HOOKER CONST., INC. v. Walker
Decision Date | 21 September 2001 |
Citation | 825 So.2d 838 |
Parties | HOOKER CONSTRUCTION, INC., and American Interstate Insurance Company v. Steve WALKER, Sr., and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
L. Brian Chunn of Stone, Granade & Crosby, P.C., Bay Minette, for Hooker Construction, Inc.
Joel A. Williams of Sadler Sullivan, P.C., Birmingham, for American Interstate Insurance Company.
John L. Moore IV, Mobile, for Steve Walker, Sr.
R. Boyd Miller and Jarrod J. White of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Mobile, for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.
Alabama Supreme Court 1010429.
Steve Walker, Sr., filed a workers' compensation action against Hooker Construction, Inc. ("the company"), alleging that he was employed by the company and that he was injured while so employed. American Interstate Insurance Company, the company's workers' compensation insurance carrier, filed a declaratory-judgment action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that, if Walker was entitled to any benefits, Liberty Mutual was liable because Liberty Mutual had paid Walker benefits for a previous work-related injury in 1986. The trial court consolidated the declaratory-judgment action with Walker's compensation action. Following the presentation of ore tenus evidence, the trial court ruled that Walker had been an employee of the company and that he was totally disabled. The court awarded benefits and ordered American Interstate to pay them. The court denied their post-judgment motions, and the company and American Interstate appealed. We will first address the issues raised by the company.
The standard of review in a workers' compensation case was stated by our supreme court in Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262 (Ala.1996): "[W]e will not reverse the trial court's finding of fact if that finding is supported by substantial evidence—if that finding is supported by `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'" 680 So.2d at 268-69 (quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co., 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)). Our review of legal issues shall be without a presumption of correctness. Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-81(e)(1).
The company first argues that the evidence was insufficient for the court to find that Walker was actually involved in an accident.
Pair v. Jack's Family Rests., Inc., 765 So.2d 678, 681 (Ala.Civ.App.2000) (citations omitted).
The company hired Walker to construct porches for houses that the company was erecting. Walker testified that while working on a roof he slipped and fell. He said he was able to stop his fall by catching a rafter with his elbow, but that the incident caused an injury to his back. Walker stated he was able to climb back up, and then, with the help of his son, was able to come down the ladder. He said he then gathered his tools and left the work site.
The company attempted to contradict Walker's testimony that the accident had occurred, by presenting the testimony of Julie Cazalas. Cazalas was a subcontractor working at the same location on the day Walker said the accident occurred. She testified that she never saw Walker fall or act as if he had been injured, but that she did see him loading his truck with tools at the end of the day. Cazalas admitted that, although she did not witness a fall, it was possible that Walker had fallen without her knowledge. Whether the accident occurred is a question for the trier of fact.
Mayfield Trucking Co. v. Napier, 724 So.2d 22, 25 (Ala.Civ.App.1998). After reviewing the record, we hold that it contains substantial evidence supporting the finding that the accident occurred.
The company next argues that Walker failed to present substantial evidence of medical causation. To prove his entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, Walker must prove causation—both legal and medical. See Patterson v. Clarke County Motors, Inc., 551 So.2d 412, 415 (Ala.Civ.App.1989)
.
Patterson, 551 So.2d at 415; see also Ex parte Valdez, 636 So.2d 401, 404 (Ala.1994)
. In support of its argument, the company contends that because Walker's physician, Dr. Robert Zarzour, was unable to say, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Walker's injuries resulted from the alleged fall, Walker failed to show medical causation. However, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kennedy, 799 So.2d 188, 195 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (citations omitted).
We hold that the record contains sufficient evidence to support a finding of medical causation. When the doctor was asked if Walker's injury was consistent with the kind of accident Walker described, the doctor responded by saying, "It would correlate." Therefore, because we have already accepted the trial court's finding that the fall actually occurred, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show medical causation. We now turn our attention to American Interstate's issues.
American Interstate first argues that the trial court erred when it found that Walker was an employee of Hooker Construction rather than an independent contractor. Specifically, American Interstate contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Hooker Construction had reserved the right to control the method and manner in which Walker constructed the porches.
To determine whether a person is considered an employee or an independent contractor, we apply the "right-of-control" test. Lacey v. American Shell Co., 628 So.2d 684 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). When applying this test, we consider the following factors: direct evidence of the right or exercise of control; the method of payment used; whether one had the right to terminate employment; and the right to control another's time. Williams v. Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co., 442 So.2d 20 (Ala.1983); Turnipseed v. McCafferty, 521 So.2d 31 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); and White v. Henshaw, 363 So.2d 986 (Ala.Civ. App.1978). Luallen v. Noojin, 545 So.2d 775, 776 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).
The record contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Walker was an employee rather than a subcontractor. Walker testified that before he began working for Hooker Construction he had a discussion with Mr. Hooker, the owner of Hooker Construction, and with Adrian Porter,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Fedex Ground Package System Inc.
...Alabama doesn't treat any single fact as dispositive; employment status is a fact-intensive inquiry. See Hooker Constr., Inc. v. Walker, 825 So.2d 838, 843–844 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (“[T]he retention of control necessary to establish employee status is determined on a case-by-case basis. No on......
-
Brewton Area Young Men's Christian Ass'n, Inc. v. Lanier
...exclusive province of the trial court, and this court is forbidden to invade that province upon review.' " Hooker Constr., Inc. v. Walker, 825 So.2d 838, 842 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (quoting Mayfield Trucking Co. v. Napier, 724 So.2d 22, 25 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) ).Although the evidence regard......
-
Patterson v. Liz Claiborne, Inc.
...of the trial court, and this court may not substitute its own judgment as to the issue of credibility. Hooker Constr., Inc. v. Walker, 825 So.2d 838 (Ala. Civ.App.2001). If a witness does not testify truthfully, the trial court may disregard some or all of the witness's testimony. Clemons v......
-
Fort James Operating Co. v. Thompson
...not supported by proof in the record. See Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Adderhold, 852 So.2d 784 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002); Hooker Constr., Inc. v. Walker, 825 So.2d 838 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). A trial court may take judicial notice of filing fees and subpoena fees. See Bostrom Seating, 852 So.2d at 799. ......