Hooks v. State, 45297.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 45297.,45297. |
| Citation | 176 P.3d 1081 |
| Parties | Jerry HOOKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Daniel J. Albregts, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, and Frank J. Coumou and James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County, for Respondent.
BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., MAUPIN and CHERRY, JJ.
This appeal presents the issue of whether appellant Jerry Hooks knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he exercised his right to represent himself at trial. Because the district court did not adequately canvass Hooks regarding his waiver, pursuant to Faretta v. California,1 and the record as a whole does not sufficiently establish a valid waiver, we reverse the judgment of conviction. In doing so, we clarify that a Faretta canvass conducted in justice court before a preliminary hearing will rarely be sufficient, standing alone, to establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel at trial. And although a trial judge's failure to conduct a thorough Faretta canvass does not require reversal when the record as a whole establishes a valid waiver of the right to counsel, we again urge the district courts to conduct thorough inquiries to ensure that criminal defendants understand the dangers and consequences of self-representation and to make findings regarding the validity of any waiver of the right to counsel.2
On November 13, 2003, appellant Jerry Hooks was charged, in a criminal complaint, with three counts of sale of a controlled substance. The State later amended the complaint to replace the third count of sale of a controlled substance with one count of giving away a controlled substance. The State alleged that Hooks sold cocaine to an undercover police officer on two occasions and gave the officer cocaine on another occasion.
When Hooks appeared in custody before the justice court for an arraignment on November 8, 2003, the justice court appointed the public defender to represent him. Subsequently, Hooks appeared for his preliminary hearing and informed the court that he wished to represent himself. The justice court asked Hooks a series of questions before allowing Hooks to represent himself. The justice court's inquiries related to Hooks' personal background and level of education, as well as Hooks' understanding of the potential sentence for the charges. Specifically, the following dialogue occurred during the justice court's canvass:
HOOKS: I would like a Faretta canvass, please.
You have had one, two, three, four, five felony convictions anyway so you know the system.
Do you know how to subpoena cases? HOOKS: That is a problem, your Honor. This is a problem that I need assistance with. We have—do you have a private investigator, should need be.
No, No. I'm going to have the public defender represent you.
HOOKS: You're saying I'm not qualified?
MR. HASTINGS: Judge, you probably need to have the canvass and ask him the questions.
I just asked him. I got to the point where I feel that he isn't qualified.
Do you understand you will be going against a prosecutor that has been trained in the law, that you'll get no special treatment.
Do you understand that?
HOOKS: Well, I understand that there are [sic] certain leniency given toward pro se.
HOOKS: Okay. Yes, sir:
You're going to be treated just like I treat any lawyer in here. HOOKS: Okay, your Honor.
You don't get special time at the library because you represent yourself.
[H]ow much time are you looking at if you get convicted of this?
HOOKS: Fifteen years.
How much time are you looking at? Not him, you.
HOOKS: I don't know. I don't know what the crime carries. I haven't been given anything. I haven't been given any discovery. I haven't had an opportunity.
It's not in discovery. Do you understand that the supreme court thinks its foolish for a person to represent themself?
HOOKS: Yes, sir. I do understand that. JUSTICE COURT: I think that it's foolish. As a former Public Defender, even if an attorney is accused of a crime, if he represents himself he has a fool for a client and a fool for an attorney.
Do you understand that?
HOOKS: Yes, I do understand.
You get no special treatment?
HOOKS: I do understand that.
HOOKS: And no assistance.
No, you're going to do this one on your own. Is that what you want to do? You want to do this?
HOOKS: Yes, sir. That's within the law, yes, sir.
At the conclusion of the canvass, the justice court allowed Hooks to represent himself and appointed standby counsel. Following a continuance, the justice court conducted the preliminary hearing and then bound Hooks over to the district court for trial.
In the district court, Hooks again requested that he be permitted to represent himself. At Hooks' initial appearance in district court, he and his standby counsel, Eric Goodman informed the court that Hooks was representing himself. The district court acknowledged that Hooks had a right to represent himself but cautioned Hooks to heed the advice of his standby counsel. Although the district court did not perform a Faretta canvass at that time, the district court did inquire into Hooks' education level and understanding of the charges as follows:
At that time, the district court appointed Goodman to assist Hooks with the trial.
Goodman later moved to withdraw from the case, and upon a hearing on Goodman's motion to withdraw, the district court once again indicated to Hooks the importance of standby counsel given the difficulty of selfrepresentation. The district court again asked Hooks if he wished to represent himself and informed him that, if he did, the court must conduct a Faretta canvass. Hooks responded that he had been canvassed in justice court. The district court then stated,
See, and you know what, sir, that just shows me how important the procedural components that I just discussed are. That's a whole different court, a whole different jurisdiction. He's Justice Court. We're District Court.
If you want to represent yourself, I'm asking you if that is your desire here today. Is that your desire to represent yourself?
In response, Hooks indicated that he wanted to represent himself. The district court then indicated it would conduct a Faretta canvass at the upcoming April 12, 2004, hearing.
At the hearing on April 12, 2004, the district court appointed new standby counsel for Hooks and indicated that it would allow Hooks to represent himself subject to a Faretta canvass. Standby counsel requested a one-week continuance to meet with Hooks. The district court granted the request and indicated that it would conduct the Faretta canvass at Hooks' next court appearance. The district court, however, did not conduct a Faretta canvass during any of the subsequent proceedings.
Following a one-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Hooks guilty on all three counts. The district court subsequently adjudicated Hooks as a habitual criminal and sentenced him to three concurrent prison terms of life with the possibility of parole in ten years.
Hooks now appeals from the judgment of conviction and argues that the district court's failure to conduct a thorough Faretta canvass before permitting him to represent himself at trial warrants reversal of the judgment of conviction. Although we conclude that the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal, we nonetheless conclude that reversal is warranted in this case because the record as a whole does not establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.3
Hooks argues that the district court's failure to conduct a thorough Faretta canvass violated his constitutional rights to counsel and a fair trial. The State contends that the record as a whole demonstrates that Hooks made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. In particular, the State focuses on the following: (1) the justice court's canvass before the preliminary hearing; (2) the justice court's conclusion that Hooks' waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) Hooks' acknowledgment in district court that he had been canvassed in justice court; and (4) Hooks' reassertion of his desire to represent himself at trial in the district court. We disagree with the State's assessment of the record and conclude that the record as a whole does not show that Hooks knew his rights and the potential consequences of self-representation. Therefore, Hooks did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to counsel, and he is entitled to a reversal of his judgment of conviction. Further, we conclude that a Faretta canvass before a preliminary hearing in justice court will rarely be sufficient, standing alone, to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel at trial in the district court.
As the United States Supreme Court has held in Faretta v. California, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a criminal defendant the right to self-representation.4 Because the Sixth...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Pough v. Gittere
...the risks of self-representation or otherwise making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision. See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 54, 176 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2008) ("The validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including ......
-
Smith v. Baca
...justice court informed him of his right to renew the motion. We agree with the State's argument in light of our recent decision in Hooks v. State, 124 Nev.___ [sic], 176 P.3d 1081, 1086-87 (2008) (holding that it was reversible error for a district court to fail to perform a Faretta canvass......
-
Williams v. Williams
...a criminal defendant must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel." Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 53-54, 176 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2008). A valid waiver of the right to counsel entails the district court apprising "the defendant fully of the risks of self-representati......
-
Turcios v. State
...of each case, including the defendant's background, experience, and conduct" in assessing the waiver of counsel. Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 54, 176 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2008). For a waiver to be effective, this court has held that it must be "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" made. I......