Hooper v. City of Baltimore

• Decision Date: 06 January 1859
• Citation: 12 Md. 464
• Parties: JAMES HOOPER v. THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

12 Md. 464

JAMES HOOPER v. THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

January 6, 1859

A ship registered at the custom-house in, and sailing out of the port of Baltimore, owned by a bona fide and actual resident of Baltimore county, having his place of business, as a merchant, in the city, is not liable to pay taxes to the city for municipal purposes.

A vessel thus situated is not, within the meaning of the tax law of 1852, ch. 337, " permanently located elsewhere within the State " than at the domicil of the owner, but is subject to the general rule of the common law, that personal property has no locality other than that of the domicil of the owner.

By the laws of congress, the registration district of which Baltimore is the port of entry, is not confined to the limits of Baltimore city, and the fact that a vessel is registered at the custom-house in Baltimore, gives to the city no more right to tax her than to any other part of the district.

Statutes are to be construed in reference to the principles of the common law; it is not to be presumed, that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon the common law, further than the case absolutely requires, but the law rather infers, that the act did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Baltimore city.

This is an appeal from a pro-forma judgment of the court below (Lee, J.) The question presented by the statement of facts is, whether a ship duly registered in and sailing out of the port of Baltimore, owned by a bona fide and actual resident of Baltimore county, having his place of business, as a merchant, in Baltimore city, is liable to city taxation?

The cause was argued before LE GRAND, C. J., ECCLESTON, TUCK and BARTOL, J.

S T. Wallis and A. S. Ridgely for the appellant:

The act of 1812, ch. 191, exempted licensed vessels from all taxes whatsoever, and by the 60th section of the act of 1841 ch. 23, vessels paying licenses to the general government were exempted from taxation for county or city purposes, but this exemption was repealed by the act of 1845, ch. 354, sec. 2, so far as respects taxation for city purposes. By the act of 1852, ch. 337, sec. 9 which, in this respect, is similar to the previous law of 1841, ch. 23, sec. 9, it is provided, that " all property owned by residents of this State, and not permanently located elsewhere within the State, shall be assessed to the owner in the county or city where he or she may reside," and the question in this case is, whether this vessel comes within the exception of property " permanently located elsewhere within the State? " It is admitted, that the owner is a bona fide and actual resident of Baltimore county, and the general rule of law that the situs of the owner's domicil is the situs of all personal property belonging to him, undoubtedly applies unless modified or repealed by the act in question. In Story's Conflict of Laws, secs. 379 to 382, the reason, policy and universality of this general doctrine is clearly stated, and has been fully recognised by this court in Newcomer vs. Orem, 2 Md. Rep., 305, and in Chauvenet vs. The Commissioners of Anne Arundel county, 3 Md. Rep., 264, which was a case in which the rule was applied in reference to taxation. In the cases of Harvard College vs. Gore, 5 Pick., 377; Salem Iron Factory vs. Inhabitants of Danvers, 10 Mass., 520; Gray vs. Kettell, et al., 12 Mass., 162, and Amesbury Woollen & Cotton Manf. Co., vs. Inhabitants of Amesbury, 17 Mass., 462; it was held, that, as a general rule, the owner is taxable for personal property in the town in which he dwells, no matter whether such property be found in that town or any other, and that this general proposition is proved by the exception introduced into the tax laws of that State, which expressly make the owners of goods and merchandise, & c., who hire shops and stores, & c., and carry on their business in other towns than those in which they dwell, liable to be taxed for such goods in the towns where their business is negotiated. The language of their acts is, " that for such goods, & c., or other stock in trade including stock employed in manufactories, ships or vessels as are sold, used or improved in any towns, & c., other than where the owners thereof dwell, such owners shall be respectively taxed therefor in such towns, & c., and not where they dwell or have their home. " The court will perceive that the language of this exception is clear and express, and entirely different from that in our act of 1852. In the cases of The Draco, 2 Sumner, 189, and Leland, et al., vs. The Ship Medora, 2 Wood. & Minot, 115, it was held, that the rule applies to the general transfer of property, according to the laws of the State, without regard to acts of Congress.

The question then recurs, what is meant by the words " permanently located elsewhere within the State?" It is supposed on the other side, that the fact, that the vessel was registered at the custom-house in Baltimore city, gives it a permanent location there. But this can have no such effect, for according to the existing laws of Congress, it could be registered no where else, so long as the owner resides where he now does, (Acts of Congress of 1792, ch. 1, sec. 3; 1798 ch. 8, sec. 2, and 1850, ch. 27, sec. 1,) and by the act of 1799, ch. 22, sec. 10, the registration district of which Baltimore is the sole port of entry, is not confined to the limits of Baltimore city, but includes " Patapsco River, Turkey Point, Spes Utiæ Island, and all the waters and shores on the west side of Chesapeake Bay, from the mouth of Magetty river, which shall not be included in the district of Havre-de-Grace." According to these laws the registry must be in Baltimore city, though the owner resides in Baltimore county, or any part of Anne Arundel, Howard or Harford counties embraced within the limits of the registration district. The registry cannot, therefore, be said to give the vessel a " permanent location " in Baltimore city. Ships and vessels are in fact permanently located nowhere, and there is no reasonable ground for presuming, in direct opposition to the fact, that they are to be held in law as located at the port of entry where they are registered or enrolled. The very purpose and objects of commerce forbid this. Registry and enrollment are for national purposes exclusively, and are so far from implying permanent location, that vessels registered and enrolled may lawfully leave the port to which they belong without ever returning to it again. They may, in fact, if they are enrolled vessels, be permanently located in another State, and carry on commerce exclusively in its waters. They may, if registered, sail altogether from and to the ports of another State. They are therefore, more properly than almost any other sort of chattels, within the reasonable rule in regard to taxation, that personal property follows the situs of the owner. If the rule were otherwise, the result would be to exclude all the citizens of Maryland from the privilege of being interested in the commercial marine of their chief port of entry, except upon the condition of contributing to pay the municipal debts of Baltimore city. In the case of Hays vs. The Pacific Mail Steam Ship Company, 17 How., 596, it was held, that the State of California had no right to tax a vessel, temporarily in San Francisco, engaged in lawful trade, and duly registered in the city of New York, where her owners resided, and it was there said, that the situs of such a vessel was her home-port, where she belonged and where the owners were liable to be taxed for the capital invested. But the circumstances of that case are entirely different from this, and even if the situs of this vessel could be said to be her home-port where her owners resided, it would not locate her in Baltimore city, any more than in any other part of the registration district of which Baltimore is the port of entry.

Again, various provisions in the acts of 1841 and 1852, show that the legislature did not intend to embrace such property as this within the words, " permanently located elsewhere within the State." We refer to the provisions of the 12th, 13th and 63rd sections of the act of 1841, and particularly to the 16th section, which makes the stock of non-resident stockholders, in banking or other moneyed corporations situated, for the purposes of taxation, at the place at which the principal office for transacting the business of such corporation is situated. There are also similar provisions in the act of 1852. See, also, the acts of December session 1841, ch. 281, 1843, ch. 289. Again, by the 2nd section of the act of 1841, Baltimore city is divided into various assessment districts, and this vessel would be returned by the assessors of that district in which the owner resided, if he resided in the city at all, though the vessel might, in fact, be in another assessment district, and if this is admitted, as it must be under the provisions of the 12th section of the same act, it is because the situs of the owner draws to it the personal property of the owner.

H. R. Dulany and G. L. Dulany for the appellee:

It is admitted that personal property, as a general rule, must be taxed where the owner resides, but it is insisted that such property, when " permanently located elsewhere within the State," must be assessed to the party by the assessors of that place in which it is situated. This position is based upon the 9th section of the act of 1852 ch. 337, which supersedes the corresponding section in the act of 1841, ch. 23. After making it the duty of the assessors to inform themselves, by all ...