Hooker v. Tunnell Gov't Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: GJH-18-2352 |
| Citation | 447 F.Supp.3d 384 |
| Parties | Adrinne HOOKER, Plaintiff, v. TUNNELL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Richard I. Chaifetz, Richard I. Chaifetz, LLC, Columbia, MD, for Plaintiff.
Charles McNeill Elmer, Linda U. Okoukoni, Jackson Lewis P.C., Reston, VA, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Adrinne Hooker ("Plaintiff") brings this action against her former employer, Tunnell Government Services, Inc. ("Defendant"), alleging that it violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. , and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-507.2 ("MWPCL"), when it terminated her because of her inability to work due to injury and refused to allow her to apply for short-term and long-term disability benefits. ECF No. 20. After Plaintiff filed a complaint in state court, Defendant removed the action to this Court and then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF Nos. 1, 6. The Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part and granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint. ECF No. 16 at 12.1 Plaintiff has amended her complaint and Defendant has submitted a partial Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 22. Plaintiff has opposed the motion, ECF No. 24, and Defendant has replied, ECF No. 25. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. Rule 105.6. (D. Md.). For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's partial Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant hired Plaintiff as a senior quality assurance specialist in early 2014 and paid her an annual salary of approximately $100,000. ECF No. 20 ¶ 4. Defendant also offered Plaintiff fringe benefits, provided to all of Defendant's employees, including short-term and long-term disability insurance. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. These benefits were described in Defendant's employee manual. Id. ¶ 6. On March 25, 2015, Plaintiff was injured in a car accident and suffered injuries to her neck and back. Id. ¶ 5. She experienced serious and continuing pain from these injuries and was unable to work full-time for a period of months. Id.
On June 15, 2015, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment because of her inability to perform work on a full-time basis. Id. ¶ 7. At or about that time, Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to apply for both short-term and long-term disability benefits. Id. Defendant denied her request. Id. Following her termination, Plaintiff was unemployed and unable to find comparably compensated work for more than one year. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff claims that she lost more than $100,000 in income as a result of the denial of disability coverage. Id. ¶ 9.
On June 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland alleging that Defendant's refusal to allow her to apply for short-term and long-term disability coverage was an unlawful denial of compensation under the MWPCL and a breach of her employment contract. ECF No. 1-2 at 10–14.3 On July 31, 2018, Defendant filed a timely Notice of Removal of the action to this Court, relying on federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. Defendant asserted that Plaintiff's claims relating to long-term disability benefits raised federal questions because they were completely preempted by ERISA. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 6. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand arguing that the long-term disability plan described in plan documents Defendant had submitted was not in effect when Plaintiff was injured. ECF No. 7 at 4. Defendant filed a motion for leave to amend its notice of removal and provided additional materials showing that the plan had been in effect since 2001, though it had been funded through different policies between that time and the time of Plaintiff's injury. ECF No. 10-1 at 4–6.
In a Memorandum Opinion issued on February 14, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, granted Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint, and granted Defendant's motion for leave to amend the notice of removal. ECF No. 16 at 12. The Court held that Plaintiff's claims for access to long-term disability benefits were completely preempted by ERISA, which granted the Court federal question jurisdiction over those claims and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state claims. Id. at 7. The Court then applied the rule that preempted state law claims falling within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision should be treated as federal claims under § 502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, rather than dismissed. Id. at 8–9 (citing Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. , 292 F.3d 181, 187 (4th Cir. 2002) ).
The Court observed that Plaintiff's claim naturally converted to a claim under § 510 of ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1140, which prohibits discharging an employee to interfere with the employee's exercise or attainment of rights under an ERISA-governed plan. Id. at 9. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that Defendant discharged her to interfere with her right to apply for long-term disability benefits under the operative plan. Id. Accordingly, the Court declared that Plaintiff's MWPCL and breach of contract claims for long-term disability benefits would be treated as a federal claim under §§ 502 and 510 of ERISA and that Plaintiff would be granted leave to amend the Complaint. Id. at 10. The Court also found that Plaintiff had stated claims that she was improperly denied short-term disability benefits in violation of the MWPCL and in breach of her contract, but that she had failed to adequately allege nonpayment of sick leave. Id. at 10–11.
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 11, 2019. ECF No. 20. The Amended Complaint asserts four counts. Count I alleges that Defendant violated the MWPCL by denying Plaintiff "short-term disability insurance," which Plaintiff alleges she requested on the day she was terminated, June 15, 2015. ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 13–15. Count II, asserted pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132, states that Defendant breached its duties as plan administrator and its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff under its long-term disability plan by denying her "request" to "be allowed to apply for long-term disability payments" and by "fail[ing] to provide to Plaintiff the necessary forms to apply for said benefit." Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Count III, which cites 29 U.S.C. § 1140, makes the same factual allegations as Count II and asserts that Defendant "unlawfully interfered with Plaintiff's efforts to obtain" long-term disability benefits "[b]y failing to provide Plaintiff with the necessary benefit application forms and to otherwise assist her in applying for said benefits." Id. ¶¶ 33–34. Count IV, repeating the same facts, alleges that Defendant violated 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) "[b]y failing to provide Plaintiff with the necessary benefit application forms and to otherwise assist her in applying for said benefits." Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
Though the language varies somewhat between the counts, each count repeats the allegation that "[o]n June 15, 2015, Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment due to her temporary inability to perform her work on a full-time basis as a result of an automobile accident." Id. ¶¶ 13, 22, 31, 39. The three ERISA counts each then assert that "[a]t that time, Plaintiff requested that she be allowed to apply for long-term disability payments," but that "[a]cting as plan administrator and fiduciary, this request was denied by Defendant, and Defendant failed to provide to Plaintiff with [sic] the necessary forms to apply for said benefit." Id. ¶¶ 23, 32, 40. For Count I, Plaintiff alleges that she lost more than $20,000 in income and seeks treble damages. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. For Counts II and III, Plaintiff asserts that she lost more than $100,000 in income as a result of Defendant's ERISA violations and seeks that amount. Id. ¶¶ 26, 34. For Count IV, Plaintiff seeks statutory penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) of $100 per day from the date of refusal to provide application forms, totaling $136,300. Id. ¶ 42.
Defendant filed a partial answer to the Amended Complaint on March 29, 2019, responding to the allegations in Count I. ECF No. 23. Defendant also filed the pending Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 22. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on April 8, 2019, ECF No. 24, and Defendant filed a Reply on April 22, 2019, ECF No. 25.
To state a claim that survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). The "mere recital of elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, is not sufficient to survive a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)." Walters v. McMahen , 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012). To determine whether a claim has crossed "the line from conceivable to plausible," the Court must employ a "context-specific" inquiry, drawing on the court's "experience and common sense." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679–80, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The Court accepts "all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in weighing the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. , 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. at 253 (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro , 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) ). "[B]ut [the Court] need not accept the...
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