Hooker v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 02 December 1942
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HOOKER et al. v. ALEXANDER.

29 A.2d 308

129 Conn. 433

HOOKER et al.

v. ALEXANDER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 2, 1942.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; Pickett, Judge.

Action by Joseph K. Hooker and others against Frederick J. K. Alexander for an injunction restraining the defendant from maintaining his house as a lodging or boarding house. Judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant appeals. No error.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and JENNINGS, ELLS, DICKENSON, and INGLIS, JJ.

Henry J. Goldberg, of Hartford, for appellant.

Reese H. Harris, Jr., and J. Harold Williams, both of Hartford, for appellees.

Frederick H. Waterhouse, of Hartford, amicus curiae, for Leon Henderson, Price Administrator.

JENNINGS, Judge.

The main question at issue is whether the keeping of a rooming house violates the covenant in a deed that the grantee will not erect or maintain on the premises conveyed any building except one one-family dwelling house.

The finding, corrected in one minor particular, discloses the following facts: In 1921, W. L., J. L. and P. L. Goodwin were the owners of a tract of land on Asylum Avenue in Hartford. At that time they laid it out as an exclusive and select real estate development containing twenty lots. All of these lots were sold subject to similar restrictions running for twenty years. Practically all of the present owners of these lots have joined as plaintiffs. The deed of the first lot was dated October 2, 1922, and of the last, September 17, 1925. The restriction on the first lot sold expired October 2, 1942, and that on the second lot sold on November 2, 1942.

The lot of which the plaintiff has the life use and which he now occupies was originally sold April 12, 1923, by warranty deed containing the following covenant: "As part consideration for this deed the Grantee for himself, his heirs and assigns agrees to and with the Grantors, their heirs and assigns forever, that for a period of twenty (20) years from and after the date hereof he will not erect or maintain, or permit to be erected or maintained, any building except one one-family dwelling-house, with necessary out-buildings, such dwelling-house to cost at least Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000)." The covenants as to the other lots differed only slightly in phraseology except for that on the first lot sold, which contained no provision as to cost and omitted the word "maintain." The house on the first lot was completed at the time of the first conveyance and both house and lot were sold for approximately $19,000. Since that time and before this suit was brought, the owners have expended about $15,000 in alterations, and the structure was then and since has been a one-family residence.

After the death of his wife in 1938, the defendant took in three paying guests to keep him company. They stayed six months. Thereafter, by rearranging the interior and adding bathrooms, he increased the facilities for taking roomers, advertised for them and at the time of trial had eight or more, paying in the aggregate nearly $100 a week. One suite contains housekeeping facilities and two other tenants use the house kitchen to prepare their food. In one of his applications for a permit to alter the premises, sworn to by him, the defendant described them as being occupied as a rooming house. He maintained his house as a rooming house and not as a one-family dwelling. This has reduced the value of other properties in the development and has impaired its reputation. The court visited the premises.

The court concluded that the use made by the defendant of his house was a violation of the covenant quoted; that the covenants in all the deeds were substantially uniform; that the plaintiffs were entitled to enforce them, particularly the plaintiff James L. Goodwin, one of the grantors in the deed in the defendant's chain of title containing the covenant sued on.

When, under a general development scheme, the owner of property divides it into building lots to be sold by deeds containing substantially uniform restrictions, any grantee may enforce the restrictions against any other grantee. Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 364, 143 A. 245; Whitton v. Clark, 112 Conn. 28, 35, 151 A. 305; De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 50 N.J.Eq. 329, 340, 24 A. 388; Berry, Restrictions on Real Property, § 315. The general rule of interpretation is that restrictive covenants, being in derogation of the common-law right to use land for all lawful purposes, will not be extended by implication. If their language is of doubtful meaning, it will be construed against rather than in favor of the covenant. Bassett v. Pepe, 94 Conn. 631, 637, 110 A. 56. The covenant is to be read in the light of the circumstances existing at the time it was entered into and the purposes sought to be attained thereby. Id., 94 Conn. 638, 110 A. 56; Finlay v. Swirsky, 103 Conn. 624, 634, 131 A. 420. These circumstances and purposes are set forth in the finding. The owners of this tract of land, in opening it for building, desired to have it maintained as an exclusive and high class residential development for a period of at least twenty years. It was for this reason that their grantees were forbidden to erect or maintain any buildings except one-family dwelling houses costing at least $20,000. The term one-family house is in common use in this jurisdiction. Its use differentiates this case from many of those cited in the briefs. There...