farm raise two issues on appeal: misconduct by plaintiff's counsel in presenting opening statement, and the alleged non-disclosure of material information by a juror during voir dire. Finding no reversible error as to either point, we affirm the verdict and rulings below.

The trial court's rulings on the motions for mistrial and new trial on these grounds are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ricks v. Loyola, 822 So.2d 502, 508 (Fla. 2002); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Levine, 875 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

Opening Statement

The case was originally set for trial on both compensatory and punitive damages. Before trial, Hood pled guilty to D.U.I. manslaughter, and he was in prison when the case came to trial. Noting that the defendants were assenting to Hood's appearance in court in shackles (and concerned that this was part of a tactic to cause the jurors to think that Hood had no money), the plaintiff moved to bifurcate the compensatory and punitive damages phases, and the trial court ultimately granted that motion.

During a break between voir dire with a first panel of jurors for the compensatory damages phase and voir dire with a second panel for that phase, the parties entered into several stipulations. First, the economic damages were agreed upon. Second, the plaintiff dropped her punitive damages claim in return for a stipulation that: Hood drove the vehicle that collided with the vehicle in which Maria Valle was a passenger; the collision caused her death; Hood's blood alcohol level was .235% (and the legal limit was .08%); Hood was legally intoxicated at the time of the incident; and he was at fault at the time of the accident. Defendants also stipulated that on the night of the collision in which Valle died, Hood had been in two other accidents before that collision.

Before trial, defendants moved for an order in limine to preclude, among other things, the plaintiff's use of the word "kill" during trial. Plaintiff's counsel agreed, and the motion was granted on that point.

During opening statement, plaintiff's counsel asked rhetorically, "What kind of pain and suffering has Mrs. Valle, the mother, suffered as a result of her first child being killed in this fashion and learning about the facts and circumstances of this case?" The defense did not object to the statement or move for a mistrial based on that violation of the earlier in limine ruling.

The defense did move for a mistrial, however, when plaintiff's counsel stated later in his opening that the jurors were "the conscience of this community." The trial judge reserved ruling on the motion1 and agreed to give a curative instruction at a point to be selected by defense counsel. Defense counsel said he would let the court know later, but never did so. After the jury verdict was returned, the trial judge denied the motion for mistrial upon which he had previously reserved ruling.

During closing argument, the plaintiff suggested a range of $1.5 million to $2 million for past pain and suffering, and $2 million to $3 million for future pain and suffering—a range for total non-economic damages of between $3.5 million and $5 million. The jury awarded a total of $3.8 million, considerably closer to the low end of the range than the high end of the suggested award.

In the context of the entire case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. The "conscience of the community" comment was promptly interrupted, a curative instruction was offered, the comment was not accompanied by a request for the jury to punish Hood,2 and the outcome does not indicate that the jury was under the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake. See Pierard v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 689 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

Voir Dire

Hood's and State Farm's second issue is based on the alleged non-disclosure of a material matter by a venire member in the first of two panels during jury selection. That individual was selected as a juror and became the foreperson.

After the jury was discharged, the trial judge authorized the jurors and attorneys to speak with...

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2 cases
  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Allen
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 18, 2017
    ...the very basic questions asked." Gamsen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 68 So.3d 290, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ; see also Hood v. Valle, 979 So.2d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).3 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the second prong of the De La Rosa standard was not met.The ......
  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. SR
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 24, 2017
    ...the very basic questions asked." Gamsen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 68 So. 3d 290, 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011); see also Hood v. Valle, 979 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).3 The trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in finding that the second prong of the De La Rosa standard was not met. The......
1 books & journal articles
  • Preliminaries
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Trial Objections
    • May 5, 2022
    ...rule” arguments, but only encouragement to the jurors to picture the scene, not put themselves in the victims’ shoes. Hood v. Valle , 979 So. 2d 961, 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial based on opening statement by plai......

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