Hooks v. Saltgrass Ark., Inc.

Decision Date07 July 2022
Docket Number4:21-cv-00841-KGB
PartiesSHAYLA HOOKS, an Arkansas citizen, and TYRONE JACKSON, an Arkansas citizen PLAINTIFFS v. SALTGRASS ARKANSAS, INC., d/b/a Saltgrass Steakhouse DEFENDANT
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
ORDER

Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge

Before the Court are several pending motions filed by defendant Saltgrass Arkansas, Inc. d/b/a Saltgrass Steakhouse (Saltgrass) and by plaintiffs Shayla Hooks and Tyrone Jackson (Dkt. Nos. 5, 7, 9, 14, 15). The Court conducted a status conference with counsel on July 5, 2022 (Dkt. No. 22). Having considered the filings and statements made by counsel at the status conference, the Court rules as follows:

(1) the Court grants Saltgrass' partial motion to dismiss and dismisses without prejudice Count III of plaintiffs' complaint (Dkt. No. 5);

(2) the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for extension of time to file answer to the counterclaim filed by Saltgrass and directs plaintiffs to answer or otherwise respond to the counterclaim within 10 days from the entry of this Order (Dkt. No. 7);

(3) the Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, plaintiffs' motion to strike certain paragraphs contained in the counterclaims filed by Saltgrass (Dkt. No. 9); and

(4) the Court grants the pending motions for leave to appear pro hac vice (Dkt. Nos. 14, 15).

The Court makes these rulings for the following reasons.

I. Partial Motion To Dismiss

Saltgrass filed a partial motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim of defamation (Dkt. No. 5). Plaintiffs did not respond timely to the partial motion to dismiss, but plaintiffs stated in a later filing that they “oppose[d] Saltgrass' partial motion to dismiss their Count III but waive their response.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 2 n.1). Saltgrass maintains that plaintiffs' defamation claim against Saltgrass in Count III of their current complaint is time-barred because under Arkansas law, the applicable statute of limitations is one year for slander, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-104(3), and because plaintiffs premise their defamation claim on words allegedly spoken by Abigail Herman approximately 15 months prior to the filing of plaintiffs' current complaint against Saltgrass (Dkt. No. 6, at 2-3). Saltgrass also maintains that the Arkansas savings statue does not provide relief from the applicable statute of limitations because plaintiffs sued Landry's, Inc., in their prior filing, not Saltgrass (Dkt. No. 6, at 3-4). Plaintiffs do not respond to these arguments on the merits. The Court grants Saltgrass' partial motion to dismiss plaintiffs' defamation claim as asserted in Count III of plaintiffs' complaint and dismisses without prejudice that claim (Dkt. No. 5).

II. Motion For Extension Of Time To File Answer

Plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of time to file answer to the counterclaim filed by Saltgrass (Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiffs request a two-week extension of time to file an answer to Saltgrass' counterclaim, citing as reasons that, [i]n Saltgrass' counterclaim, its counsel makes an allegation of extortion against plaintiffs and their counsel. . . [and] unfortunately, Saltgrass makes repeated reference in their counterclaim to a settlement communication which counsel for the parties agreed over a year ago would remain confidential.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 2).

Saltgrass responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 8). At the status conference on July 5, 2022, counsel for Saltgrass withdrew its opposition to the motion for extension of time to file answer to the counterclaim.

For good cause shown, the Court grants plaintiffs an extension of time to file answer to the counterclaim filed by Saltgrass (Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiffs have 10 days from the entry of this Order to answer or otherwise respond to Saltgrass' counterclaim.

III. Motion To Strike

Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike certain paragraphs contained in the counterclaim filed by Saltgrass (Dkt. No. 9). Saltgrass responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 12). For the following reasons, the Court grants, in part, and denies, in part, plaintiffs' motion to strike (Dkt. No. 9).

Plaintiffs request that this Court strike from Saltgrass' counterclaim certain allegations plaintiffs maintain “are scandalous, impertinent and immaterial” in that these allegations reveal “details of confidential settlement discussions between” the lawyers (Dkt. No. 9, ¶ 1). Plaintiffs also request that the Court strike publicly disclosed information regarding plaintiffs' residential addresses, claiming that the disclosure of such information put plaintiffs “in potential physical jeopardy” and created “needless risk of property damage.” (Id., ¶ 2). In support of their motion, plaintiffs submitted several redacted documents, offering to make available to the Court copies of the unredacted documents for the Court's review (Dkt. No. 10, Ex. 1-6). The Court obtained from plaintiffs' counsel and reviewed the unredacted versions of these exhibits. Saltgrass opposes the motion to strike (Dkt. No. 12).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides:

The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:
(1) on its own; or
(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

Because the Rule is stated in the permissive, however, it has always been understood that the district court enjoys “liberal discretion” under the Rule. Stanbury L. Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Thor Corp. v. Automatic Washer Co., 91 F.Supp. 829, 832 (S.D. Iowa 1950); F.D.I.C. v. Niblo, 821 F.Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993)). Even so, striking a party's pleadings is an extreme measure, and, as a result, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously held that motions to strike under Rule 12(f) “are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.” Id. (quoting Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1380 at 783 (1969))).

“Allegations may be stricken if they have no real bearing on the case, will likely prejudice the movant, or where they have criminal overtones.” Jameson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 871 F.Supp.2d 862, 867-68 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Matters are “immaterial” if they “have no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Fiala, 870 F.Supp. 962, 977 (E.D. Mo. 1994). Similarly, matters are “impertinent” when they “do not pertain to the issues in question.” Id. Scandalous matters are those that cast a derogatory light on someone, usually a party, and bear no relation to the controversy or prejudice the objecting party. Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

Nunes v. Lizza, 476 F.Supp.3d 824, 838 (N.D. Iowa 2020), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 12 F.4th 890 (8th Cir. 2021). Material also may be scandalous if it “states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court.” U.S. ex. Rel. K & R Ltd. P 'ship v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 456 F.Supp.2d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted), aff'd 530 F.3d 980 (D.D.C. 2008). “Even where matter in a pleading is relevant to the controversy, it nonetheless may be stricken if it is scandalous or set out in ‘needless detail.' Cabble v. Rollieson, Case No. 04-CV-9413, 2006 WL 464078, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2006) (citing Gleason v. Chain Service Rest., 300 F.Supp. 1241, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).

Saltgrass asserts counterclaims of trespass, nuisance, and tortious interference with a business expectancy against plaintiffs (Dkt. No. 3, ¶¶ 94-118). Plaintiffs seek to strike paragraphs 15 to 16, 76 to 81, and 82 to 89 of Saltgrass' counterclaims.

A. Paragraphs 15 To 16

Plaintiffs request that the Court strike paragraphs 15 to 16 of the counterclaim, which include plaintiffs' personal home addresses including street number, city, and state. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to strike the street addresses of plaintiffs but denies the motion as to the city and state where plaintiffs reside.

Saltgrass argues that allegations in paragraphs 15 to 16 “have a logical connection to the advancement of its claims” and therefore are proper under standards of Rule 8(a) and do not violate Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Saltgrass also maintains that, for purposes of identifying the parties and establishing this Court's diversity jurisdiction, Saltgrass pled the location of plaintiffs' residences (Dkt. No. 12, at 2).

Saltgrass accomplishes the only purpose it identifies to the Court by alleging the city and state of plaintiffs' residence; plaintiffs' home street addresses are not required and provide needless detail in Saltgrass' counterclaim. For good cause shown, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion to strike the street addresses of plaintiffs that appear in paragraphs 15 to 16 of Saltgrass' counterclaim.

B. Paragraphs 76 To 81

Plaintiffs also request that the Court strike paragraphs 76 to 81. In other filings, plaintiffs maintain that Saltgrass “makes an allegation[] of extortion” against plaintiffs and their counsel (Dkt. No. 7, at 2).

Saltgrass argues that allegations in paragraphs 76 to 81 of Saltgrass' counterclaims “have a logical connection to the advancement of its claims” and therefore are proper under standards of Rule 8(a) and do not violate Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These are the only paragraphs Saltgrass refers to when arguing that the challenged allegations “are plainly relevant to...

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