Hooper v. County of Cook

• Citation: 851 N.E.2d 663
• Decision Date: 15 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1-03-1842.,1-03-1842.
• Parties: Kenneth HOOPER, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Louise Hooper, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF COOK and Deepak Kapoor, Defendants-Appellants (Glenda Edmond-Nolla, Defendant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

851 N.E.2d 663

Kenneth HOOPER, Special Adm'r of the Estate of Louise Hooper, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The COUNTY OF COOK and Deepak Kapoor, Defendants-Appellants (Glenda Edmond-Nolla, Defendant).

No. 1-03-1842.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

May 15, 2006.

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Powers Rogers & Smith, P.C., Chicago (Larry R. Rogers and Devon C. Bruce, of counsel), for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Patrick M. Blanchard, Assistant State's Attorneys, and Marcie Thorp, Special Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for Appellee.

Presiding Justice CAHILL delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from a medical negligence action filed by plaintiff Kenneth Hooper, special administrator of the estate of his mother, Louise Hooper (Hooper), and against Cook County, Deepak Kapoor, M.D., a physician at Cook County Hospital, and Glenda Edmond-Nolla, R.N., a nurse at the hospital. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendants were negligent in failing to treat and care properly for Hooper, who committed suicide while she was a patient at the hospital. The jury found in favor of Nolla and against Dr. Kapoor and Cook County, awarding $1,212,000 to plaintiff.

Plaintiff appealed the exclusion of Nolla from the jury's negligence findings and the amount of the award but later withdrew that appeal. Defendants Cook County and Dr. Kapoor also appealed, raising a single claim: the trial court erred in its refusal to submit their special interrogatory to the jury. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial as to Dr. Kapoor and Cook County.

We are asked to decide whether the foreseeability of a hospital patient's suicide was the dispositive jury question in this medical negligence case. Defendants claim that the jury had to believe Hooper's injury was foreseeable to find that defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of her death. Defendants argue the trial court committed reversible error in denying a special interrogatory to test the jury's position on the foreseeability of Hooper's injury. The special interrogatory proposed by defendants and denied by the court was: "Prior to the death of [Louise] Hooper, was it reasonably foreseeable that she would commit suicide or act in a self-destructive manner on or before December 6, 1997? Yes ___ No ___."

The parties disagree on whether the foreseeability of Hooper's suicide was the ultimate fact on which the rights of the parties depended. See DiMarco v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill.App.3d 318, 322, 214 Ill. Dec. 959, 662 N.E.2d 525 (1996) (a special interrogatory to a jury is proper when it concerns the ultimate fact on which the rights of the parties depend). Defendants claim that unless Hooper's suicide was foreseeable, their actions cannot be deemed the proximate cause of Hooper's death. Plaintiff argues that the foreseeability of Hooper's suicide was but one of the facts that had to be determined by the jury in deciding whether defendants' actions were the proximate cause of Hooper's death.

These pertinent facts emerged at trial. Hooper was admitted to Cook County Hospital on December 2, 1997, for medical treatment unrelated to this case. At 2 a.m. on December 5, 1997, while Hooper was a patient in the intensive care unit (ICU), she developed symptoms of a form of delirium known as ICU psychosis. She became paranoid, combative and uncontrollable. Betty Shamley, a psychiatric nurse, examined Hooper and found her to have "paranoid ideation" as shown by Hooper's comments that people were trying to hurt her and invade her privacy. Shamley spoke by telephone to Dr. Kapoor, the attending psychiatrist. They developed a treatment plan that included administering the antipsychotic medication Haldol and transferring Hooper to Ward 24, a medical-surgical ward with a calmer atmosphere than the ICU. The plan called for placing Hooper on "one-to-one nursing p.r.n. for unpredictable behavior." There was testimony that "p.r.n." stands for "if necessary." An earlier order of "bed rest" was changed to "ambulatory," meaning Hooper was allowed to walk around in the ward. Dr. Kapoor did not talk to or examine Hooper.

In the evening of December 5, 1997, Hooper reported seeing green and purple lights and movement in the ceiling to a patient who shared her room. At 3:55 a.m. on December 6, 1997, Hooper was found in the bathroom by another patient. Hooper had hung herself by knotting her hospital gown. Although Hooper had a slight pulse, she was unresponsive and unconscious. She later died.

At trial, plaintiff's theory was Dr. Kapoor's failure to conduct a complete mental status examination of Hooper and his failure to order one-to-one nursing care for her caused or contributed to her injury and death. Defendants responded that a medical negligence claim cannot succeed where the defendant fails to guard against something that cannot be foreseen.

Defendants argued that because the medical experts could not identify the cause of Hooper's suicide even after her death, Hooper's suicide must have been unforeseeable. Dr. Alex John Spadoni, a physician specializing in psychiatry, testified as plaintiff's expert witness. He said that a person who was suffering from delirium or ICU psychosis would be at risk of causing harm to herself, including suicide. He opined that defendants' conduct was a contributing factor in Hooper's death. Dr. Carl Martin Wahlstrom, a forensic psychiatrist, testified as defendants' expert witness. He opined that Hooper's act of hanging herself was an intentional act, not an accident where she hurt herself because of delirium. Dr. Wahlstrom said Hooper's act involved "a substantial degree of planning." He answered "no," over plaintiff's objection, to defendants' question of whether "the suicide in this case was reasonably foreseeable."

Near the end of the trial, during the jury instruction conference outside the presence of the jury, defendants proposed a special interrogatory to the jury that was discussed by the judge and counsel for the parties:

"MR. DESIERTO [defense counsel]: Judge, we have also given counsel copies * * * [of] some special interrogatories.

First one we're proposing is[:] prior to the death of * * * Hooper was it reasonably foreseeable that she would commit suicide or act in a self-destructive manner on or before December 6th.

Judge, proximate cause is a question of fact and foreseeability is part of the proximate cause and yesterday * * * you allowed the testimony of —

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. DESIERTO: — Dr. Wahlstrom as to the foreseeability aspect of the act.

And therefore this is a question of fact that the jury has a right to consider.

MR. ROGERS, JR. [plaintiff's counsel]: Such a favorable finding on that question[,] though[,] wouldn't be inconsistent with a verdict for the plaintiff, your honor.

It has to challenge the entirety of proximate cause.

THE COURT: Anything else at this time?

MR. DESIERTO: No.

MR. ROGERS, SR. [plaintiff's counsel]: Doesn't address — the language doesn't address the suicide being unpredictable behavior.

THE COURT: All right. The Court will refuse as tendered."

Defendants' sole argument on appeal is that the trial court's refusal to tender their special interrogatory to the jury was an error that caused prejudice and denied defendants a fair trial. Defendants contend that "[i]f the jury had determined as a matter of fact that Hooper's suicide was not reasonably foreseeable, then the court would have had to enter judgment in favor of the defendants * * * because causation was not proven."

Plaintiff argues that defendants' proposed interrogatory was improper because it focused only on the foreseeability component of proximate cause while ignoring the other elements of proximate cause, including defendants' negligent care in failing to prevent a psychotic patient from engaging in impulsive, unpredictable acts.

The law governing special interrogatories appears in section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

"Unless the nature of the case requires otherwise, the jury shall render a general verdict. The jury may be required by the court, and must be required on request of any party, to find specially upon any material question or questions of fact submitted to the jury in writing. Special interrogatories shall be tendered, objected to, ruled upon and submitted to the jury as in the case of instructions. Submitting or refusing to submit a question of fact to the jury may be reviewed on appeal, as a ruling on a question of law. When the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former controls the latter and the court may enter judgment accordingly." 735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 2000).

We review a trial court's denial of a request for a special interrogatory de novo as a question of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 2004); DiMarco, 278 Ill.App.3d at 322, 214 Ill.Dec. 959, 662 N.E.2d 525.

A special interrogatory requires a jury to determine one or more specific issues of ultimate fact. Gasbarra v. St. James Hospital, 85 Ill.App.3d 32, 38, 40 Ill.Dec. 538, 406 N.E.2d 544 (1979). A special interrogatory is proper when it concerns the ultimate fact on which the rights of the parties depend. DiMarco, 278 Ill.App.3d at 322, 214 Ill.Dec. 959, 662 N.E.2d 525. A special interrogatory serves as a check on the jury's general verdict. Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill.2d 541, 555, 261 Ill.Dec. 471, 763 N.E.2d 720 (2002). "Special findings are inconsistent with a general verdict only where they are `clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the general verdict.'" Simmons, 198 Ill.2d at 555-56, 261 Ill.Dec. 471, 763 N.E.2d 720, quoting Powell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 243 Ill.App.3d 577, 581, 183 Ill.Dec. 828, 612 N.E.2d 85 (1993). "If a special interrogatory does not cover all the issues submitted to the jury and a `reasonable hypothesis' exists that allows the special finding...