Hooks v. Wainwright, 71-144-Civ-J-S
| Decision Date | 07 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-144-Civ-J-S,71-1011-Civ-J-S.,71-144-Civ-J-S |
| Parties | Harold Raymond HOOKS, et al., Plaintiffs, Michael E. Provence, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Steven M. Goldstein, Jacksonville, Fla., Bruce Rogow, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for Timothy Charles Palmes.
Sydney H. McKenzie, III, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendant.
Richard A. Belz, Thomas A. Daniel, Gainesville, Fla., for plaintiffs-intervenors.
Charles H. Livingston, Sarasota, Fla., for plaintiffs.
David J. W. Vanderhoof, Washington, D. C., for Dept. of Justice.
Professor Leslie Harold Levinson, Nashville, Tenn., Thomas McAiley, Miami, Fla., for amicus curiae.
This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Timothy Charles Palmes for stay of his execution set for June 15, 1982, and for other emergency relief. Palmes filed the motion in his capacity as a member of the plaintiff class in the above-styled cause. Because the Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render the sought-after relief, the motion will be denied.
In 1977, Palmes was convicted of murdering James N. Stone and received a sentence of death. On March 5, 1981, the Florida Supreme Court upheld his sentence and on October 5, 1981, the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari. On May 18, 1982, Florida Governor Bob Graham signed a death warrant, directing the Superintendent of Florida State Prison to set an execution date for Palmes between June 14 and June 21, 1982. The execution has been set for June 15 at 7:00 o'clock A.M.
In filing the instant motion, Palmes, through his attorneys,1 relies upon the order and opinion entered in this cause on April 14, 1982. In that opinion, the Court held that, under the factual record developed in this cause throughout more than 11 years of litigation, any suitable plan for providing Florida's prisoners with access to the courts must incorporate the assistance of counsel, in some form. The Court found that due to the inability of most inmates to obtain physical access to an adequate law library and, more importantly, the high level of illiteracy among Florida's 21,575 prisoners, the assistance of counsel is a necessary ingredient of Florida's attempt to comply with the mandate of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), that prisoners be afforded "meaningful access" to the courts. The Court declined, however, to formulate the details of any such attorney-assistance plan, leaving that task to the parties. Moreover, the Court stayed all further proceedings in this cause, pending an opportunity for the defendant to appeal the decision. On April 20, 1982, just six days after entry of the Court's decision, the defendant filed his notice of appeal.
Palmes has interpreted the Court's decision as entitling him to appointed counsel to assist him in pursuing both state proceedings under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 and federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Accordingly, he seeks an order staying his execution indefinitely and requiring the state of Florida to provide him with competent counsel to enable him to collaterally attack his conviction and death sentence.
Accompanying his motion is a well-orchestrated array of affidavits intended to show that all efforts to secure counsel to represent him have been unsuccessful. The affidavits include veiled pleas for judicial assistance on behalf of various organizations devoted to representing defendants convicted of capital crimes. The content of these affidavits reflects a broader purpose than merely securing the assistance of counsel for Timothy Palmes. They are replete with general information as to the burgeoning number of capital cases and the inability of the organizations to obtain adequate funds to cover even the expenses of volunteer attorneys.
The motion and attached affidavits are well-intentioned but, unfortunately, misdirected. Neither this Court nor this case is the proper avenue to pursue in seeking to obtain a stay of execution or appointment of counsel on behalf of Timothy Palmes. The power to stay execution of a state court judgment is statutorily prescribed. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2251 authorizes a federal judge to stay a proceeding against any person detained pursuant to a state court judgment, but only in connection with a habeas corpus proceeding.
In Reese v. Teets, 248 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a federal court lacks the power to stay execution of a state court judgment except as an incident to its habeas corpus jurisdiction. 248 F.2d at 149. In Reese, the district court denied a state prisoner's application for writ of habeas corpus and motion for stay of execution on the ground that he had failed to exhaust his state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially granted the stay of execution for a period of 30 days, pending an opportunity for review. In its opinion, the court concluded that there was no proper habeas corpus jurisdiction due to petitioner's failure to exhaust his state remedies. Consequently, the court vacated the stay, stating:
248 F.2d at 149 (emphasis added).
Of course, the law in this circuit is that exhaustion of state remedies in a Section 2254 proceeding is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a matter of federalism and comity. Morgan v. Wainwright, 676 F.2d 476 at 477 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1982); Hopkins v. Jarvis, 648 F.2d 981, 983 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1981). Nevertheless, the principle enunciated in Reese remains applicable, that is, that federal judicial authority to stay execution of a sentence imposed in a state criminal proceeding is limited to cases in which the court's habeas corpus jurisdiction has been properly invoked. Such authority is granted by the express terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2251 and implicitly through the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2243 which provides that federal courts sitting in habeas corpus are empowered to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Bates v. Estelle, 483 F.Supp. 224, 227 (S.D.Tex. 1980).
It is particularly important during these times of growing friction and disagreement concerning the proper working relationship between the state and federal courts that federal judicial authority to interfere with execution of a state court judgment operate only through its prescribed mechanisms, i.e., habeas corpus proceedings. This is not to say that federal courts should be unduly hesitant to exercise the authority granted to them by the Constitution and by Congress to review state court criminal proceedings, but only that such authority should be exercised through the appropriate legal procedures. Habeas corpus is the channel Palmes should be following, for it is the only legal remedy that potentially offers the primary relief which he is seeking, i.e., stay of his execution.2
Even assuming, however, for the sake of argument that the instant proceeding is legally proper and that the Court has the authority to grant relief of the type requested by Palmes, the Court's decision to certify the order of April 14, 1982 for immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and the defendant's decision to take advantage of that certification by appealing from the...
To continue reading
Request your trial